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Chapter 1 The Changing Dutch Immigration 
Regime  
1.1 A new integration policy approach  
The Netherlands was a “reluctant country of immigration” for decades (WRR 
2001; Muus 2004; Engbersen 2003). Although the Netherlands has had a 
positive immigration surplus since the early 1960s, successive governments 
never acknowledged it had become an immigration country. Only in 1998 did 
the Social Democrat / Liberal Cabinet at the time officially state the 
“unmistakable fact that the Netherlands has become an immigration country” 
(Kansen krijgen, kansen nemen [Getting Chances, Taking Chances]). Although 
it was merely a statement of fact, it led to heated debates in the Dutch 
parliament, since many of the political parties opposed the idea of mass 
immigration to the Netherlands. Since 2000, opposition to further immigration 
has increased. Populist icon Pim Fortuyn, who was later assassinated, simply 
stated that “the Netherlands is full”. Public opinion polls shortly after his 
assassination in 2002 showed that a good two-thirds of the Dutch population 
felt or strongly felt that “there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands” 
(SCP 2003: 370). And for the first time in Dutch history, immigration and 
integration, played a dominant role in 2002 local and parliamentary elections. 
All winning parties advocated stricter immigration and integration efforts (cf. 
Entzinger 2004).  
Another indictor of the changing climate was the establishment of a 
Parliamentary Committee on Integration Policy in 2003. Surprisingly, the first 
conclusion of the final report of this Parliamentary Committee on Integration 
Policy (2004) was that "the integration of a large number of immigrants has 
succeeded entirely, or partly, which is a considerable achievement on the part 
of the immigrants in question and of the part of the receiving society." 
However, this rather positive conclusion was severely criticised by many 
politicians and Dutch intellectuals. Many argued that the Parliamentary 
Committee had overlooked major integration problems (unemployment, 
crime, black schools, segregated areas, the increase in informal economies, 
illegality and the rise of fundamentalist movements) that exists in the large 
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cities in the Netherlands. Others, especially scholars working in the field of 
migration studies, interpreted these results as a confirmation of their own 
analysis that the 'integration machine' in the Netherlands functions relatively 
well according to common standards used in academic research. Due to this 
change in the political climate, Dutch immigration and immigrant integration 
policies have become more restrictive and demanding.  
 The Netherlands has had a Centre/Rightist Cabinet consisting of Christian 
Democrats and Liberals since 2003. The current government is making a 
strong every effort to combine restrictive immigration policies with more of 
an emphasis on integrating the immigrants and ethnic minorities already in 
the country. The more restrictive position on immigration is clear from the 
strict Dutch policy on asylum-seekers, the less lenient conditions for family 
reunification and marital migration and the current emphasis on remigration 
to stimulate and if necessary force undocumented aliens and rejected 
asylum-seekers to return to their countries of origin. The current emphasis 
on immigrant integration is particularly clear from the new and stricter 
system of compulsory introduction programmes for new immigrants and 
members of minority groups already in the country, as proposed by the 
Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration. All these new policies and proposals 
are described in this chapter. 
 In addition to the policy changes, the current Dutch cabinet also has a 
new philosophy on immigration and immigrant integration. This new 
approach, first described in the letter Integration Policy New Style (2003), 
can be characterised as a farewell to multiculturalism as the cornerstone of 
Dutch integration policy: “In this integration policy, a great deal of emphasis 
has been traditionally put on accepting differences between minorities and 
the native Dutch population. In itself, there is nothing wrong with that, but it 
is often interpreted to mean the presence of new ethnic groups is a good 
thing and automatically enriches our society. One loses sight of the fact that 
not everything that is different is consequently also good. Having newcomers 
cultivate their own cultural identities does not necessarily bridge any gaps. 
The unity of society should be sought in what the people who take part in it 
have in common with each other, in what they share.”1 
 In the perception of the current Dutch Cabinet, integration policy should 
not stress the cultural differences between various segments of the 
population, it should focus on what they have in common. The main objective 
                                               
1  Integratiebeleid nieuwe stijl.(Integration Policy New Style). Letter from the Minister 
of Alien Affairs and Integration to the Lower Chamber of the Dutch States General 
dated 16 September 2004. 
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of Dutch integration policy is described as “shared citizenship”. According to 
the government, this means immigrants should speak Dutch,  respect the 
laws and regulations and abide by “basic Dutch norms”. These norms pertain 
to earning a living, taking care of one’s surroundings, respecting other 
people’s physical integrity and sexual preferences, and accepting the notion 
of equality between men and women. The aim of all this it to enable 
everyone “to live in freedom, autonomously design an independent life and 
take part in society.”2 
 In this introductory chapter to the 2003 Dutch SOPEMI Report, we 
describe recent Dutch policy initiatives on immigration and citizenship 
(Section 1.2), compulsory introduction programmes for immigrants (Section 
1.3), the policies on labour immigration (Section 1.4) and the asylum policy 
(Section 1.5) and return migration policies (Section 1.6). 
1.2 Immigration and citizenship 
The current Dutch State has opted for more “selective and restrictive 
immigration policies”.3 Mainly due to the perceived discrepancy between the 
ongoing influx and the integration of newcomers in Dutch society, 
immigration is viewed as problematic. As is stated in recent policy 
documents, “Due to the continual arrival of considerable groups of non-
integrated newcomers, it is impossible to see the progress immigrants and 
their children are making in integrating into Dutch society.”4  
As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the Dutch political debates 
view marital migration and family reunification as problematic. As a result of 
marital migration, new and often poorly educated immigrants are entering 
the Netherlands, where their chances on the labour market are limited. More 
generally, marital migration is often taken as evidence of the poor integration 
of immigrants in Dutch society. As long as young immigrants look to their 
countries of origin rather than the Netherlands to find prospective spouses, 
they are not well integrated in Dutch society. A number of measures to limit 
marital migration and family reunification were taken in the 2000 Aliens Act, 
focusing on the Dutch residents who want to bring in their relatives or 
spouses. They have to be above the age of 18, residents of the Netherlands 
for a certain number of years and they have to earn a certain amound of 
                                               
2  Idem. 
3  Hoofdlijnenakkoord (Agreement on the Main Lines 2003). 
4  Cabinet response, p. 13. 
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money.  They are expected to have a steady job and an income of at least 
the official minimum wage. In 2003, the following new restrictions were 
added: 
 
• the minimum age for marital migration was changed from 18 to 21 (also 
to prevent forced marriages); 
• the minimum income requirement for marital migration was increased 
from 100% to 120% of the official minimum wage; 
• the partner already living in the Netherlands has to have adequate 
housing (stipulated when marital migrants enter the country and when the 
permanent residence permit is issued); 
• marital migrants need to pass a test of knowledge of a body of 500 
common Dutch words before coming to the Netherlands. 
 
The Dutch State has also made several proposals in the field of citizenship. 
Double citizenship is no longer feasible for third-generation immigrants. 
Double citizenship is now officially impossible in the Netherlands, but there 
are many exceptions. The rationale behind the new proposal is that third-
generation immigrants should decide which nationality they want. Double 
citizenship allows too much leeway according to the Dutch cabinet.5 Another 
recent proposal is to give the document granting Dutch citizenship a more 
ceremonial aspect. The aim of both proposed measures is to strengthen the 
immigrants’ link and loyalty to Dutch society rather than stress their own 
history and background. 
1.3 Immigrant introduction programmes  
The Netherlands has had a system of compulsory introduction programmes 
for newcomers  ever since 1998. The main aim is to teach immigrants 
enough Dutch to be able to take part in Dutch society in general and the 
labour market in particular. However, the ultimate aims are more 
comprehensive, as is demonstrated by recent official statements: “The 
introduction programmes focus on the skills immigrants need if they are to be 
able to take part in Dutch society and build an independent life for 
themselves here, i.e. mastery of the language and knowledge of the society, 
particularly of the values and norms in our country. The introduction 
                                               
5  Cabinet response, p. 13. 
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programmes are the start of an integration process that ultimately leads to 
the full-fledged citizenship they share with the rest of the Dutch population.”6 
Ever since a legal basis was established for the immigrant introduction 
programmes in 1998, every newcomer in the Netherlands is obliged to take 
an introduction course. This does not however apply to EU citizens or certain 
categories of usually well-educated newcomers. An immigrant introduction 
programme starts with an individual assessment. New immigrants are called 
up for an interview with a civil servant from the municipality within four 
months after their arrival. One of the aims of the interview is to ascertain 
whether the immigrant needs to attend the programme and what the 
individual goal is to be. The main element of the programme is an 
educational course of 600 hours: 500 hours to learn Dutch and 100 hours to 
learn about Dutch society. After finishing the course, immigrants are tested 
on their command of the Dutch language. Immigrants who are living on 
national assistance benefits are expected to learn enough Dutch to either 
attend further training courses or get a job. This language command level is 
referred to as the “professional self-reliance level”. Immigrants who are not 
expected to become professionally self-reliant in the Netherlands (e.g. female 
marital migrants) are expected to learn enough Dutch to cope with daily 
encounters. This language command level is referred to as the “social self-
reliance level”. The immigrant introduction programmes also include one or 
more individual interviews in which immigrants are advised on further 
activities in Dutch society (e.g. follow-up courses, paid or voluntary jobs). 
As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the results of the immigrant 
introduction programmes have been disappointing. The following three 
bottlenecks are often noted: 7 
 
• Premature dropout. A national evaluation study of the Dutch immigrant 
introduction programme estimates the premature dropout level at 15 to 
20% . Some local evaluation studies, however, note a premature dropout 
rate of up to 30%. Although dropping out can be sanctioned by reducing 
national assistance benefits, in practice this is rarely done. There are 
several reasons for premature dropout: physical or mental heath 
problems, especially for refugees, pregnancies and care duties at home 
                                               
6  Ministry of Justice, 2005 Budget. 
7  Cf. M. Brink et al. (2002), Verscheidenheid in integratie. Evaluatie van de 
effectiviteit van de WIN. (Diversity in Integration. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of 
the Introduction Act). Final Report. Amsterdam: Regional Plan (p. 91); City of 
Rotterdam (2002), Samen leven in Rotterdam. Deltaplan inburgering: op weg naar 
actief burgerschap (Living Together in Rotterdam. Introduction Delta Plan: On the 
Way to Active Citizenship), p. 27; Blok, S.A. (2004) Bruggen bouwen. (Building 
Bridges) The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers. 
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combined with insufficient childcare facilities, and the demands of 
looking for a job, especially for men. Although the introduction 
programmes are designed to stimulate labour market participation, they 
are not very effective in this respect. Participants who leave the 
programme to take a job that barely requires any qualifications are not 
apt to improve their position and will easily become dependent again on 
national assistance benefits. 
• Disappointing achievements. Only a minority of all the participants 
(40%) who take the  test at the end of the programme reach the “social 
self-reliance level”. Immigrants who are on national assistance are 
however often expected to reach the “professional self-reliance level” 
that enables them to attend further courses and participate on the 
labour market. Only 10% of the immigrants who finish the introduction 
programme reach this level. If stimulating labour market participation is 
the main aim of the introduction programme, we can conclude that this 
goal is only achieved in a small percentage of the cases.  
• Limited differentiation in course contents. A final shortcoming of the 
immigrant introduction programmes is that they are often too attuned to 
participants with very little or no education. As a result, well-educated 
participants often do not learn much at the course. The Dutch State 
intendss to diversify the courses by terminating the current exclusive 
rights of vocational schools to give the courses. In the future, 
immigrants will be able choose whatever program they want 
(privatisation). The only requirement will be that they pass the exam 
after finishing the introduction programme. 
 
So far we have only discussed the compulsory introduction programmes for 
newcomers in the Netherlands. Since it became clear though that insufficient 
command of Dutch language also impedes the labour market participation of 
foreign-born residents already in the Netherlands, similar language courses 
have been developed for oldcomers. In the first instance, attending this 
course is not mandatory for oldcomers. Today’s authorities are however 
propagating mandatory introduction courses and exams for certain groups, 
such as national assistance recipients.  
 
In response to these shortcomings of the existing introduction programmes, 
the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration announced that a complete 
The Changing Dutch Immigration Regime 
7 
new system is to go into effect  in 2006. The main components of the new 
system can be summarised as follows: 8 
 
• There is to be a new introduction exam. Newcomers wishing to settle in 
the Netherlands and oldcomers with a poor command of Dutch will have 
to take an exam. Passing the exam will be a pre-condition for a 
permanent residence permit. 
• Marital migrants will have to start learning Dutch prior to their arrival to 
the Netherlands. Starting in 2005, passing a basic exam in Dutch will be a 
pre-condition for a visa to enter the Netherlands.  
• The introduction programmes and language courses will be privatised. 
Institutions for vocational training will lose their current exclusive rights 
to give the courses. Every newcomer can freely choose any course that 
prepares for the exam. The government will regulate the introduction 
course market by creating an approval system for course suppliers to 
provide insight into their quality.  
• Immigrants, newcomers and oldcomers alike, will also be responsible for 
their own training in a financial sense. Immigrants will have to pay for 
their own introduction  course, which will cost an estimated €6,000. 
Immigrants who cannot afford it will be able to apply for financial aid. In 
addition, they can qualify for a maximised compensation of the costs once 
they have passed the exam. Passing the exam will also have other 
financial and legal significance for immigrants. National assistance 
recipients may face financial sanctions if they do not pass the exam. 
Passing the exam will also be a pre-condition for a permanent residence 
permit.  
 
The proposed new system of immigrant introduction programmes with all its 
obligations and sanctions will be much stricter and less subject to alteration 
than the existing policies. The new immigrant introduction programme 
proposals also follow the liberal philosophy of the current Dutch Cabinet, 
stressing that immigrants are responsible for learning Dutch and getting to 
know Dutch society. As is stated in this year’s budget, “In keeping with the 
Cabinet policy that emphasises the importance of individual responsibility, no 
rules will be stipulated on how newcomers are to acquire the minimal skills.”9  
                                               
8  Cabinet response, pp. 14-15; cf. Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration, 
Contourennota herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel, (General Memorandum on 
the Revision of the Introduction System). The Hague, 2004; Ministry of Justice, 
2005 Budget. 
9  Ministry of Justice, Budget 2005 
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It is important to add that the immigrant introduction programmes are 
embedded in more general integration policies in the fields of education, 
emancipation (especially of women) and labour market participation. 
1.4 Policy on labour migration 
As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the Netherlands has a 
restrictive policy on labour migration. The government stated until recently 
that it has no official labour migration policy except for temporary migration 
to fill vacancies otherwise hard to fill. Rather than invite foreign workers to 
the Netherlands, the government prefers to reduce the economic inactivity of 
the existing Dutch labour force, especially as regards ethnic minorities.10 
However, recently the Dutch cabinet has announced that procedures for 
labour migrants coming to the Netherlands, especially knowledge migrants, 
are to be simplified and/or changed. There will be a special counter for 
foreign workers and new admission rules have been developed for highly 
qualified labour migrants. The Dutch cabinet wants to stimulate highly 
qualified labour migration to the Netherlands. Labour migrants who are able 
to earn more than 45.000 Euro for wage labour on the Dutch labour market 
are eligible for a residence permit for a maximum of five years. For labour 
migrants who are less than 30 years of age the income criterion is 32.600 
Euro. After five years these labour migrants are authorised to receive a 
permanent residence permit. Surprisingly, no educational criterion is used, 
only a simple income criterion in order to select and attract highly qualified 
migrants. These new proposals show that different categories of labour 
migrants will be treated in different ways. The Netherlands is developing a 
selective labour migration system in which a more liberal entry policy is 
pursued for certain (highly qualified) labour groups who will get 
straightforward access to permanent residence, while at the same time the 
job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled labour migrants are 
considered on a strictly temporal basis (Engbersen 2003).  
 
The recruitment of temporary foreign personnel is feasible under the Foreign 
Nationals Employment Act. The purpose of this Act is to “selectively allow the 
entry of labour migrants within the framework of labour market policy and 
                                               
10  Information: Ministry of Justice, Speerpunten (Spearheads). 
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control the employment of illegal persons” (WRR 2001: 80). However, as the 
2001 and 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Reports note, the number of temporary foreign 
workers coming to the Netherlands via the Foreign National Employment Act 
has increased considerably over the past few years. The total number of 
temporary work permits issued to foreign workers almost doubled between 
1999 and 2002 from 20,000 to 35,000. In 2003, the number of temporary 
work permits for foreign workers increased to 38.000 (see Chapter 4). Given 
this growing number of temporary foreign workers in the Netherlands, one 
can hardly refer to them as exceptional cases. In addition, many of the 
current temporary foreign workers are not knowledge migrants. In 2003, 
more than a third of the temporary work permits were issued for unskilled or 
semi-skilled work in Dutch agriculture and horticulture. Many of the 
temporary work permits were given to foreign workers from Central and 
Eastern Europe, especially Poland. 
As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the arrival of temporary 
workers from Central and Eastern Europe to do agricultural of horticultural 
work is partly the result of earlier state policy. In the past, much of the 
horticultural work was done by undocumented aliens (Burgers and Engbersen 
1999). In the Westland, a well-known Dutch horticultural region, anti-fraud 
checks showed that one in four businesses employed undocumented aliens 
(WRR 2001: 81). The organisations in the agricultural and horticultural sector 
would be in favour of more lenient regulations to make it possible to legally 
employ Polish workers for seasonal work. In response, in 2001 the Dutch 
State made an agreement with the sector organisations that made it possible 
to formally recruit Polish workers. However, since most Polish workers now 
demand normal wages, which some businesses are not prepared to pay, 
undocumented aliens, now mainly Bulgarians, are once again being recruited 
(Leerkes et al 2004). In addition, in principle the government is open to 
efforts to cope with labour market bottlenecks by means of temporary labour 
migration. To this end, the Foreign Nationals Employment Act is available as a 
regulating instrument. The government plays a role in arriving at agreements 
in sectors where there is a temporary or permanent shortage of workers, 
such as health care, horticulture and Chinese restaurants. The recent 
proposal to amend the Foreign Nationals Employment Act should provide a 
legal basis for these agreements.  
Chapter 1 
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1.5 Dutch asylum policy11 
As in other Western countries, asylum policy continues to be a thorny political 
issue in the Netherlands. Following the large influx of asylum-seekers in the 
Netherlands in the 1990s, the Dutch State adopted a new Aliens Act in 2000. 
Its primary purpose is to formulate a more restrictive and efficient asylum 
policy, e.g. by following previous European agreements on asylum policy. Two 
points in this draft European asylum policy are particularly relevant to  Dutch 
asylum policy (see WRR 2001: 63): 
 
• The principle of safe countries of origin, according to which an asylum 
request is declared unfounded if the asylum-seeker comes from a country 
considered safe by the country handling the request. “Safe” means the 
political, civil and human rights in the country are sufficiently guaranteed. 
• The principle of third countries of reception, designed to stop “asylum 
shopping”, refers to the situation where an asylum-seeker has entered a 
country via another EU or a non-EU country that is considered safe. Since 
that country is safe, the asylum-seeker should have requested asylum 
there and the receiving country is entitled to send the asylum-seeker 
back there. In Europe, these instances are referred to as Dublin cases. 
 
One main problem associated with Dutch pre-2000 asylum policy was the 
lengthy procedure. It was often years before a final decision on an asylum 
request was made, especially if asylum-seekers appealed negative decisions 
of the immigration authorities (IND) or continued the procedure in an effort 
to obtain a better status. The 2000 Aliens Act aimed to shorten the asylum 
procedures in the following three ways: 
 
a) Asylum decision within six months 
In principle, the immigration authorities issue a decision on an asylum 
request within six months. This is not a strict requirement, but one that an 
effort is made to meet. A desire for faster asylum-related decision-making is 
nothing new, but in practice it has been undoable  due to the mass influx of 
asylum-seekers to the Netherlands. The Dutch have taken numerous 
measures in recent years to limit the number of asylum-seekers and simplify 
and accelerate the asylum procedure. The first measure set up registration 
                                               
11  Our description of the current asylum policy in the Netherlands is largely based on: 
WRR, Nederland als immigratiesamenleving (The Netherlands as Immigration 
Society). The Hague: 2001 (in particular pp. 62-74) (www.wrr.nl). 
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centres, where rapid decisions were to be made on asylum requests (initially 
within 24 hours, later 48 hours). Asylum-seekers rejected at the registration 
centres would have to leave the Netherlands immediately. Secondly, criteria 
were formulated on which countries could be considered safe. A country is 
considered safe if it has signed the relevant human rights agreements and 
abides by them. The Minister of Immigration and Integration decides whether 
this is the case on the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Asylum-
seekers from countries considered safe according to the formal criteria are 
not immediately rejected. There is always an assessment of each individual 
case. A pre-condition is that asylum-seekers can make a plausible case that 
their personal safety is at risk in their home country. 
 
b) Withdrawal of objection option 
The 2000 Aliens Act eliminated the option of lodging an objection to a 
decision by the immigration authorities. Now asylum-seekers can only appeal 
to the Council of State, the highest Dutch legal body, which is required to 
make a decision within six months. In  principle the asylum-seeker can 
remain in the Netherlands pending an appeal decision, though not in the case 
of a decision on a further appeal. If the asylum appeal is rejected, the alien 
no longer has a right to be at a reception centre or use any of the other 
facilities and is to leave the Netherlands. There is no way to appeal to the 
termination of the reception facilities.  
 
c) Introduction of a single asylum status 
However, the most important change in the 2000 Aliens Act pertains to the 
different asylum statuses. Prior to the Act, the Netherlands had various 
asylum statuses with different rights and privileges depending on the grounds 
for asylum. As of 1 April 2001, every asylum-seeker whose asylum request is 
approved receives the same temporary residence permit, regardless of the 
grounds for the asylum. Each asylum-seeker who is admitted first receives a 
temporary residence permit for a maximum of three years, which can be 
converted into a permanent residence permit after three years. Uniform 
rights and facilities are attached to this single status. All asylum migrants 
who have been admitted to the Netherlands (status holders) have the same 
rights as regards employment, national assistance, family reunification, study 
and study grants, refugee passports and so forth. 
 During the asylum procedure, asylum-seekers have a right to be housed 
at a reception centre or elsewhere. However, the basic principle is that 
asylum-seekers remain outside society. Asylum-seekers only have a limited 
Chapter 1 
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right to engage in paid employment and have no access to the Dutch national 
assistance system. Instead, there are pocket money arrangements at the 
reception centres. The reason for keeping asylum-seekers outside society and 
its dominant institutions is that in the end, some of them will not be allowed 
to stay. If they are integrated into Dutch society, it would only make it harder 
for them to leave again.   
 The state has announced its intention to evaluate the new asylum 
procedures in 2005. The new procedures are known to be very successful in 
the sense that the number of asylum-seekers coming to the Netherlands fell 
dramatically in recent years. However, the justice of the asylum-related 
decisions made in the fixed procedures is still being debated. In addition to 
the new procedures for handling asylum-seekers who come to the 
Netherlands, the Dutch have made several proposals to reduce the total 
numbers of asylum-seekers. For years the Dutch have been interested in a 
common European asylum policy to prevent asylum-seekers from moving 
from one country to the next, depending on where the procedures are less 
strict. The Netherlands is planning to use its role as chairman of the 
European Union in 2005 to further develop an EU asylum policy. The Dutch 
are also interested in better reception and protection for refugees in their 
own region to reduce the need to come to the Netherlands or other European 
countries.12 
1.6 Return policies 
An important change in the 2000 Aliens Act is that rejected asylum-seekers 
can be removed from reception centres much more quickly than in the past. 
If an asylum request is rejected, the alien is given 28 days to book his return 
ticket, which is his own responsibility. The Dutch state assumes that asylum-
seekers come on their own and can leave on their own if they are not 
admitted. If asylum-seekers do not leave within 28 days and enforced return 
is not possible, if necessary they are taken by force from their homes or 
reception centres. Combined with the fact that many rejected asylum-seekers 
do not leave at all, the result of this policy is that some of them end up on 
the street. Informal social safety nets have been set up for them in many 
towns, often in conjunction with churches or other private organisations. 
                                               
12  Ministry of Justice, 2005 Budget. The same proposals were also made in last year’s 
budget, as is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report. 
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However, the Dutch State does not view these informal safety nets as 
justified and insists that rejected asylum-seekers should leave the country. 
 The current government has declared an effective return policy to be a 
“spearhead of Cabinet policy”. The issue of rejected asylum-seekers who 
came into the country under the old Aliens Act and have been in the 
Netherlands for years, often illegally, is a central aspect of the return 
migration policy.13  
For four weeks (28 days), an intensive investigation is conducted to see 
whether they can return to their country of origin, and if necessary they are 
put under supervision at a reception centre during this period. If it is 
“objectively determined” in the course of these four weeks that they can not 
return to their home country through no fault of their own, they can qualify 
for a residence permit. The Netherlands wants to stimulate the countries of 
origin to take back the rejected asylum-seekers by giving countries that 
refuse to do so less development aid.  
28 days after notifying the asylum seeker that he must leave the country, an 
inspection follows by the immigration authority on the last recorded address, 
to check if the asylum seeker departed independently. The alien is registered 
as  “administratively removed” when someone is not found at home. When 
someone is found in and enforced return is a possibility follows in principle an 
arrest and after that ‘deportation’ or ‘departure under supervision’. In the 
case of deportation the alien is taken across the border under supervision 
and if necessary transported to the country of origin. In case of departure 
under supervision the alien can leave the country by oneself, but his travel 
documents are taken in only given back at the place where the alien leaves 
the country. 
 
In 2003 the Dutch state announced it would give the illegal aliens in the 
neediest situations  residence permits if they met the following requirements: 
• Aliens who submitted their initial asylum request in the Netherlands 
before May 1998 and were still awaiting a final decision on their first 
asylum request in May 2003, including aliens awaiting a final decision on 
the prolongation, withdrawal or non-prolongation of a conditional 
residence permit in the framework of this initial asylum request 
• Aliens who have continuously resided in the Netherlands from the date of 
their first asylum request to 27 May 2003. 
                                               
13  Terugkeernota, maatregelen voor een effectievere uitvoering van het 
terugkeerbeleid (Memorandum on Return Migration, Measures for a More Effective 
Implementation of the Return Migration Policy) (TK 29 344, no. 1) 
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• A residence permit is not granted if there are negative indications such as 
delinquency or false documents.  
 
On January 23 2004, Ms. Verdonk, the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs and 
Integration decided that 2,300 people awaiting a decision on their asylum 
request for five years or longer would receive a residence permit. Many 
welfare organisations, including the Netherlands Association of Municipalities, 
the Council of Churches and alien organisations unsuccessfully propagated a 
much broader measure that would apply to more than 6,000 people. 
 
Most recent measures for a more effective implementation of the return 
migration policy are the following.14 Firstly, measures for improving border 
control with the aim to prevent illegal residence, by e.g. enlarge the 
responsibility of carriers to remove aliens who have been refused at the 
border. Secondly, measures to promote the return of failed and rejected 
asylumseekers e.g. by expanding the capacity for alien detention. The new 
return migration policy means the introduction of new reception modes for 
asylum-seekers. The new structure has the following ramifications. The 
reception locations are to be divided into two kinds of locations, orientation 
locations and return migration locations, for two different categories of 
asylum-seekers. At an orientation location, asylum-seekers are housed who 
are awaiting a decision on their asylum request. Asylum-seekers at the 
orientation locations and the existing reception centres who receive an initial 
refection from the immigration authorities are then to be transferred to 
return migration locations. These return migration locations are not to house 
any asylum-seekers who are still awaiting the initial decision on their asylum 
request. 
Another measure to encourage return is to ensure that aliens remain 
available for investigations into identity and nationality and explaining the 
possible outcome of the asylum procedure more explicitly and emphatically to 
asylum seekers. 
Thirdly there are measures to promote the return of illegal migrants by 
intensifying supervision and conduct further research into the use of 
biometrics. Other measures concern generating more support for return and 
integrating departure and return into Dutch foreign Policy.  
The Return Migration Memorandum stipulates numerous measures for a 
stricter approach to the problems related to illegal aliens within the policy on 
                                               
14  Idem. 
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aliens. In addition to this memorandum, in April 2004 the Minister of Alien 
Affairs and Integration presented the Memorandum on Illegal Aliens. In the 
policy on illegal aliens, the Cabinet focuses on four spearheads: the policy on 
aliens, premises rented to illegal aliens, the employment of illegal aliens, and 
trafficking in people. The memorandum announces a wide range of measures 
to deal with these four issues. The implementation of these measures was 
launched in 2004. These efforts are to be continued in 2005.” 
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Chapter 2 Migration to and from the 
Netherlands 
2.1 Migration to and from the Netherlands 
Main trends in migration to and from the Netherlands 
• In 2003, the number of immigrants entering the Netherlands 
dropped to 104,000. This declining trend was also evident in 2002. 
In 2000 and 2001, the total number of immigrants entering the 
Netherlands reached a record number of about 130,000 a year. 
• Since the number of emigrants leaving the Netherlands, Dutch and 
foreign nationals alike,  rose in recent years, the immigration 
surplus (immigration minus emigration) in 2003 was only about 
36,000. Three years earlier, in 2000, the immigration surplus was 
twice as large (72,000). 
• An important explanation for the declining immigration is the sharp 
fall in the number of immigrants from typical refugee countries 
such as Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
Iran, Angola, former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In 
2003, there were 13,500 fewer immigrants from these ten 
countries than in 2001. This explains more than half (53%) the 
total decline in immigration from 2001 to 2003. The declining 
immigration from these countries is the intended result of the 
stricter Dutch asylum policies in recent years. 
• In public opinion, the media, and the political debate, immigration 
is often associated with immigrants from Third World countries with 
a non-Western cultural background who find it hard to integrate 
into Dutch society. However this popular picture is only true of a 
minority of the immigrants entering the Netherlands. More than 
half (55%) of the 104,000 immigrants in 2003 are either Dutch 
nationals (including Antilleans) or immigrants from other Western 
countries such as other EU countries, the United States, Indonesia 
or Japan. Even if we exclude the immigrants from the Netherlands 
Antilles, 49% of the immigrants were still either Dutch nationals or 
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from other Western countries. The other half of the immigrant 
population in 2003 either came from Central and Eastern Europe 
(8%) or from non-Western countries (36%). 
• The largest single immigrant groups in 2003 from Western 
countries were Dutch nationals from the Netherlands Antilles (more 
than 6,000), Germans (4,800), British (4,000) and immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union (3,400). The largest single non-
Western immigrant groups in 2003 were Turks (6,400), Moroccans 
(4,400), Chinese (3,900), Surinamese (2,400) and Afghans 
(1,400). These non-Western immigrant groups consist of  
traditional guest workers or post-colonial migrants as well as 
immigrants from new countries. The fastest growing, larger 
immigrant groups since 1995 have been immigrants from China 
and the former Soviet Union. 
• Almost half (47%) of the immigrants in 2003 came to the 
Netherlands for family reasons (marriage, family reunion). In some 
groups, the percentage of immigrants to the Netherlands for family 
reasons is significantly higher. This is the case for Moroccans, Thais 
and Surinamese (around 90%), Turks (80%) and Brazilians (77%). 
Half the Argentinean immigrants also came to the Netherlands for 
family reasons, the most famous being Princess Maxima, the wife 
of Dutch crown prince Willem-Alexander. 
• About one in three immigrants to the Netherlands leave again 
within six years. The percentage of return migrants is larger among 
Western than non-Western immigrants. The percentage of return 
immigrants seems to be the lowest among immigrants coming to 
the Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons. 
2.2 Immigration to the Netherlands 
This chapter describes the migration flows to and from the 
Netherlands. What are the central trends? Who are the immigrants and 
why do they come to the Netherlands? After the Second World War, the 
Netherlands was a country of emigration. Officially encouraged by the 
Dutch government, many Dutch citizens emigrated to the United 
States, Canada or Australia. This situation only changed in the early 
1960s with the arrival of guest workers from the Mediterranean. As the 
term guest worker implies, they were only expected to stay temporarily 
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in the Netherlands and return to their home countries once they had 
done their job. This myth of migrants returning home dominated 
official Dutch thinking about immigration and immigrant integration for 
many years. Only when the guest workers brought their whole families 
to the Netherlands did it became clear that they were here to stay. This 
became even clearer in the early 1980s when major flows of post-
colonial immigrants from the Caribbean (Suriname, Netherlands 
Antilles) started to come to the Netherlands as well. 
Figure 2.1 shows the numbers of immigrants to the 
Netherlands in recent decades. The figure clearly shows that 
immigration in the 1990s, although it differed from one year to the 
next, tended to be higher than in the 1980s. In most years in the 
1980s, less than 100,000 immigrants, Dutch nationals and non-
nationals alike, entered the Netherlands. In the 1990s the number of 
immigrants entering the Netherlands was above 100,000 in most 
years, with a post-war peak in 2000-2001 with more than 130,000. 
However, in the last few years the number of immigrants has been 
declining again. We noted the drop in the number of immigrants in last 
year’s SOPEMI report. In 2003 the number of immigrants fell again to 
104,000, about 20% less than two years earlier (Figure 2.1 and Table 
2.1). If this continues in the coming years, immigration to the 
Netherlands will be back at the lower level of the 1980s. 
In the same period as the fall in the number of immigrants, 
more emigrants left the Netherlands. The total number of emigrants 
increased from 59,000 in 1999 to 68,000 in 2003. Table 2.1 makes it 
clear that this increase in emigration is mainly due to the number of 
Dutch nationals who left the country. With declining immigration and 
rising emigration, of course the immigration surplus (immigration 
minus emigration) is declining as well. In 2001 the immigration surplus 
still was about 70,000, but in 2003 it was only half that much 
(35,000). 
Chapter 2 
20 
Figure 2.1 Immigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals to the Netherlands (1980-2003) (in absolute numbers) 
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Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline 
 
Table 2.1: Immigration and Emigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals in the Netherlands (1980-2003) 
 Immigration Emigration Surplus 
Year Dutch 
nationals 
Foreign 
nationals 
Total Dutch 
nationals
Foreign 
nationals
Total Dutch 
nationals 
Foreign 
nationals 
Total
1980 32,684 79,820 112,504 35,837 23,633 59,470 -3153 56,187 53,034
1981 29,767 50,416 80,183 38,216 24,979 63,195 -8449 25,437 16,988
1982 29,810 40,930 70,740 39,413 28,094 67,507 -9603 12,836 3233
1983 30,321 36,441 66,762 32,810 27,974 60,784 -2489 8467 5978
1984 29,616 37,291 66,907 31,824 27,030 58,854 -2208 10,261 8053
1985 33,196 46,166 79,362 31,009 24,206 55,215 2187 21,960 24,147
1986 34,585 52,802 87,387 31,155 23,563 54,718 3430 29,239 32,669
1987 35,080 60,855 95,935 31,139 20,872 52,011 3941 39,983 43,924
1988 32,976 58,262 91,238 34,403 21,388 55,791 -1427 36,874 35,447
1989 33,529 65,385 98,914 38,218 21,489 59,707 -4689 43,896 39,207
1990 36,086 81,264 117,350 36,749 20,595 57,344 -663 60,669 60,006
1991 35,912 84,337 120,249 35,998 21,330 57,328 -86 63,007 62,921
1992 33,904 83,022 116,926 36,101 22,733 58,834 -2197 60,289 58,092
1993 31,581 87,573 119,154 37,019 22,203 59,222 -5438 65,370 59,932
1994 30,887 68,424 99,311 39,409 22,746 62,155 -8522 45,678 37,156
1995 29,127 66,972 96,099 41,648 21,673 63,321 -12,521 45,299 32,778
1996 31,572 77,177 108,749 42,921 22,404 65,325 -11,349 54,773 43,424
1997 33,124 76,736 109,860 40,278 21,940 62,218 -7154 54,796 47,642
1998 40,706 81,701 122,407 39,175 21,266 60,441 1531 60,435 61,966
1999 40,786 78,365 119,151 38,358 20,665 59,023 2428 57,700 60,128
2000 41,467 91,383 132,850 40,474 20,727 61,201 993 70,656 71,649
2001 38,897 94,507 133,404 42,921 20,397 63,318 -4024 74,110 70,086
2002 34,631 86,619 121,250 45,571 21,157 66,728 -10,940 65,462 54,522
2003 30,948 73,566 104,514 47,015 21,870 68,885 -16,067 51,696 35,629
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline 
 
Who are the 104,000 immigrants who entered the Netherlands in 
2003? Where did they come from and why? About 30% of the 
immigrants are Dutch nationals coming or returning to the Netherlands 
(about 30,000 people in 2003, Table 2.1). The table also shows that 
the number of Dutch nationals coming or returning to the Netherlands 
was much higher at the end of the 1990s (about 40,000). Figure 2.2 
gives a more precise picture of where these Dutch nationals entering 
the Netherlands come from. 
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Figure 2.2: Immigration of Dutch Nationals (selected categories) 1995-2003 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline  
 
A relatively large percentage of immigrants with Dutch citizenship have 
come from the Dutch Caribbean islands, the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba. People from these islands have Dutch citizenship and more or 
less free access to the Netherlands. In the late 1990s more than an 
annual 10,000 Antilleans came to the Netherlands due to the poor 
economic situation there.  In 2003 the number of Antillean immigrants 
declined to about 6,000 (20% of the Dutch nationals entering the 
Netherlands and 6% of the total immigration). Of the remaining 25,000 
immigrants with Dutch citizenship, half came from other EU countries 
and the other half from other countries that remain unspecified. 
 Table 2.2 gives a more precise picture of who came to the 
Netherlands in 2003. The data in the table refer to their nationality and 
country of origin. First a distinction is drawn Dutch nationals including 
immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles and foreign nationals, whose 
country of origin is mentioned. Their country of origin is not necessarily 
their country of birth, but the country they said they came from when 
they arrived in the Netherlands. The various countries of origin are 
subdivided in Western countries (such as the EU, countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe and other Western countries) and non-Western 
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countries. With this subdivision, we are following the example set by 
Netherlands Statistics.15 
 
 
Table 2.2: Immigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin and Gender 2003 
 Male Female Total 
 in % in %  in %
Total 52,492 100.0 52,022 100.0 104,514 100.0
  
Dutch nationals 16,798 32.0 14,150 27.2 30,948 29.6
including  
 Dutch Antilles and Aruba 3,138 6.0 3,095 5.9 6,233 6.0
  
Non-Dutch nationals 35,694 68.0 37,872 72.8 73,566 70.4
  
Western Countries 16,747 31.9 18,317 35.2 35,064 33.5
including  
 14 EU countries 10,083 19.2 9,055 17.4 19,138 18.3
   
  Germany 2,311 4.4 2,523 4.8 4,834 4.6
  United Kingdom 2,354 4.5 1,631 3.1 3,985 3.8
  Belgium 835 1.6 956 1.8 1,791 1.7
  
Eastern Europe 3,240 6.2 5,316 10.2 8,556 8.2
including   
 Soviet Union (former) 1,191 2.3 2,167 4.2 3,358 3.2
 Poland 711 1.4 1,251 2.4 1,962 1.9
 Yugoslavia (former) 531 1.0 651 1.3 1,182 1.1
  
other Western countries 3,424 6.5 3,946 7.6 7,370 7.1
including   
 United States 1,395 2.7 1,395 2.7 2,790 2.7
 Indonesia 452 0.9 905 1.7 1,357 1.3
 Japan 612 1.2 566 1.1 1,178 1.1
 Australia 342 0.7 359 0.7 701 0.7
 Canada 228 0.4 303 0.6 531 0.5
  
Non-Western countries 18,684 35.6 19,347 37.2 38,031 36.4
including   
 Turkey 3,730 7.1 2,659 5.1 6,389 6.1
  
 Morocco 2,000 3.8 2,392 4.6 4,392 4.2
 Angola 657 1.3 431 0.8 1,088 1.0
 South Africa 263 0.5 424 0.8 687 0.7
 Egypt 339 0.6 244 0.5 583 0.6
 Sierra Leone 417 0.8 159 0.3 576 0.6
  
 Suriname 1,024 2.0 1,393 2.7 2,417 2.3
 Brazil 219 0.4 514 1.0 733 0.7
  
 China 1,585 3.0 2,330 4.5 3,915 3.7
 Afghanistan 754 1.4 653 1.3 1,407 1.3
 Iraq 567 1.1 470 0.9 1,037 1.0
 Thailand 174 0.3 772 1.5 946 0.9
 Iran 387 0.7 476 0.9 863 0.8
 Philippines 141 0.3 428 0.8 569 0.5
 India 326 0.6 236 0.5 562 0.5
 Vietnam 200 0.4 325 0.6 525 0.5
 Pakistan 230 0.4 274 0.5 504 0.5
  
Centre for asylum-seekers 263 0.5 208 0.4 471 0.5
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
                                               
15  Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between Western and non-Western 
countries. Western countries are all European countries including Central 
and Eastern Europe except Turkey, North American countries, some Asian 
countries (Japan and Indonesia) and the countries in Oceania (Australia, 
New Zealand). Turkey and all the countries in Latin and South America, 
Africa and Asia are considered non-Western. 
Migration to and from the Netherlands 
23 
In our opinion, these figures put the current concern about immigration 
in Dutch society into the proper perspective. The Dutch public opinion, 
the media and the political debates often associate immigration with 
people from the Third World countries with a non-Western cultural 
background who find it hard to integrate into Dutch society. However, 
as Table 2.3 makes very clear, this popular picture of immigration is 
only true of a minority of the immigrants entering the Netherlands. Of 
the 104,000 immigrants in 2003, almost 31,000 were Dutch nationals 
(including Antilleans), 19,000 came from other EU countries and 7,400 
came from other Western countries such as the United States, 
Indonesia (a former Dutch colony) or Japan. Together, these Western 
immigrants account for 55% of the total immigrant population of 2003. 
Even if we exclude the immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles, about 
half (49%) of the immigrants were still either Dutch nationals or from 
other Western countries. 
 The other half of the 2003 immigrants can roughly be divided into 
two subcategories: those from Central and Eastern Europe and those 
from non-Western countries. In recent decades, one dominant trend 
within Europe has been the growing migration from east to west. In 
2003 more than 8,000 non-Dutch immigrants (8% of the total 
immigrant population) arrived from Central and Eastern Europe. In the 
1990s the largest immigrant group from Central and Eastern Europe 
was from the former Yugoslavia, fleeing the war. The peak in 
immigration from former Yugoslavia to the Netherlands was in 1993 
when 8,912 (Muus 1993) people  from various post-Yugoslav republics 
entered the Netherlands. In 2003, however, only 1,200 non-Dutch 
immigrants from former Yugoslavia arrived in the Netherlands. Almost 
3,400 non-Dutch immigrants came from the former Soviet Union, 3% 
of the total immigrant population of 2003. As is the case with other 
Eastern European countries, more female than male immigrants came 
to the Netherlands from the former Soviet Union. 
 Lastly, 38,000 immigrants (a little more than a third of the total 
immigrant population of 2003) came from non-Western countries. The 
five largest single immigrant groups among them in 2003 were Turks 
(6,389), Moroccans (4,392), Chinese (3,915), Surinamese (2,417) and 
Afghans (1,407). It is interesting to note that the more or less 
traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans and 
Surinamese) still constitute a large percentage of the non-Western 
immigrants, although relatively new immigrant groups in the 
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Netherlands such as the Chinese and Afghans are relatively large as 
well. The same is true of the almost 3,400 immigrants from the former 
Soviet Union who came to the Netherlands in 2003. Many people in the 
new immigrant groups came to the Netherlands as asylum-seekers. 
The arrival of new immigrant groups to the Netherlands, in addition to 
the more or less traditional immigrant groups, can be interpreted as a 
sign of the growing differentiation in the flow of immigrants to the 
Netherlands. Figure 2.3 shows this trend in a historical perspective. 
 
Figure 2.3: Migration Surplus of Non-Dutch Immigrants by Country of Origin, 1980-2003 
Source: Statistics Netherlands  
 
In the early 1980s, more than two thirds of the non-Dutch immigrants 
to the Netherlands came from just three countries, Turkey, Morocco 
and Suriname. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the percentage of these 
three immigrant groups steadily declined to around 30% of the total 
immigrant population in 1993. After that the percentage of these more 
or less traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands remained at a 
much lower level (from 15 to 20%). The percentage of immigrants 
from other EU countries in the total immigrant population in the 
Netherlands remained rather steady at 15 to 20%. This means the 
percentage of immigrants from the other countries increased from less 
than 30% in the early 1980s to 70% or more in the late 1990s. All the 
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figures show an increasing heterogeneity of the immigrant population 
in the Netherlands. 
 What have been the fastest growing immigrant groups in the 
Netherlands over the past decade? Table 2.3 shows the pattern in the 
number of immigrants from selected countries from 1995 to 2002. 
Here immigrants are defined as foreign-born if they were born outside 
the Netherlands, regardless of their nationality. The countries of origin 
are again divided into Western and non-Western countries.  
 
Table 2.3: Immigration to the Netherlands by Country of Origin (1995-2003)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total 74,703 86,183 87,145 96,423 94,177 109,033 110,254 99,808 84,684
including     
Western countries 36,517 38,042 37,467 40,311 42,609 49,478 48,340 43,434 38,954
including    
EU countries 18,261 21,476 22,600 23,660 23,642 25,087 24,844 23,354 21,757
including    
 Belgium 2,087 2,461 2,809 3,036 2,882 2,718 2,609 2,459 2,364
 Germany 6,470 6,362 6,374 6,261 5,892 5,939 5,826 5,625 5,487
 United Kingdom 3,629 4,643 4,669 4,791 5,276 6,226 6,226 5,357 4,539
    
Eastern Europe 11,531 8379 6595 7440 9581 14,531 13,571 10,572 8777
including    
 Yugoslavia (former) 7,352 3,387 1,591 1,463 3910 4629 3082 1713 1240
 Soviet Union (former) 2098 2297 2061 2539 2906 5923 5965 4553 3387
 Poland 1158 1410 1430 1562 1090 1762 2067 2155 2022
    
other Western countries 6725 8187 8272 9211 9386 9860 9925 9508 8420
including    
 United States 2781 3571 3558 3920 3991 4051 3777 3811 3267
 Canada 489 679 649 681 731 770 862 702 629
 Australia 495 605 591 766 849 911 1048 1003 829
 Indonesia 757 941 949 1477 1313 1533 1674 1641 1467
 Japan 1212 1275 1221 1129 1209 1211 1240 1208 1194
    
Non-Western countries 38,160 48,048 49,671 56,112 51,568 59,555 61,914 56,374 45,730
including    
 Turkey 4803 6274 6488 5765 4917 5363 5904 6103 6579
    
 Angola 673 493 281 269 609 1161 1819 3428 1085
 Guinea 57 67 88 186 252 517 889 1021 342
 Morocco 3017 4219 4510 5079 4398 4170 4927 4849 4561
 Sierra Leone 95 185 174 214 410 768 1518 1863 578
 Sudan 211 287 571 928 785 1469 1337 783 393
 Somalia 2691 3105 1397 1087 1360 1820 1397 742 307
 South Africa 561 881 1047 1687 1307 1256 1334 1030 830
    
 Suriname 2419 3338 3229 4231 2777 3113 3134 3098 3163
 Argentina 98 108 109 126 102 147 231 283 212
 Brazil 515 688 734 766 687 745 765 819 847
    
 Afghanistan 1367 2637 3279 3449 4913 4244 4061 2410 1406
 China 1340 1324 1668 1900 1845 2636 3643 3901 3998
 Iraq 2412 4135 5544 6742 2925 4024 2807 1273 1051
 Iran 2526 2713 1581 1051 1072 1596 2068 1344 876
 India 540 607 730 874 742 666 693 607 599
 Thailand 404 549 523 660 636 862 1045 1069 1004
 Vietnam 187 214 244 290 285 388 563 706 533
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
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A comparison of data from 2003 and 1995 shows that the total number 
of foreign-born immigrants entering the Netherlands increased by 
some 10,000 from around 75,000 in 1995 to almost 85,000 in 2003, 
an increase of 13%. The total number of immigrants was much higher 
in 2000-2001. In the same period, the number of immigrants from 
other EU countries and other Western countries increased more than 
the overall average by respectively 20 and 25%. A striking feature is 
the declining immigration from Eastern Europe to the Netherlands. This 
is contrary to the expectation of growing Eastern European immigration 
due to the changed political situation in Europe in the 1990s. However, 
this declining Eastern European immigration can be explained by the 
sharp fall in immigration from the former Yugoslavia. In 1995, at the 
height of the war there, the number of immigrants from the former 
Yugoslavia (mainly refugees) reached its peak. The number of 
immigrants from former Yugoslavia fell, but the number of immigrants 
from the other Eastern European countries increased rapidly after 
1995. The number of immigrants from non-Western countries 
increased in the same period by 7,500,  an increase of 20% compared 
to 1995. 
 
Table 2.4: Countries with the Fastest Growing Numbers of Immigrants (1995-2003) 
 Increase 
since 1995 
(1995=100) 
Number of immigrants 
in 2003 
% of immigrants 
in 2003 
China 298 3,998 4.7 
Spain 184 1,737 2.1 
Poland 175 2,022 2.4 
Soviet Union (former) 161 3,387 4.0 
Morocco 151 4,561 5.4 
France 140 2,056 2.4 
Turkey 137 6,579 7.8 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 134 4,811 5.7 
Suriname 131 3,163 3.7 
United Kingdom 125 4,539 5.4 
United States 117 3,267 3.9 
Belgium 113 2,364 2.8 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (processed by RISBO) 
 
Table 2.4 summarizes Table 2.3 and shows the countries whose 
emigrants at least doubled since 1995 and that contribute a significant 
percentage of the foreign-born immigrants coming to the Netherlands 
(at least 2% of the total immigrant population). Twelve countries meet 
both criteria. China generates by far the fastest growing number of 
immigrants to the Netherlands. This is striking since China has neither 
historical colonial ties nor important contemporary economic relations 
with the Netherlands. The number of Chinese immigrants nonetheless 
almost tripled in the past decade and Chinese immigrants now account 
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for almost 5% of the l immigrants entering the Netherlands in 2003. 
Other countries with large and growing numbers of emigrants to the 
Netherlands are the former Soviet Union, Morocco, Turkey, Netherlands 
Antilles and the United Kingdom. 
 Table 2.3 also makes it possible to examine more carefully the 
declining number of immigrants since 2001. From 2003 to 2001 the 
total number of immigrants entering the Netherlands fell by almost 
26,000. This drop in the total number of immigrants can be largely 
explained by the declining number of immigrants from what are 
considered typical refugee countries, i.e. Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Iran, Angola, former Yugoslavia, and the 
former Soviet Union. In 2003, the total number of immigrants from 
these ten countries was 13,500 less than in 2001. This explains more 
than half (53%) of the total decline in immigration from 2001 to 2003. 
This leads to the assumption that the drop in immigration in the past 
two years is largely due to the declining number of refugees and 
asylum-seekers coming to the Netherlands, which in turn can be 
explained by the stricter asylum policies of recent years. 
2.2.1 Migration motives 
Another important aspect of immigration statistics pertains to why 
immigrants come to the Netherlands. When immigrants enter the 
country they are asked why they want to live in the Netherlands. This 
information is registered at the Central Register of Aliens of the Dutch 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service. Statistics Netherlands 
publishes these data every year. Figure 2.4 gives an initial overview of 
the immigration motives of Non-Dutch immigrants since the mid 
1990s. 
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Figure 2.4: Migration Motives of Foreign Nationals, 1995-2003  
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
Our assumption that the declining number of immigrants since 2001 
can be largely explained  by the decreasing number of asylum-seekers 
is confirmed by Figure 2.4. In 2000 and 2001 around 25,000 
immigrants said they had come to the Netherlands to receive asylum, 
but in 2003 the number of asylum-seekers dropped to only about 
9000. Chapter 5 of this report examines developments in the field of 
asylum migration in greater detail. It is also evident that the number of 
immigrants coming to the Netherlands to find employment is declining 
again. In the second half of the 1990s, when the Netherlands was 
experiencing a period of economic growth and increasing shortages on 
the labour market, the number of immigrants coming to the 
Netherlands to find jobs increased from 10,000 in 1995 to almost 
20,000 in 2001. In 2003, however, the number of immigrants coming 
to the Netherlands to find jobs fell again to almost 17,000. Chapter 4 
of this report examines labour migration to the Netherlands in greater 
detail. By far the most immigrants come to the Netherlands for family 
reasons such as marriage or family reunification. The number of 
immigrants coming to the Netherlands for family reasons steadily rose 
from 29,000 in 1995 to 34,000 in 2003. Almost half (47%) the 
immigrants in 2003 came to the Netherlands for family reasons. 
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Table 2.5: Immigration of Foreign Nationals for Family Reasons by Country of Birth, 2003 
Family
reunification
Family
members
Marital
migration Total
Percentage
male
Percentage 
female
Total 11,372 2325 20,654 34,351 36.9 63.1
including 
 
Western countries 4,925 1,758 5,506 12,189 31.6 68.4
including 
EU countries 3,135 1,010 687 4,832 40.8 59.2
including 
 The Netherlands 638 259 39 936 52.2 47.8
 Germany 643 157 260 1060 37.5 62.5
 United Kingdom 647 219 86 952 35.3 64.7
 Belgium 273 61 65 399 40.1 59.9
 France 211 84 61 356 37.1 62.9
 Portugal 207 60 16 283 45.2 54.8
 
Eastern Europe (1) 1,094 161 2,908 4,163 22.6 77.4
including 
 Soviet Union (former) 511 44 972 1,527 21.0 79.0
 Poland 260 64 662 986 21.3 78.7
 Yugoslavia (former) 171 21 500 692 33.8 66.2
 Romania 65 10 328 403 21.1 78.9
 Bulgaria 45 6 190 241 20.3 79.7
 
other Western countries 696 587 1,911 3,194 29.3 70.7
including 
 United States 285 277 657 1,219 35.2 64.8
 Japan 85 178 325 588 21.4 78.6
 Indonesia 112 16 563 691 17.7 82.3
 Australia 56 43 125 224 39.3 60.7
 
Non-Western countries 6443 566 15,151 22,160 39.8 60.2
including 
 Turkey 1,120 56 3,881 5,057 51.5 48.5
 Morocco 1,196 20 2,929 4,145 44.4 55.6
 Ghana 69 , 282 351 42.7 57.3
 South Africa 58 36 157 251 37.5 62.5
 Suriname 724 12 1,373 2,109 41.4 58.6
 Brazil 162 29 419 610 22.6 77.4
 Colombia 142 6 197 345 28.4 71.6
 Afghanistan 584 3 322 909 36.3 63.7
 Thailand 207 11 640 858 15.0 85.0
 China 187 11 493 691 31.3 68.7
 Iraq 249 3 178 430 27.9 72.1
 Philippines 90 6 270 366 19.7 80.3
 Iran 116 16 195 327 25.7 74.3
 India 43 23 210 276 28.6 71.4
 Vietnam 49 2 172 223 17.9 82.1
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
1) Albania, not included (missing data) 
 
Table 2.5 distinguishes various family-related migration motives. 
Marital or family formation migration means an immigrant comes to 
the Netherlands to marry or live with someone already living in the 
Netherlands. Family reunification means a family already existed before 
the migration and one or more family members (spouse, children) are 
joining the immigrant who came to the Netherlands earlier. In 2002 
more than 34,000 migrants came to the Netherlands for family 
reasons. The majority of this group (20,000 or 60% of the family-
related immigration) can be categorized as marital migrants, in other 
words unwed individuals who came to the Netherlands to form a family 
or a couple with someone already residing in the country. Among 
immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and non-Western 
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countries, the percentage of marital migrants is even larger, almost 
70% of the family-related migration. 
 Unfortunately, the table gives no information about the partners of 
marital migrants who already live in the Netherlands. This means we 
do not know whether they are native Dutch with a foreign bride or 
groom coming to the Netherlands or first or second generation 
immigrants themselves. However, we do know from other research that 
marital migrants from the largest immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccan, 
and Surinamese) almost exclusively come to the Netherlands to form a 
family with earlier immigrants from these countries. The marital 
immigrants from the three countries jointly account for 40% of the 
marital immigrants of 2003 (more than 8000). Lastly, Table 2.5 shows 
the percentages of men and women among the migrants for family 
reasons. In general, family-related migration is a more female than 
male phenomenon. Almost two thirds of the immigrants for family 
reasons in 2003 were women. However, the two largest family-related 
immigrant groups (Turks and Moroccans) exhibit a difference. In the 
two groups, the percentage of male migrants to the Netherlands for 
family reasons is larger. In the Turkish group, men even constitute a 
small minority among the migrants to the Netherlands for family 
reasons. 
 We conclude this section with a breakdown of the data on 
immigration motives by country of birth (Table 2.6). Obviously, there 
are significant differences in the migration motives of different 
categories of the immigrant population. For immigrants from other EU 
countries, jobs are clearly the dominant reason for coming to the 
Netherlands. Family reasons are somewhat surprisingly the dominant 
immigration motive for immigrants from other Western countries, 
especially from the US (half the US immigrants to the Netherlands 
come here for family reasons). Family reasons are also the dominant 
migration motive for immigrants from Eastern Europe, although other 
reasons are also important for them. Almost half the immigrants from 
former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union (as is noted above,  the 
most important upcoming country of immigration) come here to seek 
asylum. A considerable number of immigrants from Poland come for 
employment reasons. 
 For immigrants from non-Western countries, family reasons are 
clearly the main  migration motive. Of the non-Western immigrants to 
the Netherlands in 2003, 55% came for family reasons. Of the non-
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Western immigrants, 19% came to seek asylum, 12% to study and 8% 
to find jobs. In some immigrant groups, the percentage of immigrants 
to the Netherlands for family reasons is significantly higher: around 
90% of the immigrants from Morocco, Thailand and Suriname, 80% of 
the immigrants from Turkey and 77% of the Brazilian immigrants. 
Lastly we see that slightly more than half the Argentinean immigrants 
came to the Netherlands for family reasons, the most famous one 
being Princess Maxima, since 2003 the wife of the Dutch crown prince 
Willem-Alexander. 
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Table 2.6: Immigration by Country of Birth and Motive, 2003 
 Employment Asylum Family Study other
Absolute numbers 16,621 9,272 34,351 8,773 4,549
in % 22.6 12.6 46.7 11.9 6.2
including  
  
Western countries 39.5 5.0 36.3 11.5 7.7
including  
EU countries 56.3 0.0 27.7 9.2 6.8
including  
 Belgium 50.1 0.0 26.4 6.5 17.1
 Germany 46.8 0.0 25.5 13.9 13.9
 United Kingdom 69.0 0.0 27.3 1.8 1.9
  
Eastern Europe (1) 17.5 18.2 46.0 12.2 6.2
including  
 Yugoslavia (former) 5.5 28.9 54.9 5.9 4.8
 Soviet Union (former) 8.9 33.5 42.3 9.8 5.4
 Poland 35.9 0.2 45.6 10.8 7.5
  
other Western countries 26.1 0.4 45.0 16.5 11.9
including  
 United States 32.1 0.0 50.2 12.1 5.8
 Canada 29.1 0.0 39.9 11.3 19.0
 Australia 24.3 0.0 32.7 4.4 38.0
 Indonesia 3.8 0.9 49.1 31.9 14.2
 Japan 38.2 0.0 47.6 11.2 2.9
  
  
Non-Western countries 8.4 19.0 55.4 12.2 4.9
including  
 Turkey 13.3 3.6 79.4 2.3 1.4
  
 Angola 5.8 87.0 5.2 0.3 1.4
 Guinea 6.6 80.0 13.1 0.0 1.0
 Morocco 3.2 1.2 90.8 3.2 1.5
 Sierra Leone 1.4 90.7 6.5 0.5 0.9
 Sudan 1.0 70.4 27.5 1.0 0.5
 Somalia 1.5 62.5 36.0 0.3 0.3
 South Africa 25.7 0.1 34.3 7.7 32.0
  
 Suriname 0.9 1.2 86.9 9.0 2.0
 Argentina 31.9 0.4 52.2 7.8 8.2
 Brazil 10.3 0.1 76.9 6.2 6.1
  
 Afghanistan 0.1 49.2 50.2 0.2 0.3
 China 5.6 5.0 17.6 56.7 15.0
 Iraq 0.4 63.9 34.5 0.1 1.3
 Iran 6.3 44.4 38.0 8.5 2.7
 India 35.5 0.7 40.3 16.5 6.9
 Thailand 2.0 0.0 89.8 1.8 6.2
 Vietnam 2.7 7.1 39.8 49.0 0.9
  
Source: Statistics Netherlands     
1) Albania, not included (missing data)     
2.3 Emigration from the Netherlands  
The counterpart of immigration is emigration. Earlier in this chapter, 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the emigration of Dutch nationals and 
foreign nationals since 1980. The total emigration from the Netherlands 
remained quite stable from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s and 
fluctuated between 55,000 in 1985 and 61,000 in 2000. But as we 
noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI report, the number of emigrants has 
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been growing in recent years. In 2002, almost 67,000 emigrants left 
the country and in 2003 the total number rose to almost 69,000. The 
latter figure is the largest number of emigrants in one year since 1980. 
Rising numbers of emigrants are visible among Dutch as well as foreign 
nationals, but more marked among Dutch nationals. 
 
Table 2.7: Emigration of Dutch and Non-Dutch Nationals by Country of Destination and Gender, 2003 
  Dutch non-Dutch  total
 male female total male female total male female Total
2003 25,321 21,694 47,015 11,091 10,779 21,870 36,412 32,473 68,885
in % 36.8 31.5 68.3 16.1 15.6 31.7 52.9 47.1 100.0
   
Including   
Western countries 18,513 15,451 33,964 8,574 8,564 17,138 27,087 24,015 51,102
Including   
14 EU countries 14,709 12,243 26,952 5,408 5,355 10,763 20,117 17,598 37,715
including   
Germany 4,017 2,964 6,981 1,362 1,479 2,841 5,379 4,443 9,822
Belgium 4,231 3,671 7,902 660 722 1,382 4,891 4,393 9,284
United Kingdom 2,535 2,361 4,896 1,110 1,014 2,124 3,645 3,375 7,020
France 1,195 1,072 2,267 566 540 1,106 1,761 1,612 3,373
Spain 1,326 1,015 2,341 527 479 1,006 1,853 1,494 3,347
Italy 285 303 588 370 316 686 655 619 1,274
Portugal 189 161 350 171 143 314 360 304 664
Sweden 225 146 371 129 148 277 354 294 648
Greece 99 125 224 175 83 258 274 208 482
   
Eastern Europe 525 360 885 865 900 1,765 1,390 1,260 2,650
including   
Yugoslavia (former) 134 131 265 260 223 483 394 354 748
Poland 101 57 158 211 253 464 312 310 622
Soviet Union (former) 118 67 185 154 182 336 272 249 521
   
other Western 3,279 2,848 6,127 2,301 2,309 4,610 5,580 5,157 10,737
Switzerland 384 357 741 127 119 246 511 476 987
Norway 180 135 315 63 114 177 243 249 492
   
United States 1,209 987 2,196 940 935 1,875 2,149 1,922 4,071
Canada 457 391 848 146 187 333 603 578 1,181
   
Japan 57 39 96 527 440 967 584 479 1,063
Australia 515 551 1,066 212 247 459 727 798 1,525
Indonesia 146 95 241 188 193 381 334 288 622
New Zealand 259 244 503 65 47 112 324 291 615
   
non-Western 6,808 6,243 13,051 2,517 2,215 4,732 9,325 8,458 17,783
including   
Turkey 228 253 481 407 237 644 635 490 1,125
   
South Africa 251 229 480 96 204 300 347 433 780
Morocco 199 147 346 180 127 307 379 274 653
Egypt 102 120 222 27 22 49 129 142 271
   
Neth. Antilles and Aruba 2,991 3,170 6,161 18 33 51 3,009 3,203 6,212
Suriname 453 351 804 71 81 152 524 432 956
Brazil 154 116 270 59 98 157 213 214 427
   
China 212 138 350 251 210 461 463 348 811
Thailand 176 69 245 34 93 127 210 162 372
Singapore 98 76 174 53 46 99 151 122 273
Israel 88 80 168 57 44 101 145 124 269
India 64 34 98 109 42 151 173 76 249
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
Table 2.7 shows the countries of destination for Dutch and foreign 
nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2003. Dutch nationals constitute a 
little more than two thirds of the emigrants in 2003 and foreign 
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nationals one third. For Dutch nationals, the percentage of male 
emigrants is slightly higher than of female emigrants. For foreign 
nationals, the percentage of male emigrants more or less equals the 
percentage of female emigrants. Dutch as well as foreign nationals 
predominantly emigrate to other Western countries. More than half 
(57%) the  Dutch nationals went to other EU countries, another 15% 
went to other Western countries including Central and Eastern Europe. 
Only 28% of the emigrating Dutch nationals went to non-Western 
countries, almost half of them to the Netherlands Antilles (presumably 
native Antilleans themselves). For emigrating foreign nationals, the 
figures are not very different. Almost half (49%) the emigrating foreign 
nationals went to other EU countries, and another 30% went to other 
Western countries. Only 22% of them went to non-Western countries, 
even less than among Dutch nationals. This leads to the conclusion 
that although immigrants from  non-Western countries form a 
considerable percentage of the immigrants to the Netherlands, only 
relatively few people leave for these countries. 
 Lastly, combining the Dutch and foreign nationals leaving the 
Netherlands in 2003 makes it clear that just nine countries attracted 
almost 60% of the emigrants in 2003. With the exception of the 
Netherlands Antilles, they are all Western countries: Germany, 
Belgium, the United States, France, Spain, Australia, Italy and Canada. 
Germany and Belgium are by far the most important destination for 
emigrants from the Netherlands: 28% of the Dutch and non-Dutch 
emigrants went tothese two countries. Almost 75% of the Dutch and 
non-Dutch emigrants went to other Western countries including Centeal 
and Eastern Europe, and only 26% of the emigrants leaving the 
Netherlands in 2003 went to a non-Western country. 
 The findings thus far raise a question about the significance of 
return migration. To what extent do immigrants to the Netherlands 
eventually return to their country of origin, and to what extent do they 
stay in the Netherlands? This has been examined by Statistics 
Netherlands in a cohort analysis (Alders and Nicolaas 2003).16 The 
study, the results of which are presented here in an abbreviated form, 
covers the period from 1995 to 2001. The data are taken from the 
municipal population registers [Gemeentelijk Basisadministratie (GBA)] 
                                               
16  The following is completely based on: M. Alders & H. Nicolaas, (2003) a third 
of the immigrants left within six years. In: CBS, Bevolkingstrends, first three 
months (www.cbs.nl). 
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where all the legal residents of the Netherlands are registered. In 
addition to characteristics such as age, sex and so forth, the length of 
stay is also recorded (the period they have spent in the Netherlands 
since their last arrival) is also recorded for everyone who is of foreign 
descent. This information makes it possible to distinguish between 
migrants who are here temporarily and those who are residents of the 
Netherlands on a more or less permanent basis. The most important 
result of the analysis is that most of the immigrants remain in the 
Netherlands but a significant percentage also depart again within a 
fairly short period of time. 
Table 2.8 shows the percentage of immigrants to the 
Netherlands in a certain year (a cohort) who depart again in 
subsequent years. The main conclusion of the analysis is that a little 
more than third of the immgrants who came to the Netherlands from 
1995 to 1997 left again in the subsequent four to six years. In the 
following years, the return migration figures  gradually fell. This does 
not mean immigrants who came to the Netherlands later have less of a 
tendency to depart again, it just meants they were less apt to leave in 
the period examined. It can be assumed that some of these 
immigrants will leave the Netherlands as well in the future.  In the 
whole period from 1995 to 2001, a total of more than 650,000 
migrants came to the Netherlands. Of this group almost 22% had 
departed again by 2001.  
 
Table 2.8: Emigration of Foreign-born Immigrants by Years of Residence in the Netherlands 
Settled down: Total Of which % left in : Total 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
 x 1000 %         
1995 74.8 3.1 9.5 7.4 5.4 3.5 2.8 2.4 2.6 36.8 
1996 86.2  3.6 10.2 7.9 4.7 3.5 2.9 2.8 35.6 
1997 87.0   4.0 10.5 7.5 5.0 3.5 3.5 34.0 
1998 96.5    3.8 10.1 7.1 5.0 5.0 30.9 
1999 94.3     3.7 8.5 7.1 6.2 26.4 
2000 109.1      3.4 8.5 8.2 20.0 
2001 110.3       3.4 10.3 13.7 
2002 99.9        3.8 3.8 
Source: Nicolaas et al., bevolkingstrends 2004 (2) 
 
Although the pattern for Western and non-Western migrants is similar, 
there are considerable differences in the departure percentages. For 
example, almost half the 35,000 Western immigrants who came to the 
Netherlands in 1995 left again within six years. Of the 40,000 non-
Western immigrants who came in that year, a quarter left the 
Netherlands within six years. Of the 1997 immigration cohort, almost 
half the Western immigrants left within ony four years. This means 
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Western immigrants to the Netherlands in 1997 left even more quickly 
than their predecessors. For the non-Western immigrants this 
percentage is 20%, which is comparable to the immigration cohort of 
1995.  
Figure 2.5 shows the differences in return migration between 
immigrants from Western and non-Western countries. The figure shows 
that return migration is more common among Western than non-
Western immigrants: whereas about 45% of the Western immigrants 
left the Netherlands in the years examined, this is only true of slightly 
more than 25% of the non-Western immigrants. However, there are 
significant differences between the two categories. The percentage of 
return migrants from Western countries is considerably lower than the 
overall average for immigrants from former Yugoslavia and the former 
Soviet Union. However, the percentage of return migrants is significant 
higher than the overall average for immigrants from the United 
Kingdom, the United States and expecially Japan. There are similar 
differences in the category of non-Western immigrants. Immigrants 
from Afghanistan, Morocco, Iraq, Iran and Turkey tend are less apt to 
leave the Netherlands than other non-Western immigrants. Immigrants 
from India, South Africa and the Netherlands Antilles are more apt to 
leave the Netherlands than the average non-Western immigrants. 
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of Immigrants who Arrived in 1995 and Emigrated within 6 Years 
Source: Alders and Nicolaas, Statistics Netherlands, 2003 
 
The percentage of return migrants in each immigrant group seems to 
be related to the dominant group immigration motives (cf. Table 2.5). 
Immigrants who primarily come to  the Netherlands for employment 
reasons tend to are be much more apt to return home than immigrants 
who predominantly come to the Netherlands to seek asylum of for 
family reasons. This distinction can be observed among Western as 
well as non-Western immigrants. Of the immigrants from Western 
countries, immigrants from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet 
Union predominantly came to the Netherlands to seek asylum or in 
recent years for family reasons. They have the lowest percentage of 
return migration of all the Western immigrants. Immigrants from 
countries like the United Kingdom and Japan who mainly  come to the 
Netherlands for employment reasons exhibit the highest percentages of 
return migration. (US immigrants seem to be an exception. Although 
half the US immigrants came to the Netherlands for family reasons, 
more than 70% of them leave in the next few years). There are similar 
differences among non-Western immigrants. Immigrants who mainly 
come to the Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons such as 
Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, Turks and Moroccans exhibit the smallest 
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percentages of return migration. Typical non-Western labour 
immigrants such as Indians and South Africans tend to be relatively 
quick to leave again.  
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Appendices for Chapter 2 
Net administrative corrections 
Migration figures in the Netherlands need to be corrected by the 
number of net administrative corrections, a figure that is largely 
influenced by the unreported emigration of foreigners. If the net 
administrative corrections are deducted from the registered migration 
surplus, the result is a lower corrected migration surplus. Statistics 
Netherlands [Dutch acronym: CBS] presents the registered migration 
statistics as well as the net administrative corrections. The corrected 
migration surplus (1980-2003) as stated in this appendix should be 
regarded as an unofficial figure. 
 
Table A2.1:  Development of External Migration of Dutch Nationals and Foreigners, 1980-2003 
 Dutch nationals Foreigners Total 
Year Immi- 
gration 
Emi-
gration
Surplus Immi-
gration
Emi-
gration
Surplus Immi-
gration
Emi-
gration
Surplus Net. 
Admin. 
Correct. 
Corrected 
Surplus
1980 32,684 35,837 -3,153 79,820 23,633 56,187 112,504 59,470 53,034 - 53,034
1981 29,767 38,216 -8,449 50,416 24,979 25,437 80,183 63,195 16,988 - 16,988
1982 29,810 39,413 -9,603 40,930 28,094 12,836 70,740 67,507 3,233 - 3,233
1983 30,321 32,810 -2,489 36,441 27,974 8,467 66,762 60,784 5,978 -3,647 2,331
1984 29,616 31,824 -2,208 37,291 27,030 10,261 66,907 58,854 8,053 -2,920 5,133
1985 33,196 31,009 2,187 46,166 24,206 21,960 79,362 55,215 24,147 -4,260 19,887
1986 34,585 31,155 3,430 52,802 23,563 29,239 87,387 54,718 32,669 -5,889 26,780
1987 35,080 31,139 3,941 60,855 20,872 39,983 95,935 52,011 43,924 -8,833 35,091
1988 32,976 34,403 -1,427 58,262 21,388 36,874 91,238 55,791 35,447 -8,205 27,242
1989 33,529 38,218 -4,689 65,385 21,489 43,896 98,914 59,707 39,207 -12,356 26,851
1990 36,086 36,749 -663 81,264 20,595 60,669 117,350 57,344 60,006 -11,595 48,411
1991 35,912 35,998 -86 84,337 21,330 63,007 120,249 57,328 62,921 -13,311 49,610
1992 33,904 36,101 -2,197 83,022 22,733 60,289 116,926 58,834 58,092 -14,974 43,118
1993 31,581 37,019 -5,438 87,573 22,203 65,370 119,154 59,222 59,932 -15,566 44,366
1994 30,887 39,409 -8,522 68,424 22,746 45,678 99,311 62,155 37,156 -17,073 20,083
1995 29,127 41,648 -12,521 66,972 21,673 45,299 96,099 63,321 32,778 -18,874 13,904
1996 31,572 42,921 -11,349 77,177 22,404 54,773 108,749 65,325 43,424 -26,620 16,804
1997 33,124 40,278 -7,154 76,736 21,940 54,796 109,860 62,218 47,642 -19,755 27,887
1998 40,706 39,175 1,531 81,701 21,266 60,435 122,407 60,441 61,966 -18,848 43,118
1999 40,786 38,358 2,428 78,365 20,665 57,700 119,151 59,023 60,128 -19,756 40,372
2000 41,467 40,474 993 91,383 20,727 70,656 132,850 61,201 71,649 -17,776 53,873
2001 38,897 42,921 -4,024 94,507 20,397 74,110 133,404 63,318 70,086 -19,248 50,838
2002 34,631 45,571 -10,940 86,619 21,157 65,462 121,250 66,728 54,522 -30,190 24,332
2003 30,948 47,015 -16,067 73,566 21,870 51,696 104,514 68,885 35,629 -35,946 -317
Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline 
Administrative corrections: Administrative corrections consist of inclusions in and withdrawals from the municipal population 
registers for other reasons than birth, death, migration or redefinition of municipal borders. Most of these administrative 
corrections pertain to people who have left the municipality, often to live abroad. Entries often pertain to people who reappear 
in the same or in a different municipality and are then included in the population register.  
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Chapter 3 Labour migration  
3.1 Introduction 
The desirability of labour migration is a much-discussed topic within Europe. 
Recently both the European Commission and some European governments 
have argued that labour migration in EU countries is an indispensable 
solution for existing and future tensions on the European labour markets. 
Proponents of further labour migration argue that the influx of labour 
migrants is necessary to compensate for the decreasing birth rates in most 
European countries and to restore the balance between the number of 
economically active and inactive citizens in the ageing European populations. 
 
In response to these discussions the Dutch government has stated in the 
preceding years that labour migration is not opportune in the Netherlands. 
Despite the profitable economic development and job growth in the 
Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s there is still an unacceptably 
large number of job seekers and labour market drop-outs (especially people 
in disability schemes). According to the Dutch government, large-scale labour 
migration in the Netherlands will only become an option once Dutch job 
seekers have been reintegrated in the labour market. This standpoint that 
has been confirmed by the Dutch labour unions is even more relevant now 
that the economic situation in the Netherlands has worsened and the 
unemployment figures are rising. Yet this line of reasoning has ignored the 
specific need for certain workers on the Dutch labour market. On the one 
hand there is a need for qualified and well-educated workers (nurses, 
doctors, teachers, ICT specialists, etcetera) in specific economic sectors 
(health, education, personal and commercial services, ICT). Dutch job 
seekers are often not qualified for these jobs. On the other hand there is also 
a need for low-qualified workers in specific economic sectors in which Dutch 
job seekers are often not willing to work (especially in horticulture and to a 
lesser extent in the hotel and catering industry). Illegal foreign immigrants 
often find employment in these sectors.  
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Despite the official Dutch denial of the need for labour migration, Dutch 
employers are increasingly looking for qualified employees abroad. A well-
known example of this was the arrival of nurses from the Philippines and 
South Africa. At present Dutch hospitals are trying to contract South African 
doctors on quite a large-scale. This paradox on the Dutch labour market 
(persistent economic inactivity on the one hand and labour shortages on the 
other) has also become apparent with the continual growth in the number of 
temporary work permits issued during the second half of the 1990s. Since 1 
September 1995 the employment of non-EU foreigners has been regulated 
under the Foreign Employment Act (Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen or WAV). This 
system was generally seen to be satisfactory.  
 
In reaction to national and international trends and practises in labour 
migration, the Dutch Cabinet has recently developed a programme to 
stimulate highly qualified labour migration to the Netherlands. Labour 
migrants who are able to earn more than 45.000 euro for wage labour on the 
Dutch labour market are eligible for a residence permit for a maximum of 5 
years. For labour migrants who are less than 30 years of age the income 
criterion is 32.600 euro. After, five years these labour migrants are 
authorized to receive a permanent residence permit. Surprisingly, no 
educational criterion is used, only a simple income criterion in order to select 
and attract highly qualified migrants. These new proposals show that 
different categories of labour migrants will be treated in different ways. The 
Netherlands is developing a selective labour migration system in which a 
more liberal entry policy is pursued for certain (highly qualified) labour 
groups who will get straightforward access to permanent residence, while at 
the same time the job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled 
labour migrants are considered on a strictly temporal basis (Engbersen 
2003). The raison d'être behind this differential policy is to safeguard the 
Dutch welfare state and to prevent that groups of labour migrants gain easy 
access to public provisions.  
3.2 Increase in temporary work permits 
The WAV was described in detail in the SOPEMI-Netherlands report of 1995. 
A temporary work permit on the grounds of the WAV can be seen as an 
incidental solution for mismatches on the labour market. A Dutch employer 
who is unable to find an employee in the category priority workforce can 
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apply for a special work permit (TWV) for a foreign employee. The priority 
workforce consists of employees in the European Economic Area. These 
employees are not obliged to obtain a special work permit to carry out work. 
The TWV applications are assessed by the Central Organisation for Work and 
Income (CWI), which, among other things conducts a labour market check to 
assess whether the employer concerned has made sufficient efforts to hire an 
employee from the priority workforce.  Employees who have been granted a 
work permit must apply for a residence permit for the Netherlands. In order 
to enter the Netherlands, they first require a temporary residence permit. 
This permit is granted for a maximum of three years. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the number of temporary work permits has increased 
significantly in recent years. 
 
Figure 3.1:  The number of temporary work permits and 'declarations' issued on the ground of the Dutch Foreign 
Nationals Labour Act (WAV) in the period 1990-2003 
Source: WRR 2001, unpublished data by CWI 
 
This chapter gives a more factual picture of the number of foreign temporary 
workers coming to the Netherlands. It is important to note that these figures 
only provide insight into the labour migration of employees from outside the 
European Economic Arena. According to figures of the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) in 2003 16.621 labour migrants came to the Netherlands. A 
sharp decline compared to the period 2000-2002 when approximately 19.000 
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labour migrants came to the Netherlands (see also figure 2.4, chapter 2). 
Approximately 60% of labour migrants were from Europe, most of whom 
were from other member states of the European Union. See table A3.1. 
 
From 1990 to 1997 the number of temporary work permits was fairly stable. 
In 1997 the number of temporary work permits exceeded 10,000 per year for 
the first time. In the following four years the number of temporary work 
permits tripled to reach 30,000 in 2001. In 2003 this increase in the number 
of temporary work permits continued, despite of the current economic 
recession. In 2003, a total of 38,000 temporary work permits were issued. 
Table 3.1 shows the countries of origin for labour migrants who came to the 
Netherlands with a temporary work permit. More than two-thirds of the 
temporary labour migrants came from Western countries (including Eastern 
European countries) and one-third came from non-Western countries. In 
particular, the number of temporary labour migrants from Eastern European 
countries has increased sharply over the last few years. In 1999 about 6400 
temporary workers from several Eastern European countries came to the 
Netherlands. Four years later, in 2003, their number had nearly tripled to 
more than 17.000. This means that 45 percent of all temporary labour 
migrants who came to the Netherlands in 2003, came from Eastern European 
countries, whereas in 1999 this was only 31 percent. Moreover, the number 
of temporary workers from Poland has increased sharply due to the covenant 
the Dutch government concluded with agricultural and horticultural 
organisations that made formal recruitment of Polish seasonal workers 
possible. In 2001, the highest number most labour of labour migrants still 
came from the United States. In 2003 the five countries with the highest 
number of temporary labour migrants in the Netherlands were: Poland, the 
former Soviet Union, the United States, the former Czechoslovakian Republic 
and the People’s Republic of China. Remarkable is the severe increase in 
labour migrants from Sierra Leone. 
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Table 3.1:  Number of temporary work permits (WAV) by nationality (1996-2003) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total 9173 11,062 15,181 20,816 27,678 30,153 34,558 38,036
   
Western countries - - - 11,994 16,234 17,633 20,184 22,658
of whom from   
   
Eastern Europe - - - 6437 10,047 11,653 14,867 17,203
 of whom from   
   
 Poland 735 928 1184 1501 2497 2831 6575 9510
 Soviet Union (former) - - - 2121 3572 3784 3562 2850
 Czechoslovakia (former) 174 256 282 606 1058 1673 1487 1648
 Yugoslavia (former) - - - 746 1146 1098 1016 734
 Hungary 275 349 502 662 718 1063 999 953
 Romenia 287 193 299 458 643 741 858 1097
 Bulgaria  317 387 427 326 381
   
Other Western countries - - - 5556 6186 5980 5316 5455
 of whom from   
 United States 1945 2275 2603 2822 3133 2918 2594 2564
 Canada 286 412 439 604 628 504 407 405
 Japan 949 893 871 890 945 909 1008 1204
  Indonesia 146 148 211 482 547 799 795 872
  Australia 240 263 312 444 505 515 376 324
   
Non-Western countries - - - 8695 11,229 12,245 14,044 15,378
 of whom from   
 Turkey 467 442 661 710 1007 931 1109 1276
   
 Sierra Leone - - - 31 81 222 1047 1252
 Angola - - - 31 110 268 589 757
 Sudan 7 6 70 322 488 524 569 463
 South Africa 197 223 588 479 566 646 376 402
 Guinea - - - 11 60 110 324 371
 Somalia - - - 158 273 321 241 142
 Cameroon - - - 45 92 144 222 322
  Morocco - - - 198 230 198 211 195
   
  Suriname  261 364 445 387 25
   
 China 578 489 512 701 980 1161 1743 2263
 Afghanistan 8 15 238 651 580 699 979 1016
 Iraq 12 30 964 1520 1627 1176 793 789
 India 390 519 830 901 1006 974 778 843
 Iran - - - 160 300 448 545 474
 Syria - - - 95 188 196 285 210
Source: CWI 
 
Table 3.2 shows the types of jobs for which temporary work permits were 
issued. Contrary to the popular idea that temporary work permits are 
primarily issued for better-qualified professions, the data reveal that the 
highest number of work permits is issued for work in the agricultural and 
horticultural sectors. In 2001 more than one-quarter of all temporary work 
permits were issued for agricultural and horticultural work and in 2003 this 
was more than one-third. The increase in the number of Polish temporary 
labour migrants from the year 2002 seems to be related to the growing need 
for agricultural and horticultural workers in the Netherlands. The increasing 
number of foreign agricultural and horticultural workers is striking, since the 
idea that Dutch unemployed persons can be employed in this sector is 
frequently discussed. Other lower-qualified professions that attract a 
Chapter 3 
46 
relatively large number of labour migrants are various industrial production 
jobs, chauffeurs and personnel for the hotel and catering industry. 
 
In addition to these lower-qualified professions, labour migrants are also 
attracted to certain more highly qualified jobs. A relatively large proportion of 
temporary work permits are issued for the artistic professions and scientists. 
 
Table 3.2: Number of temporary work permits(WAV) by type of profession (1999-2003) 
 Absolute in percentages 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
agriculture / horticulture 5.040 7.694 8.046 11.749 13.225 24,2 27,8 26,7 34,0 34,8
artistic professions 3.616 4.324 4.408 3.971 3.569 17,4 15,6 14,6 11,5 9,4
production work 1.132 1.996 2.828 4.127 5.316 5,4 7,2 9,4 11,9 14,0
Science 2.377 2.851 2.715 2.576 3.246 11,4 10,3 9,0 7,5 8,5
computer specialists 1.725 2.209 2.291 1.193 900 8,3 8,0 7,6 3,5 2,4
executive professions 1.525 1.889 1.972 1.712 1.677 7,3 6,8 6,5 5,0 4,4
Advisors 1.962 1.919 1.749 1.443 1.510 9,4 6,9 5,8 4,2 4,0
Drivers 898 1.088 1.358 1.396 1.285 4,3 3,9 4,5 4,0 3,4
hotel and catering industry 410 672 1.019 1.543 1.557 2,0 2,4 3,4 4,5 4,1
other services 1.311 2.032 2.192 3.240 3.485 6,3 7,3 7,3 9,4 9,2
Construction 139 278 615 294 810 0,7 1,0 2,0 0,9 2,1
health care 182 291 429 605 722 0,9 1,1 1,4 1,8 1,9
Sports 261 256 210 199 203 1,3 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,5
unskilled work 44 43 111 310 295 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,9 0,8
Mechanics 55 59 91 125 99 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,3
other professions 71 76 119 75 137 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,2 0,4
Unknown 68 1 0 0 0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
All professions 20.816 27.678 30.153 34.558 38.036 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: CWI 
 
Table 3.3: Temporary work permits(WAV) by type of profession and region 2003 (percentage) 
  Western countries Non-western countries 
 Total (N) Eastern 
Europe
Northern-
America
Japan and 
Indonesia
Oceania Turkey Africa Other 
America
Other 
Asia
agriculture / horticulture 13,225 55.0 0.5 1.8 0.3 8.9 33.8 1.8 20.6
artistic professions 3569 10.2 34.0 4.6 15.3 4.8 4.2 19.5 2.3
production work 5316 9.3 9.9 3.0 3.8 29.5 26.8 7.6 18.2
Science 3246 5.9 8.9 12.7 11.8 6.3 5.4 23.3 14.4
computer specialists 900 1.0 4.6 1.6 9.3 1.8 0.8 2.7 6.1
executive professions 1677 0.7 17.1 18.4 20.9 8.0 1.1 4.6 5.3
Advisors 1510 1.2 12.3 18.2 23.6 3.5 1.5 5.5 4.0
Drivers 1285 6.5 0.0 - 0.3 10.6 0.5 0.1 0.1
hotel and catering industry 1557 2.0 0.3 20.0 1.3 2.4 1.6 3.7 8.7
other services 3485 2.8 6.3 8.8 7.5 10.0 18.3 25.3 16.1
Construction 810 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.3 0.0 0.3
health care 722 1.1 1.5 9.6 2.3 0.6 2.5 2.1 1.5
Sports 203 0.2 3.8 0.5 2.5 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.2
unskilled work 295 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.2
Mechanics 99 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.5
other professions 137 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.3 2.4 0.3 0.6 0.5
Total  100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
(n) 38,036 17,203 2969 2076 398 1276 5627 958 7147
Source: CWI 
 
Table 3.3 shows the types of jobs in which temporary workers from different 
countries are employed. Hardly surprisingly, there are clear differences 
between temporary workers from the more developed Western countries on 
the one hand and temporary workers from Eastern Europe and developing 
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia on the other. Temporary workers 
from the developed Western countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Oceania, 
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including Australia and New Sealant) predominantly work in high-skilled jobs 
such as executive professions and advisors. American temporary workers are 
also frequently employed in the artistic professions. Temporary workers from 
Eastern European countries, in particular Poland, and from African countries 
predominantly work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. Eastern 
European and Latin American temporary workers also frequently work in the 
artistic professions. African and Asian temporary workers frequently work in 
production jobs. African, Latin American and Asian temporary workers are 
also frequently employed in the so-called 'other services' such as cleaning 
jobs. 
3.3 Dual system of labour migration 
The recent Dutch labour migration policy proposals make clear that, when it 
comes to highly skilled workers, the adage of temporariness is increasingly 
less adhered to. The reason for this is the increased competition between 
OECD countries in attracting the necessary human capital to be 
internationally competitive. The worldwide shortage in highly educated, 
technical and medical personnel stimulates migration to countries where the 
conditions for taking up residence and perspectives are the most favourable. 
An important condition is guaranteeing a quick route towards permanent 
residence (and consequently access to comprehensive social rights). Such a 
policy is, however, without risk for the welfare state because these 
immigrants perform better on European labour markets than average 
residents. An inflow of such immigrants would positively affect the public 
budget (Roodenburg et al., 2003). It is also acknowledged that highly 
educated employees are geographically very mobile. A recent Dutch study 
estimates that highly skilled immigrants from western countries and countries 
such as Japan and India will leave again within six years (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2003). 
As far as immigrants with a low or intermediate level of education are 
concerned, temporariness remains the basic principle in the Netherlands. This 
principle should enable a flexible labour market policy and prevent that 
temporary immigrants gain access to public provisions. It also prevents 
extensive forms of chain migration to follow in the wake of initial migration. 
In most West European countries employers have to look at availability within 
their own labour supply, i.e. within the national borders or within the 
European Economic Area (EEA), before they may hire (temporary) labour 
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migrants. This labour market test is applied in a permissive way due to the 
fact that in countries with substantial numbers of inactive and unemployed 
people, shortages in specific sectors still persist. Examples are the vacancies 
in nursing and other forms of care (requiring an intermediate level of 
education) and those in domestic services and agriculture and horticulture 
(requiring low and unskilled workers). These sectors give already an 
indication of the diversity of temporary labour migration, ranging from short-
term labour migration in the case of seasonal labour (for three months) to 
long-term labour migration in the health care sector (for more than two 
years). 
 
Two relevant comments need to be made with respect to labour migration (cf. 
ACVZ 2004). The first involves the problematic maintenance of temporary 
labour migration. There are several systems for encouraging migrants to 
return to their country of origin, but none of these systems actually 
guarantees this return. In actual practice, labour migrants find ways to stay 
longer or even permanently. Thus, temporary work and residence may result 
in permanent residence. Labour migrants can also lengthen their stay 
through marriage or may choose to remain illegally in a country once their 
permit has expired. Another comment is that regulated temporary labour 
migration only partially limits illegal employment at the underside of the 
labour market. This applies particularly to advanced Scandinavian and 
continental welfare states, and to a lesser extent to countries such as Spain 
and Italy. The idea that illegal labour at the underside of the labour market 
will be pushed back by regulating the recruitment of (temporary) labour 
migrants is dubious. Illegal immigrants are economically interesting for many 
employers because they are illegal and can be paid wages below the 
statutory minimum wage levels (cf. Engbersen 1999 en 2003). 
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Table A3.1: Immigration of foreign nationals by reasons of labour by country of birth 1995-2003  
  1995 1997 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total (count) 10.208 12.652 13.193 15.379 16.304 19.014 19.948 18.520 16.620
of which   
   
Western countries 84,7 84,8 84,4 83,7 84,7 85,5 83,6 82,2 79,7
of which   
EU-countries 65,7 64,6 64,2 62,2 64,1 64,4 61,3 61,7 59,0
of which   
  The Netherlands 5,6 2,2 2,1 2,0 1,7 1,3 0,7 0,4 0,4
  Germany 11,8 10,8 10,9 10,9 10,7 11,3 11,2 12,7 11,7
  United Kingdom 18,6 20,3 19,6 17,1 18,1 18,7 18,3 15,6 14,5
  Belgium 5,8 5,3 6,0 5,5 5,4 5,0 4,3 4,6 4,6
  France 4,6 5,4 5,6 6,2 6,2 5,7 5,3 5,4 5,0
  Portugal 2,1 2,1 1,9 2,1 3,1 3,6 4,2 4,5 4,7
  Italy 4,8 4,8 5,1 4,9 5,3 5,1 4,9 4,8 4,6
  Spain 3,0 2,9 2,9 3,5 3,4 3,9 3,8 4,4 4,5
  Sweden 1,4 1,9 1,7 1,9 2,1 1,8 1,3 1,5 1,5
   
Eastern Europe (1) 3,5 4,1 4,3 6,8 5,8 7,9 10,4 8,9 9,5
of which   
  Soviet Union (former) 1,3 1,2 1,1 2,0 1,9 1,9 2,1 2,0 1,9
  Poland 0,9 1,6 1,5 2,0 1,5 3,0 4,1 3,9 4,7
  Yugoslavia (former) 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,4 0,4
  Romania 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,7 0,6 0,8 1,1 1,0 0,9
  Bulgaria 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,5
  Czechoslovakia (former) 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,8 0,4 0,7 1,0 0,6 0,6
  Hungary 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,6 1,0 0,6 0,5
   
other Western countries 15,6 16,1 15,9 14,7 14,8 13,2 12,0 11,6 11,2
of which   
  United States 6,2 7,6 7,7 7,0 6,9 6,0 4,9 4,4 4,7
  Japan 5,0 4,3 3,6 3,0 2,9 2,6 2,4 2,8 2,8
  Indonesia 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,3 0,5 0,3 0,3
  Australia 1,1 1,1 1,1 1,3 1,6 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,0
   
Non-Western countries 15,3 15,2 15,6 16,3 15,3 14,5 16,4 17,8 20,3
of which   
  Turkey 2,1 2,2 1,9 1,4 1,0 1,2 1,5 2,2 5,1
   
  Morocco 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,1 0,8 0,9 0,7 0,8 0,9
  Ghana 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,6 0,9 0,6
  South-Africa 0,7 1,2 0,9 2,3 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,0 1,1
  Somalia 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0
  Syria 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  Sudan 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
   
  Suriname 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,1
  Brazil 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5
  Colombia 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,4
  Dominican Republic 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1
  Argentina 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4
   
  Afghanistan - 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  Thailand 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1
  China 1,5 1,3 1,0 1,0 1,1 0,9 1,3 1,2 1,3
  Iraq - 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
  Philippines 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,3
  Iran 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3
  India 1,5 1,4 1,6 2,2 2,1 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,5
  Vietnam 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
  Pakistan 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4
  Sri Lanka 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0
  South-Korea 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
source:  Statistics Netherlands         
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Chapter 4 Developments in asylum migration 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly describes recent developments with respect to the influx 
of asylum seekers and asylum policy. The most striking aspect is the sharp 
decrease in the number of asylum seekers over the past five years. The new 
Dutch Aliens Act, which came into effect in 2000, is held responsible for this 
decrease. In this chapter we will mainly focus on the influx of asylum seekers 
to the Netherlands and changes in the composition of this category. Finally, 
we will examine the concluding part of the asylum policy, the return policy.  
4.2 Asylum requests 
The Dutch government’s restrictive asylum policy is probably the most 
important reason for the decrease in the number of asylum applications 
(especially the high percentage of rejections in the accelerated procedure and 
the strict policy for unaccompanied minors). The number of asylum requests 
decreased from more than 32,000 in 2001 to some 13,400 in 2003 (see table 
5.1). In table 5.1 we can see the sizeable monthly differences between the 
years 2001 and 2003 and in figure 5.1 we can see the trends over a period of 
more than 10 years. The number of asylum request in 2003 was lower than 
in the beginning of the 1990s. 
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Table 4.1: Total number of individual asylum seekers who arrived, with monthly breakdown and percentage 
variation between years: 
Month 2001 2002 2003 Variation +/-(%) 2002 tov 2003
January 3697 2377 1234 -48% -1143
February 2805 1972 1042 -47% -930
March 3086 1950 1398 -28% -552
April 2781 1767 1570 -11% -197
May 2549 1590 1391 -13% -199
June 2219 1479 831 -44% -648
July 2475 1419 1127 -21% -292
August 2462 1350 989 -27% -361
September 2551 1432 1103 -23% -329
October 3401 1374 1015 -26% -359
November 2399 1037 931 -10% -106
December 2154 920 771 -16% -149
Total -28% -5265
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
Figure 4.1: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1991-2003 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline 
 
In 2003, almost all countries of origin except Iraq and Liberia exhibited a 
large absolute decrease in asylum influx in comparison to previous years (see 
table 4.2).  
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Table 4.2: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1997-2003 (top ten countries 2003) 
Country of nationality 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iraq 9640 8300 3710 2780 1329 1022 3472
Soviet Union (former) 1960 3230 5520 4200 3235 1891 1100
Iran 1250 1680 1530 2550 1519 665 555
Yugoslavia (former) 3790 8330 8520 5700 2184 847 539
Afghanistan 5920 7120 4400 5050 3614 1077 492
Somalia 1280 2780 2740 2110 1098 538 451
Liberia 470 190 180 240 167 292 441
Nigeria 300 390 240 290 401 556 414
Turkey 1140 1220 1500 2270 1400 638 414
Burundi 60 150 200 330 427 452 402
Other nationalities 8630 11,830 14,190 18,370 17,205 10,689 5122
Total  34,440 45,220 42,730 43,890 32,579 18,667 13,402
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Ministry of Justice 
 
A closer examination of the figures from the former Soviet Union countries 
reveals that most of the asylum applications come from Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Russia and Georgia (see table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Asylum applications from Former Soviet Union countries in The Netherlands 
Country of origin 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Armenië 1249 812 529 427 204
Azerbaijan 2449 1163 634 335 265
Belarus 40 113 115 131 55
Estonia 0 2 3 3 -
Georgia 321 291 298 219 116
Kazakhstan 102 180 133 43 8
Kyrgyzstan 6 119 71 55 21
Latvia 10 9 9 10 -
Lithuania 12 11 12 9 10
Moldova 31 28 20 31 36
Russia 960 1016 911 420 245
Tajikistan 21 42 56 12 8
Turkmenistan 0 1 1 0 -
Ukraine 306 218 191 156 85
Uzbekistan 13 197 252 40 47
Total 5520 4202 3235 1891 1100
  
Totals 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Applications from Former S.U. 5520 4202 3235 1891 1100
Total applications in The 
Netherlands 
39,299 43,895 32,579 18,667 13,402
Percentage Former S.U. 14% 10% 10% 10% 12%
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
The proportion of asylum applications from (former) countries where a 
residence permit is granted on the basis of a categorical protection policy 
(former Provisional Residence Permit Policy) decreased from 56 percent of 
the total issued in the Netherlands in 1998 to just 34 percent in 2002. In 
2003 it increased due to the war on Iraq (46 percent). The number of asylum 
seekers from, for example, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan decreased 
dramatically in 2002 and 2003. The decreases for Afghanistan and Sierra 
Leone were due to the general protection policies for these countries being 
terminated in the summer of 2002 (see table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4: Asylum applications from nationalities with current or former categorical protection policy in The 
Netherlands 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Afghanistan 5920 7118 4400 5055 3614 1077 492
Bosnia-Herz. 1968 3769 1169 1652 1026 221 103
Burundi 64 147 204 335 427 452 402
D.R. Congo 592 411 252 539 500 522 193
Iraq 9641 8300 3703 2773 1329 1022 3472
Liberia 471 193 175 240 167 292 441
Rwanda 192 415 422 334 222 118 50
Sierra Leone 390 482 1280 2023 2405 1620 314
Somalia 1280 2775 2697 2110 1098 538 451
Sudan 678 1875 1744 1426 869 513 293
Total 21,196 25,485 16,046 16,487 11,657 6375 6211
        
Totals 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Applications cat. prot. 21,196 25,485 16,046 16,487 11,657 6375 6211
Total applications in The Netherlands 34,443 45,217 39,299 43,895 32,579 18,667 13,402
Percentage cat. prot. 62% 56% 41% 38% 36% 34% 46%
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
The influx of indicated unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in the 
Netherlands decreased from 5009 in 1999 to 1216 in 2003. The figure of 
unaccompanied minors as a percentage of the total influx of asylum seekers 
was rather high and stable in the 2000-2002 period (17 percent). This has 
changed in 2003. The figure is now 9 percent. In 2003, the main countries of 
origin were Angola, China and Iraq.  
 
Table 4.5:  Influx of indicated unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in The Netherlands 
Country of origin 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Angola 756 1.059 1.991 854 146
China 335 261 344 177 116
Iraq 793 942 117 56 108
Somalia 496 410 248 87 75
Guinea 380 819 668 199 70
Liberia 19 55 22 47 68
Sierra Leone 529 757 728 392 61
Ivory Coast 2 48 37 46 56
Afghanistan 215 303 228 141 41
Nigeria 24 31 43 70 40
India 0 6 11 28 40
Other 1460 2014 1514 1135 395
Total UMA 5009 6705 5951 3232 1216
  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total UMA 5009 6705 5951 3232 1216
Total 37,921 43,895 32,579 18,667 13,402
Percentage UMA 13% 15% 18% 17% 9%
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
4.3 Asylum requests in Europe 
The decrease in the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands is also 
clear if we compare the Dutch data with data from 13 other European 
countries with respect to the influx of asylum requests under consideration. 
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Table 4.6 presents the influx in asylum requests under consideration from 
2002-2003. In 2003 more than 325,000 asylum applications were submitted 
in the countries stated, a decline of 20 percent with respect to the same 
period in 2002.  
 
There were particularly strong decreases in the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Ireland and the Netherlands. France was the only country in which the 
number of asylum applicants increased in 2003.  
 
Table 4.6: Asylum requests in Europe compared; 2003 with 2002  
  2001 2002 2003 mutation mutation in %
France** 88,287 51,004 61,993 10,989 22%
United Kingdom 47,260 103,080 61,051 -42,029 -41%
Germany 90,244 71,127 50,563 -20,564 -29%
Austria 30,135 39,354 32,364 -6990 -18%
Sweden 23,499 32,995 31,355 -1640 -5%
Switzerland 20,633 26,125 20,806 -5319 -20%
Norway 24,527 17,480 15,613 -1867 -11%
Belgium* 14,782 18,768 16,940 -1828 -10%
The Netherlands 32,579 18,667 13,402 -5265 -28%
Ireland 10,325 11,634 7900 -3734 -32%
Spain 9219 6179 5918 -261 -4%
Denmark 12,512 5947 4593 -1354 -23%
Finland 1650 3443 3221 -222 -6%
Total 405,652 405,803 325,719 -80,084 -20%
* Data do not include accompanied minor dependants. 
** Since 2003, minor dependants are included 
Source: Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC) 
4.4 Granted asylum requests 
The submission of an asylum request is the first step in a process only some 
of the asylum requests are actually approved. Table 4.8 shows the number of 
asylum requests approved per year for ten different groups. The number of 
asylum requests approved has shown a marked decrease. In 1997 almost 
17,000 requests were approved, whereas in 2003 less than 50 percent of this 
number was approved.  
 
Table 4.7:  Asylum requests granted by country of nationality, 1997-2002 (top ten countries 2003) 
Country of nationality 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iraq 4340 5990 550 510 660 1504 3506
Afghanistan 4240 3990 4380 3410 2440 277 798
Soviet Union (former) 650 530 510 480 410 833 550
Somalia 1180 880 1030 920 440 488 267
Burundi 30 70 50 170 300 296 249
Iran 1100 600 530 350 210 383 240
Angola 200 140 200 580 230 922 237
Yugoslavia (former) 2260 350 420 730 600 360 232
Sierra Leone 50 130 160 280 1410 1204 187
Sudan 530 820 300 420 380 345 172
Other nationalities 2410 1600 1360 1880 1160 1767 849
Total  16,990 15,100 9490 9730 8240 8610 7820
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, numbers rounded in units of five, 1997-2001,  
Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2002-2003  
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Table 4.8 provides additional information about the type of status awarded. 
From the data presented it is clear that there has been a strong decrease in 
the number of ‘A statuses’ awarded during the period 1997-2000, whereas 
the granting of residence permits with a humanitarian status has decreased 
much less. The figures for 2003 concern statuses awarded under the new 
Aliens Act and they therefore cannot be simply compared with the situation in 
2000.  
 
Table 4.8:  Refugees admitted and the humanitarian or refugee status granted 1997-2003 (1) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Before new Aliens Act 2000   
 Refugees   
  Individual requests ‘A status’ granted 6630 2356 1507 1808 444  
   
 Humanitarian status   
  Granted (VtV) 5176 3591 3471 4791 1567  
  Provisional status temporary protection 
(VVtV) 
5182 9152 8512 3127 806  
   
After new Aliens Law 2000 (april 2001)   
  VV asylum fixed term 4906 4086 5626
  VV asylum indefinite term 508 721 1402
   
  VV regulier fixed term (2) 2325 4000 2715
  VV regulier indefinite term (2) 24 25 6
   
Refused (old and new Aliens Law)  28,318 28,173 41,367 57,418 51,317 26,761 13,869
1) betreft zowel uitkomsten na beslissingen in eerste instantie als herziene beslissingen 
2) De reguliere vergunningen die in asielzaken zijn verleend hebben ondermeer betrekking op alleenstaande minderjarige asielzoekers 
en op verblijfsvergunningen in het kader van het zogenaamde 3-jaren beleid. 
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
The figures presented in the previous tables concern the decision taken 
during the year in question (approved or rejected), irrespective of the year in 
which the asylum request was submitted. Therefore the figures presented 
about approvals cannot be directly compared with the figures presented in 
table 4.2 about the asylum requests submitted and thus do not provide any 
insight into the percentage approved. In order to delineate the percentage 
approved cohort studies are needed. In the 2001-Sopemi Study we have 
presented the results of a cohort study conducted by Van der Erf (2002). On 
the basis of material made available by the IND concerning the completion of 
asylum procedures according to the year of submission (1994-2000), Van der 
Erf concluded that the percentage of asylum requests approved in the 
Netherlands has significantly decreased. For asylum seekers who submitted 
their request in 1997, the approval percentage was 47 percent. For those 
who submitted their request in 2000 the figure was probably not be higher 
than 17 percent. The results of recent cohort studies show that the approval 
percentage is still decreasing. For 2003 the average approval percentage was 
7,7 percent. We can distinguish three clusters of countries of origin: asylum 
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seekers from Afghanistan, Angola and Sierra Leone have a high approval 
percentage; asylum seekers from Iran, Nigeria and Turkey have a low 
approval percentage; and the approval percentage for asylum seekers from 
China, Congo, Iraq and Somalia is variable (Ministry of Justice 2003). 
4.5 Return policy and the expulsion of asylum seekers 
The majority of aliens who request asylum in the Netherlands do not receive 
a residence permit and therefore there is a constant stream of aliens leaving 
the Netherlands. Most of these aliens depart of their own volition and a small 
number need to be forcibly expelled. The return of legally removable asylum 
seekers is one of the most unmanageable parts of the alien policy. There are 
three basic assumptions in the Dutch return policy.  
 
A first basic principle is that in the asylum procedure, the responsibility for 
self-reliant return rests on the asylum seeker. The idea behind this is that the 
asylum seeker managed to get to the Netherlands on his own initiative and 
must therefore return on his own initiative as well. After every negative 
decision in the procedure the asylum seeker will be reminded of his 
responsibility and encouraged to make preparations for his return. 
 
A second basic principle is that the government’s primary responsibility is to 
terminate the refuge provisions. If the asylum seeker does not leave of his 
own accord then enforced departure can be effected. 
 
Finally there is a high level of cooperation between the various authorities 
involved such as the Aliens Police, the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service, the Central Council for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers [Dutch 
acronym: COA) and the Royal Netherlands Military Police. In the case of 
voluntary return the asylum seeker can request support from the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM). 
 
The main stages in the return process are:  
 
For each negative decision in the asylum procedure of an asylum seeker the 
IND informs the COA of this by sending a copy of the judicial order or 
judgement. 
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• After it has received each copy of the judicial order of judgement, the COA 
invites the asylum seeker to an interview. In this interview the asylum 
seeker is informed of the possibility that in the end he will not be allowed 
to remain in the Netherlands and in that case the reception facilities will 
be terminated after 28 days. The asylum seeker is advised not to wait 
until after the 28 days have elapsed and to prepare for a possible 
departure during this 28-day period. In this he is reminded of his own 
responsibility. For help and advice in these preparations for an 
independent return he is referred to the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM). For legal information and support he is referred to the 
Dutch Refugee Council and his own lawyer. Before the asylum seeker can 
finally be expelled legally, the COA holds a final interview. In this interview 
(complimentary to the aforementioned information) the asylum seeker is 
informed that he must leave the reception facility within 28 days. If he 
does not do that voluntarily the accommodation will be cleared by the 
police or alien police.  
• 28 days after the alien has been informed that he or she must leave the 
country, a check is performed to establish whether this has actually 
happened. The Aliens Department then carries out an address check at 
the last known address of the alien. The alien is considered to be 
“administratively removed” if he is not encountered at the address and it 
can be assumed that he has departed. In the majority of cases this 
implies "departure with unknown destination". 
• If the alien is found at the last known address after 28 days and forced 
return as possible then the person is taken into custody before being 
deported or leaving under supervision.  
The rejected asylum seeker can receive various forms of supervision for his 
return. For example, there are country specific projects in which the Dutch 
government cooperates with the countries of origin and a range of 
organisations who are active in the field of migration. Furthermore, there is 
supervision from the return office of the IOM which assists rejected asylum 
seekers in their return. In 2003, the number of people who were assisted by 
the IOM in their return to the country of origin or to migrate further increased 
with one-third compared to 2002 (this mostly concerned rejected asylum 
seekers). In 2003, 3028 persons departed voluntarily with help from the 
IOM. 
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The number of people that voluntarily departed with help from the IOM is 
relatively small compared to the total number of 'expelled asylum seekers' in 
2003, namely nearly 22,000. From the table below it can be seen that the 
number of expelled asylum seekers rose considerably compared to 2001. In 
particular, asylum seekers from Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet 
Union and Angola were expelled on a large-scale (see table 4.9). However, 
we do not know the degree in which these groups actually left the 
Netherlands. In figure 4.2 the removals for the period 1992-2001 are detailed 
according to the type of removal. 
 
Table 4.9: Expelled asylum seekers by country of nationality, 1997-2003 (top ten countries 2003) 
Country of nationality 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Yugoslavia (former) 2910 3280 6210 4140 2180 2300 2183
Soviet Union (former) 1360 960 950 1420 1350 1880 2138
Angola 430 180 110 170 250 760 1618
Somalia 1120 680 850 890 940 1526 1354
Iran 1070 440 460 730 770 1012 1336
Iraq 1040 1190 1940 1310 1780 2421 1158
Sudan 160 150 280 350 420 700 944
Turkey 790 820 660 880 1250 1047 864
Sierra Leone 160 150 190 290 490 801 826
China 690 490 480 490 420 700 799
Other nationalities 9140 6000 6210 5950 6170 8108 8676
Total  18,870 14,340 18,340 16,620 16,020 21,255 21,896
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Ministry of Justice 
 
Figure 4.2: Expelled asylum seekers by type of expulsion, 1992-2003  
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
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The chart shows that the proportion of compulsory removals (Controlled 
departure and Expulsion) has strongly decreased during the past three years. 
In 1999, more than one-third of all removals occurred in this manner, 
whereas in 2003 less than 20 percent of the rejected asylum seekers were 
forcibly expelled from the country. Also in absolute terms the number of 
expulsions and the number of cases in which controlled departure takes place 
is decreasing. By far the greatest numbers of rejected asylum seekers are 
therefore removed by means of checking the address. Although this is in 
accordance with the policy’s objectives, the asylum seeker bearing 
responsibility for his return, it is not clear whether these persons actually 
leave the country or continue to remain in the Netherlands as illegal 
immigrants. There are clear indications that a significant proportion will 
continue to remain in the Netherlands on an illegal basis (Engbersen et al. 
2001; Leerkes et al 2004). Figures about detained illegal aliens in the period 
1997-2000 reveal, for example, that substantial numbers of illegal aliens 
from ‘asylum countries’ such as Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet 
Union and Somalia were detained (Engbersen et al. 2002).  
 
Due to the problems in returning, two tendencies are visible. Firstly, more 
use has been made of enforced return by means of building special centres. 
The capacity for alien detention is being expanded. The capacity to detain 
illegal aliens will increase in the period 2003-2007. In 2007 there will be a 
structural capacity of 2000 places for detained aliens. Furthermore, two expel 
centres for illegal immigrants and rejected asylum seekers are established in 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam-Schiphol. Secondly, use has also been made of 
the expertise of local organisations that offer help to rejected asylum 
seekers. We end this chapter by presenting some results of a local voluntary 
return programme in the city of Rotterdam.  
4.6 Voluntary return  
In 2002 a cooperative project was set up, financed by the European Refugee 
Fund, within the framework of the 'Return and Emigration of Aliens from the 
Netherlands (REAN)' programme. In this project, efforts are made to provide 
specific assistance to groups of illegal aliens and asylum seekers from the 
States of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and 
Belarus. Within the framework of this project 153 people returned to these 
countries with help from the IOM and Pauluskerk (Paul’s Church) in 
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Rotterdam. In the majority of cases, however, this concerned illegal aliens 
and not rejected asylum seekers (cf. Weltevrede et al 2003). 
 
The project objective, firstly, was to improve counselling by means of a more 
systematic description of the profile and migration motives of the target 
group and to provide more targeted assistance for the return and 
reintegration of (refused) asylum seekers from the Southern Caucasian states 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and 
Belarus. The research objective was operationalised in the project indicator: 
300 (refused) asylum seekers to be interviewed from the abovementioned 
countries. This project indicator was not achieved as only 173 people were 
interviewed. This was caused by:  (i) inadequate grounds for the proposed 
300 interviews; (ii) lack of clarity with regard to the control group of illegal 
immigrants, which meant people were ‘careful’ about interviewing this group 
and therefore did not achieve the desired number of respondents in the 
control group. Nevertheless the research goal was partially achieved. Insight 
was gained into the background and migration motives of people from 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and 
Belarus.  
 
The second project objective was an aid objective, operationalised in four 
indicators: 
 
• to provide intensive supervision to 200 people from the target group (= 
(rejected) asylumseekers from the abovementioned countries); 
• to have 50 people from the target group get in touch with their country of 
origin; 
• to provide temporary shelter to 50 people from the target group; 
• to have 150 people from the target group return to their country of origin 
and to assist these people to this end. 
 
The first two project indicators have been realised. The indicators pertaining 
to shelter and (the provision of assistance to) return of (rejected) asylum 
seekers were however set too high (respectively 50 whereas only 8 realised, 
150 whereas 43 realised). The principal cause of this was the fact that when 
the project started it was insufficiently realised that - compared to (refused) 
asylum seekers - much more illegal migrants returned to their country of 
origin via the Pauluskerk. If these two groups of illegal migrants and 
(refused) asylum seekers are combined, the project indicator pertaining to 
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return has been achieved. In that case the aid objective also seems to have 
been achieved: an increase in the number of people returning home in 
comparison to the preceding years.  
 
The return project brought a number of success factors and a failure factor 
experienced by the Pauluskerk to light. The Pauluskerk’s success factors with 
regard to return are connected with its approachability and the trust the 
institution emanates. Furthermore, the Pauluskerk offers its clients a broad 
package of aid, irrespective of whether a client is considering returning home 
or not. By being present for consultation at the Pauluskerk the IOM has been 
able to benefit from these factors (cf. Weltevrede et al. 2003).  
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Chapter 5 Foreign Nationals and 
Immigrants in the Netherlands 
Main findings 
• Non-native residents of the Netherlands are defined in Dutch 
statistics by their own and their parents’ country of birth. The term 
non-native refers to people who were born outside the Netherlands 
of at least one foreign-born parent (first-generation immigrants) or 
in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents (second generation). 
• At the end of 2003, there were 3,000,000 non-native residents of 
the Netherlands, accounting for 19% of the Dutch population, about 
half  from Western countries including those in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the other half from non-Western countries. The largest 
immigrant groups in the Netherlands are Indonesians (398,000), 
Germans (384,000), Turks (351,000), Surinamese (325,000) and 
Moroccans (306,000). 
• In 1995 there were 2,500,000 non-native residents. This means the 
non-native population  increased by 24% in just eight years. The 
number of non-native residents from non-Western countries 
increased even more rapidly from 1,200,000 in 1995 to 1,700,000 
in 2003, an increase of 42% in eight years. In 2003, non-Western 
immigrants accounted for exactly 10% of the total Dutch 
population. The percentage of non-Western immigrants is expected 
to grow to 12% in 2010 and14% in 2020. 
• On the average, non-Western immigrants are much younger than 
the native Dutch population. Almost one in five of the native Dutch 
population is above the age of 65, which is only true of 2.5% of the 
residents of non-Western descent. The relatively young non-Western 
immigrants are a welcome counterweight to the aging Dutch 
population. 
• Non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are heavily 
concentrated in the main urban centres. Only 13% of the total 
Dutch population live in the four main cities and 40% of the non-
Western immigrants. 
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• There has been a sharp fall in the number of non-Dutch residents 
who obtain Dutch citizenship. The number of foreigners who 
obtained Dutch citizenship fell from 83,000 in 1996 to 45,000 in 
2002. In 2003, the number of naturalizations fell to only 29,000. 
Moroccans and to a lesser extent Turks as well obtained or applied 
for Dutch citizenship less often. The reason for the declining number 
of naturalizations is not clear. Is it due to stricter naturalization 
rules or do immigrants find Dutch citizenship less attractive because 
of growing anti-immigrant feelings in Dutch public opinion? 
• According to recent research, a sizeable number of undocumented 
aliens live in the Netherlands (112,000 to 163,000), most of them 
in certain multicultural districts of large cities such as Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam, which can have a negative influence on everyday 
life there. Although most undocumented aliens do not engage in 
criminal activities, there is a significant trend towards more forms of 
survival crime. 
5.1 Introduction 
We have described the immigration flows to and from the Netherlands. 
In this chapter we address the foreign nationals and immigrants living 
in the Netherlands. Before providing any specific data, we need to clear 
up the problem of definitions. Who are the foreign nationals and who 
are the immigrants in the Dutch statistics? International migration 
statistics usually provide information on foreign nationals or residents 
in a country with a different nationality, and the foreign-born or 
residents who - regardless of their nationality - were born in another 
country. In the Netherlands, a third, more complicated definition is 
used of immigrants or the non-Dutch. Let us first explain though why 
the two approaches noted above are not applicable to immigrants in 
the Netherlands. 
 The most obvious way to describe immigrants in a country is to say 
they are residents with a different citizenship (foreign nationals). 
However, there are several reasons why this would present an 
incomplete picture of the immigrant population in the Netherlands. As 
a former colonial power, the Netherlands has a relatively high number 
of immigrants from its former colonies. Many people from Suriname or 
the Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship, so they would not be 
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considered immigrants if we only examine non-Dutch nationals. The 
same is true of other immigrants who have acquired Dutch citizenship, 
which is relatively easy in the Netherlands and not uncommon. 
According to the present regulations, children born in the Netherlands 
of at least one Dutch parent including naturalized immigrants 
automatically have Dutch citizenship, so this category of second-
generation immigrants would not be considered non-Dutch. 
 A second approach to the immigrant population would be to include 
everyone born outside the country (foreign-born). Although this 
definition is often used in international statistics, it has its limitations. 
It includes the foreign-born children of Dutch parents and  excludes the 
children of immigrants born in the Netherlands (the second 
generation). However, the Dutch authorities also want to keep track of 
this second generation of immigrants because so many of them are 
socially disadvantaged. For all these reasons, in Dutch statistics 
immigrants or the non-Dutch are defined by their parents’ as well as 
their own country of birth. In Dutch official publications, immigrants 
are also often referred to as allochtonous or ethnic minorities. 
 In Dutch statistics, a distinction is drawn between native Dutch and 
non-native Dutch residents. In the latter category, a distinction is 
drawn between first and second-generation immigrants. People are 
non-native residents if they and at least one of their parents were born 
outside the Netherlands or if they themselves were born in the 
Netherlands but both their parents were not. A child born outside the 
Netherlands of two Dutch parents is considered native Dutch, but a 
child born outside the Netherlands of one foreign parent is not. A child 
born in the Netherlands of one Dutch and one foreign parent is also 
considered native Dutch, but a child born in the Netherlands of two 
foreign parents is non-native. Lastly, the official Dutch statistics draw a 
distinction between non-native residents from Western and from non-
Western countries. This distinction is explained in Chapter 2. 
In this chapter we refer to foreign nationals and non-native 
Dutch residents according to different definitions. In doing so, we see 
that the different definitions and approaches result in a variety of 
figures (5.2). We describe the various demographic characteristics of 
the non-native population in the Netherlands (5.3), and the 
naturalization figures (5.4). 
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5.2 Numbers of non-Dutch residents and immigrants in 
the Netherlands 
Table 5.1 shows how much it matters which definition is used for the 
non-Dutch population. If we only look at foreign nationals, there are 
700,000 non-Dutch residents, but if we look at foreign-born people, 
there are 1,700,000 including the foreign-born children of Dutch 
parents. Using the official Dutch definitions, the total number of non-
Dutch residents in 2003 was a little more than 3,000,000 (first and 
second-generation immigrants). If we only look at foreign nationals, 
4.3% of the residents of the Netherlands are non-Dutch. Using the 
official definitions, almost one in five (19%) residents of the 
Netherlands are non-Dutch. A little less than half the non-Dutch 
population are first or second-generation immigrants from Western 
countries (1,400,000 or 9% of the total Dutch population), a little more 
than half the non-Dutch population are from non-Western countries 
(1,600,000 or 10% of the total Dutch population). 
 We can conclude that definitions matter quite a lot in statistics. If 
we use the official Dutch definitions, the total number of non-Dutch or 
non-native residents of the Netherlands is four times as high as if we 
only look at people who are not formally Dutch citizens. Part of the 
difference is due to the fact that by definition the 130,000 people from 
the Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship. The last column of 
Table 5.1 shows the percentages of each population category based on 
ethnic origin, thus second as well as first  generation, who still have 
the nationality of their country of origin. The figures show that the vast 
majority of immigrants and their children or grandchildren in the 
Netherlands have the Dutch nationality. This is not only the case for 
older immigrant groups such as Indonesians, Surinamese, Turks and 
Moroccans, but also for newly arrived groups such as Somalians, 
Syrians, Angolans, Iranians, Iraqis, Ethiopians and Afghans. In each of 
these new migrant groups, less than one in eight people (12%) still 
have the nationality of their country of origin.  
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Table 5.1: Non-Dutch / Non-native Population in the Netherlands 2003 (= 1-1-2004) 
  
(I)
Foreign nationals
(II)
Foreign-born
(III)
Ethnic origin
III as % 
of the entire Dutch 
population 
% with 
nationality of 
their country of 
origin
Total 16,258,032 16,258,032 16,258,032 100.0 
  
Native Dutch 15,555,847 14,526,244 13,169,880 81.0 
  
non-native 702,185 1,731,788 3,088,152 19.0 22.7
   
Western countries 294,376 662,342 1,419,855 8.7 20.7
  
 14 EU countries 211,009 311,723 748,417 4.6 28.2
  
 Germany 56,466 119,002 389,912 2.4 14.5
 United Kingdom 43,678 48,267 76,457 0.5 57.1
 Belgium 26,223 47,052 113,081 0.7 23.2
  
Eastern Europe 38,871 130,374 188,642 1.2 20.6
  
 Yugoslavia (former)  11,586 55,497 76,346 0.5 15.2
 Soviet Union (former)  10,658 32,802 42,033 0.3 25.4
 Poland 7,431 21,177 35,542 0.2 20.9
 Czechoslovakia (former)  2,508 5,794 9,813 0.1 25.6
 Hungary  1,886 5,618 12,564 0.1 15.0
 Romenia 2,735 5,992 7,895 0.0 34.6
  
other Western countries 44,496 220,245 482,796 3.0 9.2
  
United States  15,075 22,594 30,161 0.2 50.0
Canada 3,456 8,829 12,660 0.1 27.3
Australia  3,383 10,203 14,221 0.1 23.8
Indonesia  11,185 158,804 398,502 2.5 2.8
Japan 5,813 6,111 7,215 0.0 80.6
  
Non-Western countries 296,829 1,069,446 1,668,297 10.3 17.8
  
Turkey 101,845 194,615 351,648 2.2 29.0
  
Morocco  94,380 166,607 306,219 1.9 30.8
Somalia  1,792 17,381 25,001 0.2 7.2
South Africa 3,321 12,292 15,164 0.1 21.9
Ghana  3,807 12,105 18,727 0.1 20.3
Cape Verde 1,364 11,443 19,666 0.1 6.9
Egypt  2,649 10,814 17,873 0.1 14.8
Ethiopia 1,194 8,050 10,236 0.1 11.7
Angola 993 10,124 12,281 0.1 8.1
Sudan 1,054 6,339 7,626 0.0 13.8
Congo 417 5,942 1,616 0.0 25.8
  
Suriname 9,406 189,732 325,281 2.0 2.9
Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba 
- 91,332 130,722 0.8 -
Colombia 1,919 11,312 9,366 0.1 20.5
Brazil 3,298 9,783 11,638 0.1 28.3
Dominican Republic 1,141 6,949 9,546 0.1 12.0
  
Iraq 4,182 35,968 42,931 0.3 9.7
Afghanistan  3,923 32,143 36,043 0.2 10.9
China  13,330 31,455 41,694 0.3 32.0
Iran 2,589 24,171 28,438 0.2 9.1
India  3,592 11,829 13,363 0.1 26.9
Vietnam  2,496 12,006 17,536 0.1 14.2
Pakistan 2,541 11,054 17,990 0.1 14.1
Hong Kong  - 10,410 17,965 0.1 -
Sri Lanka 1,624 10,402 9,812 0.1 16.6
Philippines  2,841 8,366 12,401 0.1 22.9
Thailand 4,366 9,103 11,462 0.1 38.1
Syria 685 6,650 8,803 0.1 7.8
south Korea 1,477 5,779 3,328 0.0 44.4
  
Unknown/stateless 110,980 - -  
Source: Statistics Netherlands      
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Tables A5.2 and A5.3 (Appendix) show the trends in the number of 
residents of the Netherlands of non-Dutch descent. In Table A5.2, their 
background is based on nationality (foreign nationals) and in Table 
A5.3 on ethnic origin (first and second-generation immigrants). The 
number of foreign nationals in the Netherlands surprisingly reveals that 
their numbers have decreased since 1995, despite strong increases in 
immigration surpluses in the second half of the 1990s (see Chapter 2). 
The explanation for this apparent contradiction is that so many 
immigrants have obtained Dutch citizenship. This is further examined 
in 5.4. 
 Table A5.3 shows the trends in the number of non-native residents 
of the Netherlands (first and second-generation immigrants) from 1995 
to 2002. The number of non-native residents of the Netherlands 
increased rapidly from scarcely 2,500,000 in 1995 to more than 
3,000,000 in 2003. This means that in just eight years, the number of 
non-native residents of the Netherlands increased by 24%, though the 
native Dutch population remained more or less stabile. The strong 
increase in the number of non-native residents of the Netherlands is  
mainly due to the growing influx from various Eastern European and 
non-Western countries. The number of immigrants (first and second-
generation) from Central and Eastern Europe increased by almost 60% 
from 1995 to 2002 from 119,000 to 188,000. The influx  from the 
former Soviet Union more than tripled in this period. Immigrants from 
the former Soviet Union are among the fastest growing immigrant 
groups in the Netherlands. The number of non-native residents with a 
non-Western background also grew rapidly in this period from almost 
1,200,000 in 1995 to almost 1,700,000 in 2003, an increase of 42% in 
a period of eight years. 
 Lastly, Table A5.3 also distinguishes between the first and second 
generation of non-native residents in 2003, i.e. between people born 
outside the country who have come to the Netherlands and people 
born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. Both categories 
are about the same size. Of the little more than 3,000,000 non-native 
residents of the Netherlands in 2003, 52% were first generation and 
48% second generation. The percentage of second-generation 
immigrant children born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents 
is particularly high among the Western migrant groups such as 
Germans (74%), Belgians (68%), Indonesians (67%) and Australians 
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(65%). As a rule the percentage of  second generation is much smaller 
in non-Western immigrant groups (39%) than Western ones (59%). 
Non-Western immigrant groups with the largest percentage of second 
generation are the Moroccans (45%), Turks (45%) and Surinamese 
(42%). Afghans are the immigrant groups with the smallest percentage 
of second generation (only 1%). 
 
Population forecast 
We conclude this section with a non-native population forecast in the 
Netherlands. The non-native population includes first and second-
generation immigrants from Western and non-Western countries (Table 
5.6). The number of non-native people from other Western countries is 
not expected to increase significantly in the coming decades (from 
1,400,000 in 2003 and 1,500,000 in 2010 to 1,900,000 in 2030; this 
last figure is not included in the table). The number of non-native 
residents with a non-Western background is expected to increase more 
quickly, albeit somewhat less than in the 1990s. From 1990 to 2002, 
the number of non-Western immigrants and their children and 
grandchildren in the Netherlands almost doubled from more than 
800,000 to 1,600,000. According to current forecasts, the number of 
first and second-generation non-Western immigrants in the 
Netherlands will continue to grow to almost 2,000,000 in 2010 and 
almost 2,500,000 in 2020. This means the percentage of non-Western 
immigrant groups in the total population in the Netherlands will 
gradually increase from 10% in 2002 and 12% in 2010 to 14% in 
2020. 
 
Table 5.2  Population Forecast: Western and Non-Western Non-native Population (1990-2020) 
 1990 2003* 2010 2020 
  X1000  
Western - 1,419 1,502 - 
Non-Western 831 1,623 1,974 2,425 
     
 Turkey 203 341 394 452 
 Morocco 164 295 359 432 
 Suriname 224 321 349 375 
 Neth. Antilles and Aruba 69 129 153 189 
 other Non-Western 171 537 719 978 
Non-Western as % of the total population 8.3 10.0 11.8 14.1 
*2003= 1 January 2003 
Source: SCP, 2003 Report on Minorities, pp. 17 
 
Table 5.6 also shows that the older immigrant groups in the 
Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) will 
continue to grow in the future. However, the greatest increase will be 
among other non-Western immigrant groups. In 1990, people from 
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other non-Western countries were only a fifth of the total non-Western 
immigrant population in the Netherlands. By 2020 this percentage will 
increase to about 40%, confirming the previously observed increasing 
heterogeneity of the non-native population in the Netherlands. The 
number of immigrants and their children and grandchildren from 
Central and Eastern Europe will also increase considerably in the 
coming years. An annual influx of about 20,000 people is expected in 
the coming years from these countries, partly as a result of the 
expansion of the EU.  
 Table 5.2 does not distinguish between first and second-generation 
immigrants. If we do draw this distinction (expanded data in the 
Appendix, Table A5.3) we see that in the non-Western immigrant 
groups, the first and second generation are expected to grow 
significantly in the coming years. The first generation is growing due to 
continuous immigration: the number of first-generation migrants from 
non-Western countries is expected to increase by more than 160,000 
from 2002 to 2010. This is a consequence of an estimated annual 
migration surplus of 20,000. Since first-generation immigrants will 
have children in the Netherlands, the second generation will also 
increase in size. In the coming years about 30,000 children a year are 
expected to be born of a non-Western mother or father in the 
Netherlands. This means that by 2010 the non-Western second 
generation will grow by more than 250,000 to 838,000. In 2010 more 
than 42% of the non-Western immigrant population in the Netherlands 
will belong to the second generation, a percentage that was only 38% 
in 2002. The second generation is growing more rapidly than the first. 
However, in the course of time, the growth rate of the second 
generation is expected to gradually decrease again. Non-Western 
women will gradually have less children and the first generation will 
gradually become older and no longer be of childbearing age. 
5.3 Some demographic characteristics of the immigrant 
population 
In this section we discuss some demographic characteristics of the 
non-native population in the Netherlands. We examine the distribution 
according to age and sex and region. 
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 Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the native Dutch and non-native 
population according to age and sex. The non-native population, as 
usual, includes first and second- generation immigrants and is split into 
Western and non-Western. With respect to gender distribution, there 
are few if any differences between the population groups. In the Dutch 
population as well as the non-Western immigrant groups, the 
percentage of men is more or less half (49 and 51.5% respectively). 
This is striking in so far as typical immigrant groups might be expected 
to have a higher percentage of men than women. Yet this is not the 
case. In the Western immigrant population, the percentage of females 
is even slightly larger (52%) than the percentage of males. 
 
Figure 5.1 Dutch and Non-native Population By gender in % (2003) 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline 
 
However, as Figure 6.2 shows, there are large differences in the age 
structure of various population groups. Non-Western immigrants are 
predominantly young. Almost half (49%)  the residents of the 
Netherlands with a non-Western background are younger than 20, as 
are  only about one in three in the native Dutch population. The 
percentage of elderly in the native Dutch population is however much 
higher than in non-Western immigrant groups. Almost a fifth (18%) of 
the native Dutch population is above 65, as are only 2.5% of the 
residents of the Netherlands with a non-Western background. There 
are scarcely any people above the age of 75 in the non-Western 
immigrant groups. The relatively young age of the non-Western 
immigrant groups is a welcome counterweight to the ageing Dutch 
population. 
 
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
non-native (non-
Western)
non-native (Western)
native Dutch
Female Male
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Figure 5.2: Age Distribution of Native Dutch and Non-native Populations (2003) 
 
Another widely debated theme in the Netherlands is the regional 
distribution of the immigrant population (Table 6.3). Despite the public 
debate, the Netherlands can scarcely be termed a multicultural society. 
Only one in ten residents of the Netherlands are immigrants or the 
children of immigrants from non-Western countries. But since non-
Western immigrants are heavily concentrated in the four main cities of 
the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), the 
country does have a number of multicultural cities. Although these four 
cities together only have a population of little more than 2,000,000, 
about a third of them are non-Western immigrants (660,000). Of the 
four main cities in the Netherlands, only in the smallest one, Utrecht, is 
there a smaller percentage of non-Western immigrants (20%). In the 
other medium-sized Dutch cities, the percentage of non-Western 
immigrants is significantly lower. 
 The concentration of non-Western immigrants is also clear in the 
last row of Table 5.3, which shows the percentage of the total 
population in each of the four main cities. Living in a large city is not 
particularly popular among the native Dutch; only one in eight live in 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague or Utrecht. Immigrants from 
Western countries are slightly more city-oriented than the overall 
average. About one in six of the immigrants from Western countries 
live in one of these four large cities. Non-Western immigrants are much 
0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0
0 to 10
10 to 20 
20 to 30 
30 to 40 
40 to 50 
50 tot 65 
65 or older
Dutch non-native (Western) non-native (non-Western)
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more oriented to the main cities. Almost 40% of the non-Western 
immigrants live in one of the four main cities and this percentage is 
even higher among Surinamese and Moroccans. About half  the 
Surinamese and Moroccans live in one of the four main cities. Turks 
and Antilleans appear to be more dispersed in other municipalities. 
 
Table 5.3:  Regional Distribution of Non-native Population (Western and Non-Western) (2003) 
 Total  
  Western Non-Western  
  Turkey Morocco Suriname Neth. Antilles
   
Netherlands 16,258,032 1,419,855 1,668,297 351,648 306,219 325,281 130,722
   
 Amsterdam 739,104 102,537 250,539 37,360 62,776 70,741 11,490
 The Hague 469,059 58,346 146,159 30,830 23,372 44,883 10,749
 Rotterdam 598,923 59,305 207,396 44,603 35,317 52,239 20,282
 Utrecht 270,244 26,644 55,159 12,158 23,305 6,987 2,198
   
as % of the total   
Netherlands 100.0 8.7 10.3 2.2 1.9 2.0 0.8
    
 Amsterdam 100.0 13.9 33.9 5.1 8.5 9.6 1.6
 The Hague 100.0 12.4 31.2 6.6 5.0 9.6 2.3
 Rotterdam 100.0 9.9 34.6 7.4 5.9 8.7 3.4
 Utrecht 100.0 9.9 20.4 4.5 8.6 2.6 0.8
   
% total population 
in all 4 cities 
12.8 17.4 39.5 35.5 47.3 53.8 34.2
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
5.4 Naturalization 
Most of the non-native residents of the Netherlands have the Dutch 
nationality, sometimes in addition to the nationality of their country of 
origin. Most of the Surinamese and Antilleans have always had Dutch 
citizenship. Two thirds of the older immigrant groups such as Turks and 
Moroccans also have Dutch citizenship. However, it is striking that most 
of the new immigrant groups such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and 
Somalians now also have the Dutch nationality. From 1996 to 2003, 
about 435,000 non-Dutch residents of the Netherlands acquired Dutch 
citizenship. The peak in the number of naturalizations was in 1996, 
when almost 83,000 non-Dutch residents obtained Dutch citizenship. 
In the following years the number of naturalizations gradually 
decreased to about 45,000 in 2002. In 2003, however, the number of 
naturalizations declined again quite drastically to 29,000, a decline of 
36% in one year (Figure 5.3).  
Chapter 5 
74 
 The trend in the number of naturalizations strongly correlates with 
Dutch policy changes. The peak in the number of naturalizations in 
1996 was the result of the growing number of non-Dutch immigrants in 
the early 1990s and changes in the Dutch policy on aliens in 1992. 
From 1 January 1992 to 1 October 1997, non-Dutch residents who 
obtained the Dutch nationality were allowed to keep their original 
nationality. On 1 October 1997, this dual nationality option was 
replaced by a more restrictive policy. Dual nationality is now only 
possible in a number of exceptional cases, usually pertaining to 
nationals from countries that do not allow citizens to give up their 
nationality. Another exception is made for people for whom it would be 
unreasonable to give up their nationality (Muus, 2001). As a result of 
this policy change, the number of naturalizations fell sharply from 
83,000 in 1996 to 60,000 in 1997. In particular, the number of 
naturalizations among Turks decreased sharply in 1997. The policy 
changes barely affected Moroccans, since Moroccan law does not allow 
them to give up their nationality. After this marked decrease, the 
number of naturalizations from 1997 to 1999 stabilized at about 
60,000 and then fell to 45,000 in 2002 and 29,000 in 2003. 
 
Figure 5.3: Non-Dutch Residents Obtaining Dutch Nationality by Year 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline 
 
Table A5.4 in the Appendix specifies the country of origin of new Dutch 
citizens. It shows  the largest decline in the number of naturalizations 
among Moroccans, and to a lesser extent among Turks. In 2003 the 
number of persons obtaining Dutch citizenship was more than 16,000 
less than a year earlier; 40% of the difference can be explained by the 
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declining number of Moroccan or Turkish residents of the Netherlands 
who obtained or applied for Dutch citizenship. The number of 
naturalizations among Moroccan residents fell by 4,900 and the 
number of naturalizations among Turkish residents fell by 1,700. We 
can only guess the reason for this decline. Perhaps stricter 
naturalization rules prevented larger numbers of naturalizations. It is 
also possible that growing anti-immigrant feelings in the Dutch public 
opinion made Moroccan and Turkish residents less eager to apply for 
Dutch citizenship. 
5.5 Undocumented aliens in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands, like other Western countries, is confronted with 
growing numbers of undocumented aliens, i.e. foreign nationals who 
live here without a valid residence permit. Contrary to the common 
myth, the Netherlands is not flooded with undocumented aliens. 
Empirical research shows that not that many undocumented aliens live  
in the Netherlands. The same research also shows that contrary to 
another widely held myth, they are not necessarily criminals. In fact, 
most of the undocumented aliens in the Netherlands do not engage in 
crime. 
 This section summarizes the main findings of the study 
Undocumented Aliens in the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 2001; a 
more comprehensive summary of this report can be found in the 2001 
Dutch SOPEMI report). One objective of the study was to draw up an  
estimate of the total number of undocumented aliens in the 
Netherlands and shed light on the often assumed relation between 
illegal residence and crime. The study analysed police files on 
undocumented aliens arrested in the Netherlands from 1997 to 2000. 
The data were supplied by the 25 police regions in the Netherlands. 
From 1997 to 2000, more than 53,000 arrests were made involving 
more than 47,000 undocumented aliens. 
 
The main finding of the study is that nation-wide, the Netherlands has 
a limited number (112,000 to 163,000) of undocumented aliens.17 
Although on a national scale, this number is limited, on a local or 
                                               
17  This estimate is somewhat higher than the one published by Netherlands 
Statistics of 46,000 to 116,000 illegal aliens living in the Netherlands. 
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regional scale the picture is quite different. In cities like Amsterdam or  
Rotterdam and in certain regions, there are relatively large numbers of 
undocumented aliens. Especially in certain multicultural 
neighbourhoods, the percentages are sizeable. These areas have large 
undocumented populations with a positive as well as a negative 
influence on everyday life there. A second finding is that most 
undocumented aliens do not engage in criminal activities, although 
certain forms of survival crime are becoming increasingly common.  
 The number of undocumented aliens in the Netherlands has been 
estimated using police data on the arrests of undocumented aliens. Of 
the arrests in the Netherlands from 1997 to 2000, more than 53,000 
involved approximately 47,000 undocumented aliens. The total number 
of undocumented aliens who live in the Netherlands is annually 
estimated on the basis of these findings. However, police data are not 
always reliable. In addition, the data refer to undocumented aliens 
whose behaviour exposes them to the risk of arrest, for example they 
work in the informal economy or commit offences. Undocumented 
aliens who lead a shadow life, hiding at home, barely run any risk of 
being arrested and cannot be taken into account in the estimates. The 
real number of undocumented aliens in the Netherlands is thus higher 
than the figure in our estimates. 
 An annual estimated 65,000 to 91,000 undocumented aliens enter 
the Netherlands, excluding those from Eastern and Western Europe. 
The number of Eastern and Western Europeans is roughly estimated at 
47,000 to 72,000 annually. However, these estimates are much less 
reliable than for the other groups. With this estimate included, the total 
number of undocumented aliens on an annual basis would amount to 
112,000 to 163,000. 
 The population of undocumented aliens mainly comprises men and 
women between the ages of 20 and 40. Compared to previous studies, 
the percentage of women among those arrested has slightly increased. 
As regards country of origin, the group is very diverse. The arrested 
undocumented aliens come from no fewer than 200 countries or areas 
all over the world. This strong variation in the origins of immigrants 
confirms recent insights on the increasing heterogeneity of migration 
flows, including increases in long-distance migration and East-West 
migration. The largest groups of undocumented aliens come from 
Eastern Europe, Africa, Western Europe and Asia. The percentage of 
people from countries where numerous asylum-seekers came from in 
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the years in question has not exhibited a rapid rise, though it is on the 
increase. By now the percentage of people from asylum countries 
constitutes more than a third of the total number of arrested 
undocumented aliens and is slightly increasing. 
 On what grounds are undocumented aliens arrested? An 
examination of all the police arrests in the period from 1997 to 2000 
(N=53,000) shows that more than half the undocumented aliens were 
not arrested for serious crimes, but for violating the Aliens Act or police 
regulations. More than a third of the undocumented aliens were 
arrested because they were suspected of committing offences ranging 
from shoplifting to manslaughter, but often theft-related and to a lesser 
extent drug-related, primarily survival offences in an effort to support 
themselves in Dutch society.  
 The 1997-2000 police statistics demonstrate a sharp rise in the 
category of minor offences (particularly property offences and 
unspecified offences) from 18.5% to 28.2%, and a fall in the total 
number of arrests in the same years from more than 14,000 to 13,000 
(see Table 5.2). This seems to indicate a rise in the survival crime rate 
among undocumented aliens. As the total number of arrests has 
decreased, this finding cannot be explained by the fact that the police 
stepped up their efforts, which might have been a second explanation. 
A third explanation may be that the police are now sooner able to 
register an offence thanks to greater social sensitivity to crime and 
advanced computerization. However, this would not solely apply to 
undocumented aliens, but to the entire population.  
5.6 Money transfers by immigrants 
The final topic in this chapter is the transfer of money by immigrants to 
their country of origin. Since we did not obtain any new data, we can 
only repeat our data from the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI report. People have 
always moved to other countries to obtain better living conditions and 
financially support those who stay behind (immediate and wider family, 
fellow villagers and compatriots from the area). Migrants often 
maintain strong financial links with their country of origin. According to 
recent estimates, the total money flow from migrants to their home 
countries is at least 100 billion dollars. This is greater than the amount 
of money devoted worldwide to development aid. 
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Table 5.7:  Private Transfers of Money to Selected Countries 1992-2001 (in millions of euros) 
Millions of euros 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
former labour recruitment 
countries 
           
Morocco 85 88 100 101 106 117 124 151 169 180 191
Turkey 124 132 141 146 151 168 175 216 227 250 249
Portugal  18 17 19 20 22 23 25 28 36 39 28
Spain 57 56 61 23 29 42 43 68 75 94 48
Former Yugoslavia 1 5 5 11 17 22 20 31 48 37 
Greece 4 3 7 7 7 7 7 8 11 12 11
 
Refugee countries 
     
Iraq 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Iran 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sri Lanka 6 5 5 8 5 7 5 5 7 9 9
Vietnam  0 1 1 5 9 9 9 9 11 13 12
China  0 0 2 4 9 7 9 10 12 11 12
Somalia 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zaire 3 1 3 4 4 3 1 0 0 0 0
Congo-Kinshasa  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Source: The Dutch Central Bank, Statistical Information Division 
 
In the Netherlands, Turks and to a lesser extent Moroccans transfer a 
great deal of money to their countries of origin. Further research 
indicates that the size of this financial support depends on features of 
the receiving as well as the sending households.18 Households in 
Turkey or Morocco that are in a dependent position, for example 
because they are headed by women with children, receive more money 
than households headed by men. In most cases this kind of transfer 
involves men who came to the Netherlands as guest workers while 
their wives and children remained back home. Research also shows 
that more affluent migrants transfer more money to their country of 
origin than less affluent migrants. Migrants with a job send at least 
four times as much money to their country of origin as those on social 
assistance benefits. Lastly, there is the issue of whether the financial 
transfers encourage others to migrate. Generally speaking this is the 
case. People from households in Turkey and Morocco that received 
generous sums of money from abroad are significantly more apt to 
intend to migrate themselves than people from households that 
received little or no money. 
 
                                               
18  See T. Fokkema and G. Groenewold, De migrant als suikeroom (The migrant 
as rich uncle) in: Demos June/July 2003 (www.nidi.nl/public/demos) 
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Appendix for Chapter 5 
Table A5.1: Population by Nationality (1995-2003) on December 31 
 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total 15,493,889 15,654,192 15,863,950 15,987,075 16,105,285 16,192,572 16,258,032
    
Dutch nationals 14,768,468 14,976,115 15,212,418 15,319,273 15,414,892 15,492,618 15,555,847
    
Non-Dutch nationals 725,421 678,077 651,532 667,802 690,393 699,954 702,185
 From    
Western countries 275,372 271,112 268,345 275,265 285,645 291,423 294,376
    
 14 EU countries 191,074 190,192 195,886 201,574 207,858 210,549 211,009
    
 Germany 53,922 53,914 54,272 54,811 55,572 56,060 56,466
 United Kingdom 41,146 39,153 39,466 41,404 43,604 44,052 43,678
 Belgium 24,111 24,443 25,382 25,860 26,148 26,306 26,223
    
Eastern Europe 48,964 45,240 33,763 32,748 34,519 36,505 38,871
    
 Yugoslavia (former)  33,513 28,417 15,565 12,904 12,122 11,754 11,586
 Soviet Union (former)  5,011 6,534 7,120 7,575 8,543 9,533 10,658
 Poland 5,910 5,680 5,645 5,944 6,312 6,912 7,431
 Czechoslovakia (former)  891 1,210 1,593 1,893 2,297 2,374 2,508
 Hungary  1,133 1,272 1,385 1,538 1,719 1,832 1,886
 Romania    2,735
    
Other Western countries 35,334 35,680 38,696 40,943 43,268 44,369 44,496
     
United States  12,769 12,980 14,074 14,751 15,217 15,412 15,075
Canada 2,574 2,702 2,892 3,130 3,398 3,435 3,456
Australia  2,013 2,031 2,522 2,802 3,201 3,352 3,383
Indonesia  8,159 7,970 8,717 9,338 10,127 10,786 11,185
Japan 5,347 5,369 5,507 5,626 5,771 5,747 5,813
    
Non-Western countries 435,387 368,637 316,819 305,493 297,749 292,962 296,829
    
Turkey 154,310 114,696 100,688 100,782 100,309 100,286 101,845
    
Morocco  149,841 135,721 119,726 111,396 104,262 97,843 94,380
Somalia  17,223 13,648 5,296 35,67 2,654 2,116 1,792
South Africa 1,444 1,769 2,512 2,864 3,230 3330 3321
Ghana  5,150 4,375 3,887 3,877 3,756 3,630 3,807
Cape Verde 2,111 1,786 1,567 1,404 1,352 1,289 1,364
Egypt  4,084 3,101 2,771 2,588 2,425 2,440 2,649
Ethiopia 3,653 1,870 1,280 1,203 1,161 1,166 1,194
Angola 1,633 1,679 1,184 982 946 1,009 993
Sudan 676 868 1,113 1,212 1,114 1,089 1,054
Congo 3,213 2,765 1,887 1,622 1,437 1,310 417
    
Suriname 15,174 11,760 8,665 8,469 8,491 8,573 9,406
Neth. Antilles and Aruba    
Colombia 1,569 1,718 1,790 1,636 1,668 1,743 1,919
Brazil 2,145 2,380 2,597 2,728 2,841 2,994 3,298
Dominican Republic 1,453 1,312 1,204 1,164 1,158 1,165 1,141
    
Iraq 9,694 13,008 10,025 8,639 6,919 4,771 4,182
Afghanistan  3,913 5,275 4,395 4,203 4,259 3,997 3,923
China  7,912 7,260 7,473 7,997 9,395 11,223 13,330
Iran 10,150 7,831 3,892 2,833 2,520 2,513 2,589
India  2,748 2,803 3,234 3,361 3,417 3,416 3,592
Vietnam  3,765 2,032 1,546 1,613 1,885 2,274 2,496
Pakistan 3,724 3,199 2,882 2,880 2,737 2,605 2,541
Hong Kong     
Sri Lanka 3,186 2,395 1,549 1,531 1,591 1,604 1,624
Philippines  2,363 2,428 2,351 2,417 2,427 2,597 2,841
Thailand 1,985 2,162 2,520 2,920 3,288 3,783 4,366
Syria 2,031 857 543 560 628 670 685
South Korea 722 910 1,079 1,193 1,280 1,421 1,477
    
unknown/stateless 14,662 38,328 66,368 87,044 106,999 115,569 110,980
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
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Table A5.2: Population by Ethnicity (1995-2003) on December 31 
In 2003 of which
  
 
 
1995 1997 1999 2001
 
 
2003 
First
generation
Second
generation
Total 15,493,889 15,654,192 15,863,950 16,105,285 16,258,032  
    
Native Dutch 12,995,175 13,033,792 13,088,648 13,140,336 13,169,880  
    
Of foreign descent 2,498,714 2,620,400 2,775,302 2,964,949 3,088,152 1,602,730 1,485,422
 from    
Western countries 1,327,601 1,341,947 1,366,535 1,406,596 1,419,855 581,656 838,199
     
 14 EU countries 731,929 733,059 739,309 748,930 748,417 274,837 473,580
    
 Germany 411,503 405,991 401,119 396,316 389,912 103,256 286,656
 United Kingdom 65,663 66,781 69,263 74,869 76,457 45,224 31,233
 Belgium 111,228 111,537 112,604 113,239 113,081 36,116 76,965
    
Eastern Europe 119,296 131,753 147,008 173,646 188,642 129,370 59,272
     
 Yugoslavia (former)  56,220 60,959 66,947 74,640 76,346 55,381 20,965
 Soviet Union (former)  13,485 17,334 22,625 34,903 42,033 32,734 9,299
 Poland 25,125 27,315 29,180 32,210 35,542 20,773 14,769
 Czechoslovakia (former)  7,106 7,616 8,274 9,456 9,813 5,716 4,097
 Hungary  11,454 11,742 11,917 12,359 12,564 5,503 7,061
  7,895 5,791 2,104
    
other Western countries 476,376 477,135 480,218 484,020 482,796 177,449 305,347
  0 0 0
United States  22,730 24,479 26,808 29,093 30,161 18,723 11,438
Canada 9,519 10,370 11,217 12,199 12,660 4,451 8,209
Australia  10,355 11,076 12,230 13,493 14,221 5,038 9,183
Indonesia  411,622 407,885 405,155 402,663 398,502 133,503 264,999
Japan 6,355 6,475 6,674 7,078 7,215 5,926 1,289
    
Non-Western countries 1,171,113 1,278,453 1,408,767 1,558,353 1,668,297 1,021,074 647,223
    
Turkey 271,514 289,777 308,890 330,709 351,648 194,319 157,329
    
Morocco  225,088 241,982 262,221 284,124 306,219 166,464 139,755
Somalia  20,060 25,842 28,780 28,979 25,001 17,368 7,633
South Africa 9,629 10,737 12,524 14,378 15,164 8,133 7,031
Ghana  12,480 13,973 15,609 17,232 18,727 11,903 6,824
Cape Verde 16,662 17,478 18,242 19,012 19,666 11,437 8,229
Egypt  11,598 12,738 14,398 16,108 17,873 10,709 7,164
Ethiopia 7,978 8,460 8,997 9,783 10,236 7,233 3,003
Angola 2,594 3,352 4,477 7,962 12,281 10,096 2,185
Sudan 943 1,936 3,919 6,935 7,626 6,319 1,307
Congo 4,546 5,147 6,115 7,657 1,616 1,075 541
    
Suriname 280,615 290,467 302,514 315,177 325,281 187,990 137,291
Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba 
86,824 92,105 107,197 124,870 130,722 84,024 46,698
Colombia 4,937 6,002 7,025 8,122 9,366 6,369 2,997
Brazil 6,589 7,639 8,913 10,237 11,638 7,171 4,467
Dominican Republic 5,321 6,174 7,341 8,676 9,546 6,866 2,680
    
Iraq 11,278 22,295 33,449 41,323 42,931 35,909 7,022
Afghanistan  4,916 11,551 21,468 31,167 36,043 32,123 3,920
China  23,471 26,191 29,759 35,691 41,694 29,422 12,272
Iran 16,478 20,685 22,893 26,789 28,438 23,929 4,509
India  9,476 10,302 11,516 12,589 13,363 8,859 4,504
Vietnam  12,937 13,801 14,717 16,012 17,536 11,901 5,635
Pakistan 14,127 15,135 16,149 17,325 17,990 10,879 7,111
Hong Kong  17,147 17,304 17,510 17,789 17,965 10,119 7,846
Sri Lanka 5,636 6,463 7,685 9,053 9,812 7,122 2,690
Philippines  7,738 8,868 9,857 11,100 12,401 8,012 4,389
Thailand 5,576 6,503 7,701 9,450 11,462 8,374 3,088
Syria 3,604 4,324 5,397 7,736 8,803 6,623 2,180
South Korea 1,492 1,819 2,245 2,764 3,328 2,106 1,222
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
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Table A5.3:  Non-native Population Forecasts by Country of Origin in the Netherlands (2002 – 2050) 
    2002 2010 2030 2050 
    x1000       
Non-Western 1st generation 972 1,136 1,448 1,606 
 2nd generation 587 838 1381 1852 
 Total 1,558 1,974 2,829 3,458 
Western 1st generation 575 636 915 1,065 
 2nd generation 831 866 998 1,155 
 Total 1,407 1,502 1,914 2,220 
Turkey 1st generation 186 204 230 229 
 2nd generation 145 191 265 318 
 Total 331 394 495 547 
Morocco 1st generation 160 178 209 217 
 2nd generation 125 181 271 320 
 Total 284 359 481 537 
Suriname 1st generation 186 192 191 160 
 2nd generation 129 158 197 220 
 Total 315 349 387 380 
Neth. Antilles and Aruba 1st generation 82 93 120 136 
 2nd generation 43 60 105 151 
 Total 125 153 225 288 
Africa 1st generation 120 140 178 216 
 2nd generation 58 95 178 253 
 Total 178 235 356 469 
Asia 1st generation 201 276 425 526 
 2nd generation 67 121 288 458 
 Total 268 397 713 984 
Latin America 1st generation 37 54 95 122 
 2nd generation 21 33 77 132 
 Total 58 87 172 254 
Indonesia 1st generation 137 121 85 65 
 2nd generation 265 266 256 196 
 Total 403 387 341 261 
EER 1st generation 278 290 367 404 
 2nd generation 476 474 462 496 
 Total 754 765 829 901 
Other European 1st generation 124 188 396 522 
 2nd generation 59 89 213 361 
 Total 184 276 608 883 
Other non-European 1st generation 35 37 69 74 
 2nd generation 31 38 67 102 
  Total 67 74 135 176 
Source: Alders, M., Statistics Netherlands, 2003   
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Table A5.7: Naturalization of Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin 1996-2003
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total 82,687 59,831 59,173 62,093 49,968 46,667 45,321 28,799
    
    
Western countries 9764 11,257 11,927 13,746 8569 6214 5501 3956
    
EU countries 3520 2904 2419 2127 1848 1884 2049 1621
    
 Germany 776 567 558 580 508 573 608 445
 United Kingdom 1,174 912 578 453 374 356 394 294
 Belgium 287 183 200 189 164 189 223 250
    
Eastern Europe 4,950 7,362 8,634 10,769 5,948 3,572 2,678 1,659
    
 Yugoslavia (former) 2,283 5,412 6,668 7,993 3,809 1,647 938 539
 Soviet Union (former) 591 586 826 1,510 1,103 879 758 503
 Poland 1129 827 677 688 587 597 530 318
    
other Western 1294 991 874 850 773 758 774 676
    
 United States 489 410 261 161 160 168 225 181
 Canada 121 109 108 74 51 65 66 54
 Indonesia 436 314 368 514 456 416 380 291
    
Non-Western countries 72,108 47,891 46,044 43,724 33,999 32,653 30,173 24,843
    
 Turkey 30,704 21,189 13,484 5,214 4,708 5,513 5,391 3,726
    
 Morocco 15,598 10,478 11,252 14,217 13,471 12,721 12,033 7,126
 Egypt 1,077 551 393 496 443 528 437 190
 Somalia 3,002 2,141 4,918 3,487 1,634 873 378 180
 Ghana 1,208 737 502 432 348 360 357 157
 Nigeria 268 166 98 153 143 196 214 96
    
  Suriname 4,445 3,019 2,991 3,194 2,008 2,025 1,957 1,242
  Colombia 409 354 288 341 382 259 274 112
  Brazil 319 279 227 257 231 290 249 137
  Dominican Republic 387 207 217 235 200 206 143 91
    
  Iraq 854 798 2,721 3,834 2,403 2,315 2,367 832
  Afghanistan 360 217 905 1,847 945 803 1,118 982
  China 1,394 975 800 977 1,002 1,111 908 722
  Iran 2,299 1,285 1,806 2,560 1,375 754 336 180
  Thailand 319 253 235 275 277 355 289 171
  Philippines 401 279 298 295 300 348 263 159
  India 407 249 234 235 242 309 250 138
  Pakistan 630 296 287 277 237 255 241 132
    
 Stateless 815 683 1,202 4,623 7,400 7,800 9,647 6,624
Source: Statistics Netherlands  
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Table A5.8:  Dutch and Non-native Population by Gender and Age in % (2003) 
 Dutch Non-native (Western) Non-native (non-Western) 
Age male female total male female total male female total
0 to 5  6.2 5.8 6.0 4.8 4.2 4.5 10.2 10.2 10.2
5 to 10  6.0 5.6 5.8 4.7 4.1 4.4 9.4 9.4 9.4
10 to 15  6.2 5.8 6.0 4.9 4.4 4.6 9.4 9.3 9.3
15 to 20  5.9 5.5 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.8 9.4 9.0 9.2
20 to 25  5.7 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.8 5.8 9.3 9.9 9.6
25 to 30  5.9 5.6 5.7 6.8 7.2 7.0 8.7 9.6 9.1
30 to 35  7.6 7.2 7.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 9.7 10.0 9.9
35 to 40  8.1 7.7 7.9 8.9 8.7 8.8 9.4 8.6 9.0
40 to 45  8.2 7.8 8.0 8.3 8.2 8.2 7.8 7.2 7.5
45 to 50  7.7 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.7 5.4 5.5 5.4
50 to 55  7.3 6.9 7.1 8.2 7.8 8.0 3.7 3.9 3.8
55 to 60  7.2 6.9 7.1 7.8 7.1 7.4 2.8 2.7 2.8
60 to 65  5.2 5.1 5.1 6.3 5.7 6.0 2.3 1.9 2.1
65 or older 12.9 17.5 15.2 12.0 16.2 14.2 2.5 2.7 2.6
Total (N) 6,510,578
(49.4%)
6,659,302 
(50.6%) 
13,169,880
(100%)
681,536
(48.0%)
738,319
(52.0%)
1,419,855
(100%)
853,800 
(51.2%) 
814,497 
(48.8%) 
1,668,297
(100%)
Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline 
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Chapter 6 Labour Market Integration of 
non-Western Immigrants in the 
Netherlands 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the socio-economic position of first and second-
generation non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands. Since the early 
1980s, the Netherlands has had extensive policies in place to improve 
the labour market position of non-Western immigrants. They were first 
framed as minority policies, and since the mid 1990s as integration 
policies. More specifically, they focus on the two groups of former guest 
workers (Turks and Moroccans) and the two groups of post-colonial 
immigrants (Surinamese and Antilleans). These immigrants are also 
referred to as ethnic minorities or simply minorities. In this chapter we  
use the phrase non-Western immigrants, but the reader should bear in 
mind that in addition to the immigrants themselves, the analysis 
pertains to their children born in the Netherlands (first and second-
generation immigrants). 
 The main issue in this chapter is the labour market position of non-
Western immigrants. Since an adequate educational level is an 
important precondition for labour market participation, we first 
examine the changing educational levels of non-Western immigrants in 
the Netherlands (6.2). We then describe various aspects of the labour 
market position of minorities such as the extent of employment or 
unemployment (6.3), various aspects of the employment position of 
immigrant workers (6.4) and the extent to which immigrants and the 
native Dutch receive social assistance and other benefits (6.5). We 
conclude with a more theoretical discourse on possible explanations for 
the poor labour market position of non-Western immigrants (6.6).  
 We start with some information about the empirical sources used in 
this chapter. Most of the statistics in this chapter are derived from two 
surveys. The Labour Force Survey (Enquête Beroepsbevolking) 
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conducted by Netherlands Statistics is an annual large-scale survey in 
which 80,000 to 90,000 people from 50,000 to 60,000 households are 
annually interviewed. The number of respondents is large enough to 
allow for statements about the labour market position of the four 
immigrant groups mentioned above (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese 
and Antilleans). In addition, the Labour Force Surveys distinguish a 
rapidly growing category of immigrants from other non-Western 
countries, including asylum-seekers from various parts of the world. 
The native Dutch respondents in the Labour Force Surveys are 
considered representative of the Dutch population as a whole. 
 The Social Position and Facility Usage of Non-Western Immigrants 
Survey (Sociale Positie en Voorzieningengebruik Allochtonen or SPVA) 
has been conducted every four years since the 1990s and is especially 
designed  to monitor the social position of the four largest non-Western 
immigrant groups in the Netherlands. To reach respondents in non-
Western immigrant groups, the survey is held in specific urban districts 
with large concentrations of non-Western immigrants. In the 2002 
survey, a total of 8.321 respondents from the four major non-Western 
immigrant groups were interviewed. The SPVA contains no information 
about other non-Western or Western immigrant groups. The SPVA does 
give information about a native Dutch comparison group, but the 
native Dutch SPVA respondents  are not representative of the Dutch 
population as a whole since they also live in the specific relatively poor 
immigrant districts of the Dutch cities. 
 In both surveys, members of immigrant groups are identified 
according to the standard definition formulated by Netherlands 
Statistics, according to which someone is an immigrant if they are born 
outside the Netherlands of at least one foreign-born parent or if they 
are born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. As in earlier 
chapters, the term immigrant refers to the second as well as the first 
generation.  
6.2 Educational level of non-Western immigrants 
Although this chapter focuses on the labour market integration of non-
Western immigrants, we would also like to say something about their 
educational level. The reason for doing so is obvious. In our type of 
society, a good education is a prerequisite for a good labour market 
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position. A major problem for immigrants from the Third World to 
countries like the Netherlands is often that they are not adequately 
schooled for the current post-industrial labour markets. One might 
however expect the educational level of younger members of 
immigrant groups, especially the second generation born in the 
Netherlands, to be significantly higher than that of their parents. This 
raises the question of how the minority educational level has developed 
in recent years. 
 Table 6.1 shows that the minority educational level, especially of the 
former guest workers (Turks and Moroccans), was still very low in 
2002. It also shows that their educational level is slowly increasing. In 
1998, 65% of the Turks and no fewer than 74% of the Moroccans had 
only completed primary school, if that. Four years later in 2002, the 
percentage of Turkish and Moroccan respondents with only primary 
school fell to 51 and 58%. The percentage of Turks and Moroccans with 
college or university degrees increased in the same period from 4 to 6 
and 8%. This means that though Turks and Moroccans still tend to be 
poorly educated, there have been small improvements. The post-
colonial migrants (Surinamese, Antilleans) are relatively better 
educated. From 1998 to 2002, the percentage of very poorly educated 
people with only primary school in both groups fell from 29 to around 
20%. In 2002, 15% of the Surinamese and 20% of the Antillean adults 
had graduated from a college or university. 
 
Chapter 6 
88 
Table 6.1. Educational Level of Post-School Age Workers (14-65) by Ethnic Descent and Gender (1998-2002) 
 native Dutch Turks Moroccans Surinames Antilleans 
 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002
All respondents 
primary school 18 12 65 51 74 58 29 22 29 20
 lower vocational and 
general secondary 
school  27 25 16 23 10 14 31 33 30 32
intermediate 
vocational and general 
secondary school  26 41 15 20 11 21 24 31 27 28
Higher education  28 23 4 6 4 8 15 14 15 20
(N) (2024) (2880) (1897) (2234) (1553) (2404) (1367) (1157) (906)
Male 
primary school 18 11 58 43 72 53 28 19 23 18
lower vocational and 
general secondary 
school  26 22 19 27 12 15 34 33 29 31
intermediate 
vocational and general 
secondary school  25 42 17 22 11 22 21 32 28 29
Higher education  30 24 6 8 6 10 16 15 20 23
(N) (930) (1521) (1016) (1297) (851) (1058) (653) (489) (441)
Female 
primary school  18 12 71 61 79 63 30 25 32 22
lower vocational and 
general secondary 
school 29 27 13 19 8 13 30 32 30 33
intermediate 
vocational and general 
secondary school  27 40 13 18 11 19 26 30 26 27
Higher education  26 21 3 3* 2 5 14 13 12 18
(N) (1081) (1356) (882) (933) (701) (1340) (714) (665) (465)
* small number of observations (N < 35) 
Source: SVPA 1998 and SVPA 2002 
 
However, the native Dutch improved their educational level as well and 
the question remains whether the non-Western immigrants were able 
to improve their educational position relative to the native Dutch. Are 
they slowly catching up or losing ground? The figures in Table 1 show a 
clear improvement. In 1998, the percentage of Turks and Moroccans 
with only a primary school education was 4 to 5 times higher than 
among the native Dutch. In 2002, Turks and Moroccans only had a 
primary school education 3.5 and 4 times as often. At the high end, 
these minority groups are also slowly improving their position. In 1998, 
the native Dutch still had a college or university education 7 times 
more often than Turks or Moroccans. Four years later, it was only 4 
times more often than the Turks and 3 times more often than the 
Moroccans. Although very slowly, the Turks and Moroccans are catching 
up.  
 The educational position of the Surinamese and Antillean groups is 
much better. In 2002, the percentage of Antillean and Surinamese 
respondents with only primary school was around 70 to 80% higher 
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than among the native Dutch. In the same year, the percentage of 
well-educated Antillean and Surinamese was only 10 to 40% lower 
than among the native Dutch. As is clear later in this chapter, the 
improved Surinamese and Antillean educational position also means 
much better chances on the Dutch labour market than the still 
predominantly poorly educated Turks and Moroccans.  
 It might not be surprising that so many Turks and Moroccans have 
so little formal education since many of them came to the Netherlands 
to fill the vacancies at the time doing unskilled work at Dutch factories. 
Many of these former guest workers and their spouses did not have 
any formal education at all before they came to the Netherlands. In 
examining the changing educational position of non-Western 
immigrants, it is better not to look at the whole population but only the 
younger generation (15-25).19  
 
Figure 6.1. Achieved Educational Level of 15-24 Age Group No Longer at School by Ethnic Origin (1988-2002) 
(in %) 
Source: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, 2003 Report on Minorities (Social and Cultural Planning Bureau 2003: 46) 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the changes in the educational level of the native 
Dutch and non-Dutch youth from 1988 to 2002. The figure only shows 
                                               
19  The remainder of this section on education is taken from: Social and Cultural 
Planning Bureau, 2003 Report on Minorities (Social and Cultural Planning 
Bureau 2003) 
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the educational level of young people no longer at school. The darker 
colours stand for a lower educational level. The figure clearly shows 
rising educational levels, especially among the non-Dutch youth. The 
percentage of poorly and very poorly educated young people is 
especially high among Turks and Moroccans and to a lesser extent the 
Surinamese and Antillean youth. Although the percentage of well-
educated native Dutch youths is still much higher, the various 
immigrant groups have been slightly catching up.  
 One important reason for the high percentage of poorly educated 
youth, especially Turks and Moroccans, is premature school dropout. 
Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of native Dutch and non-Dutch youths 
(15-34) who left school without a diploma. The figure shows that 
although premature school dropout rates have declined in recent years, 
they are still rather high among minority youths. In 1998, one in four 
young Turks and Moroccans left school without a diploma. For years, 
premature school dropout among these groups has declined, but it is 
still rather high, since 21% of the Turks and 17% of the Moroccans left 
school without a diploma. Premature school dropout rates did not 
decline in recent years among Surinamese and Antilleans, but are 
lower than among Turks and Moroccans. Premature school dropout 
occurs least among native Dutch youth (6% in 1998, no data available 
about 2002). 
 
Figure 6.2. Premature School Dropout by Ethnic Origin, 15-34 Age Group (1998 and 2002) 
Source: SVPA 1998 and 2002 
 
A further examination of the figures drawn up by the Social and 
Cultural Planning Bureau (2003) shows that the Turkish and Moroccan 
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premature school dropout rates declined more among young females 
than males. In 1998, young Turkish and Moroccan women left school 
without a diploma more often than their male counterparts. These 
differences had however disappeared by 2002. According to the Social 
and Cultural Planning Bureau, this is another sign that young Turkish 
and Moroccan women are catching up. The Social and Cultural Planning 
Bureau also explains the differences between the ethnic groups in 
premature school dropout rates by noting that since non-Dutch youths 
do not do as well at primary school, they have less chance of 
successfully completing secondary school. Their poor performance at 
primary school can largely be explained by their parents’ poor 
educational level and their own insufficient command of Dutch when 
they start school. Other risk factors explaining premature minority 
dropout include growing up in lone parent families and living in big 
cities. According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, (2003), a 
new explanation for the high minority premature school dropout rates 
is the tendency of primary schools to “over-advise” non-Dutch pupils. 
Given their performance at primary school, pupils sent to higher-level 
secondary schools run a greater risk of premature school dropout. 
Pupils who are unable to meet the standards at secondary school tend 
to leave school altogether rather than switch to a lower-level school. 
6.3 Ethnic minority employment and unemployment 
After a very favourable period of economic growth in the second half of 
the 1990s, sometimes referred to in international literature as the 
“Dutch miracle” (cf. Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Schmid 1999), the 
Netherlands experienced an economic downturn starting in 2001. As 
the job growth and historically low unemployment levels came to an 
end, the Netherlands had to face rising unemployment again. In the 
2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, we note that at first the new economic 
recession did not hurt the non-Western immigrants, especially Turks 
and Moroccans, as much as it hurt native Dutch workers, since the first 
dismissals predominantly pertained to high-level jobs. Most Turks and 
Moroccans have lower-level jobs and were less affected at first by the 
recession. In this section we examine whether this changed in 2003. 
We start however with an overview of the employment and 
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unemployment figures of native Dutch and non-Dutch residents of the 
Netherlands since the mid-1990s. 
 
Changing minority labour market position in the Netherlands (1994-
2002) 
In the late 1990s in particular, the Netherlands experienced a very 
favourable period of economic growth and a continuous rise in the 
number of jobs. The number of employed people in the Netherlands 
(who work at least 12 hours a week, including part-time workers) rose 
from less than 6 million in 1994 to 7 million in 2002. This means an 
almost 20% increase in the total number of working people in eight 
years. In 2003 however the Netherlands witnessed a decline in the 
number of jobs for the first time in many years. From 2002 to 2003, 
the total number of working people decreased by more than 30,000. In 
this section, we analyse how the immigrant groups fared in this decade 
of economic growth and decline. Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the 
key indicators of the changing labour market position of native Dutch 
and ethnic minority workers in the Netherlands from 1994 to 2003. The 
tables the figures are based on are in the Appendix. The tables in the 
Appendix also show the differences in employment and unemployment 
between men and women for each population category. 
 Figure 6.2 distinguishes three key indicators to describe the 
changing labour market position of various categories in the Dutch 
population: gross labour participation, net labour participation and 
unemployment rates. For each population group, the gross labour 
participation shows the percentage of working age people in the 15 to 
64 age group who are either working or unemployed but actively 
seeking a job and the net labour participation shows the percentage of 
working age people who are actually employed for at least 12 hours a 
week. The gross labour participation describes all the labour market 
participants and the net labour participation describes the actual 
workforce. For each population category, the unemployment rate 
shows the number of unemployed people as a percentage of all the 
labour market participants. 
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Figure 6.3:  Gross and Net Labour Participation and Unemployment by Ethnic Descent (1994-2003) 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the development of these three labour market 
position indicators presents a very clear picture. In the early 1990s the 
labour market participation of non-Western immigrants was still rather 
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low and their unemployment rates were dramatically high. If the 
Netherlands was a “welfare state without work” (Esping-Andersen 
1996), this was particularly true of these two groups at the time. In 
particular, Turks and Moroccans exhibited a disastrous combination of 
low labour market participation and high unemployment. In 1994 only 
around 40% of the Turkish and Moroccan adults in the Netherlands 
were on the labour market and less than 30% were gainfully employed. 
The other two immigrant groups, post-colonial migrants from Suriname 
and the Netherlands Antilles, were doing better on the labour market. 
In 1994, from 55 to 60% of the working age Surinamese and Antilleans 
were on the labour market and around 45% of them were gainfully 
employed. The native Dutch population exhibited a gross labour 
participation of 63% and a net labour participation of 58%. 
 The differences in the labour market participation of the various 
ethnic groups can be explained by several factors: the number of 
women who are not on the labour market, the age structure of the 
various groups (a group with numerous school-age children will exhibit 
low labour market participation) and the number of people who are no 
longer on the labour market (labour market dropouts), a category that 
includes the long-term unemployed no longer looking for a new job and 
the physically disabled due to health problems. All three factors 
influence the extremely low labour market participation of Turks and 
Moroccans in the Netherlands. Many Turkish and Moroccan women are 
not on the labour market because they work in the household. The 
Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands are relatively 
young and have numerous school-age children. In addition, there is 
considerable labour market dropout among the former guest workers 
due to persistent unemployment and widespread health problems. As is 
noted in this chapter, Turks and Moroccans are thus over-represented 
among social assistance as well as disability benefit recipients. 
 The question is however whether and to what extent non-Western 
immigrants were able to improve their labour market position during 
the period of economic growth in the second half of the 1990s. In other 
words, to what extent were immigrant groups able to benefit from this 
prosperous period in the Dutch economy? As Figure 6.3 shows, non-
Western immigrants in the Netherlands were able to improve their 
labour market position during this period and in part were actually able 
to catch up with native Dutch. This is especially clear as regards the 
development of the net labour participation and unemployment rates of 
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various ethnic groups from 1994 to 2001. As noted above, the total 
working population in the Netherlands increased by more than 20% in 
a short period from 1994 to 2002. As Table 6.2 shows, the rise in the 
number of working people was much larger among various immigrant 
groups than among the native Dutch. In fact the number of employed 
immigrant workers in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans 
and other non-Western residents) more than doubled from 1994 to 
2002.  
 
Table 6.2.  Number of Working People (at least 12 hours a week) (1994-2003) 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2002 2003
 x 1000  1994=100 
Native Dutch 5,223 5,318 5,617 5,831 5,961 5,954 114 114
Non-Western immigrant 262 318 384 460 523 509 200 194
Turks 51 62 72 92 100 98 196 192
Moroccans 34 44 60 58 82 74 241 218
Surinamese 106 103 119 134 137 139 129 131
Antilleans 21 27 31 42 49 47 233 224
Other non-Western immigrants 50 81 102 134 154 151 308 302
Total 5747 5953 6385 6751 7006 6972 122 121
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (Labour Force Surveys) 
 
Although these figures may in part also result from population growth 
as such in the various communities (especially among immigrants from 
other non-Western countries), the net labour participation of non-
Western immigrants also increased. The net labour participation is a 
more reliable measure for changes in the labour market position since 
it corrects for population growth as such. As is noted above, in 1994 
the net labour participation of Turks and Moroccans was extremely low, 
with less than 30% of the adults gainfully employed, though by 2002 
this figure had increased to around 45%. There are two ways to look at 
these figures. It can be argued that with less than half the Turkish and 
Moroccan adults gainfully employed, their labour participation is still 
very low. It should be acknowledged though that relatively speaking, 
the net labour market participation of Turks and Moroccans increased 
very quickly and in part, they have been able to catch up with the 
native Dutch. 
 The improved labour market position of immigrants in the 
Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s is especially clear as 
regards the third indicator, the unemployment rates. In 1994, 
unemployment among Turks and Moroccans as well as Surinamese and 
Antilleans was still very high (about 30 and 20% respectively). From 
1994 to 2002 however, unemployment among non-Western immigrants 
fell to less than 10%. But here as well, there are various ways to look 
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at these figures. Since unemployment also fell among the native Dutch 
in this period, it can be argued that relatively speaking, immigrant 
groups did not improve their situation. In 1994 as well as 2002, 
unemployment was two to three times as high among immigrant 
groups as among the native Dutch. This did not change in the 1990s. 
Other observers stress the considerable or even “spectacular” decline 
in minority unemployment and argue that at less than 10%, minority 
unemployment had reached an “acceptable level” (Dagevos 2001 and 
2002, Veenman 2003a). 
 
Recent changes in the minority labour market position in the 
Netherlands (2001-2003) 
 
The conclusion is thus that non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands 
were indeed able to benefit from the favourable economy in the late 
1990s and improve their labour market position. Another question is, 
however how they fared in the recent recession. The 2003 Report on 
Minorities drawn up by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office 
reported last year that non-Western immigrants (especially Turks and 
Moroccans) seemed to be less affected by the current recession than 
the native Dutch. The following table shows the most recent ethnic 
minority and Dutch unemployment figures. 
 
Table 6.3.  Number and Percentage of Unemployed by Ethnic Descent (2001-2003) 
 Number of unemployed (x 1000) Unemployment rate (in %) 
  2001 2003 Difference 2001-03 2001 2003  Difference 2001-03
Native Dutch 172 262 52.3 2.8 4.2 50.0
Turks 9 16 77.8 7.9 14.4 82.3
Moroccans 8 15 87.5 10.1 17.0 68.3
Surinamese 9 15 66.7 6.4 10.0 56.3
Antilleans/Arubans 4 9 125.0 8.6 16.6 93.0
Other Non-Western immigrants 19 29 52.6 11.1 16.3 46,8
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations) 
 
The first two columns show the various groups’ absolute 
unemployment figures for 2001 and 2003. They show that 
unemployment increased in all non-Western immigrants, but the 
increase in various groups (Turks, Moroccans and especially Antilleans) 
was larger than in others. The divergent unemployment rates of the 
various immigrant groups in the table are also interesting. The rates 
rose most among Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans (around 80 
percentage points or more), and the Surinamese and immigrants from 
other non-Western countries were more similar to the native Dutch (an 
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increase in the total number of unemployed people of 50 to 70 
percentage points).  
 The same pattern emerges if we examine the unemployment rates 
of various ethnic groups rather than the absolute numbers of 
unemployed people. These data are more reliable because they are not 
influenced by possible population growth in the categories as such. The 
large unemployment growth among the Antilleans is thus partly the 
result of population growth as such (more Antilleans on the labour 
market) and partly of the rising unemployment rates in the group. The 
data on changing unemployment rates clearly show that the current 
recession affects the various ethnic groups in different ways. Although 
all the ethnic groups have experienced higher unemployment rates in 
recent years, this was true for some groups more than others. Among 
the native Dutch, the Surinamese and migrants from other non-
Western countries, unemployment rates increased by approximately 50 
percentage points from 2001 to 2003. Among the Turks, Moroccans 
and Antilleans the unemployment rates increased by 70 percentage 
points or more in the same period. This means last year’s finding that 
Turks and Moroccans were less affected by the current recession 
appears to be an anomaly.  
All in all, the current labour market position of non-Western 
immigrants in the Netherlands is far less favourable than we thought 
last year. Although we should not forget the major improvements in the 
minority labour market position in the late 1990s that actually lasted 
until 2001, most of the recent unemployment figures show that the 
improvements are rather weak (especially among Turks, Moroccans 
and Antilleans, though perhaps less among the Surinamese) and that 
unemployment rates are rising again, although fortunately not to the 
dramatic levels of the mid-1990s. 
 
Explaining unemployment among non-Western immigrants20 
 
Another question is how to explain the higher unemployment rates 
among non-Western immigrants. Are they due to a shortage of human 
capital, especially formal education, as human resource theorists tend 
to believe, or do other factors such as discrimination play a role? The 
2003 Report on Minorities drawn up by the Social and Cultural Planning 
                                               
20  This section is completely taken from: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, 
2003 Report on Minorities, pp. 219-221. 
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Bureau addresses this question using empirical data from the SVPA and 
sophisticated statistical techniques. The analysis goes as follows. 
Regression techniques are used to calculate the extent to which the 
risk of unemployment among the native Dutch can be explained by 
general factors such as age, sex and education. The coefficients 
obtained by these regression analyses show the average chance of a 
native Dutch person with specific characteristics being unemployed. 
The coefficients are then used to estimate the unemployment rates 
among various immigrant groups, assuming that immigrants run the 
same risk of unemployment as native Dutch people with the same 
characteristics. This provides an estimated unemployment percentage 
for each ethnic minority that would apply if a certain age, sex and 
education meant the same risk of unemployment as they do for the 
native Dutch. Lastly, the estimated unemployment rates for each ethnic 
minority group are compared with the actual unemployment rates. 
 
Table 6.4 Actual and Estimated Unemployment Percentages in Non-Western immigrants (2002)  
 Turks Moroccans Surinamese Antilleans 
 Actual Estimated Actual Estimated  Actual Estimated Actual Estimated 
Total 14 5 14 6 10 5 12 5 
Female 18 8 14 9 12 7 16 7 
Young people (15-24) 18 10 17 11 30 11 27 11 
Education in the Netherlands 9 5 11 5 6 4 7 4 
Adequate command of Dutch 9 4 10 5 6 4 9 4 
Well-educated (First degree+) 10 3 10 3 4 3 4 3 
         
Source: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, 2003 Report on Minorities, p. 211 (based on several surveys) 
 
The results of the analyses are shown in Table 6.4. For each ethnic 
group, the table shows an estimated unemployment rate, assuming 
that individual factors such as age, sex and education mean the same 
risk of unemployment as they do for the native Dutch. If the estimated 
unemployment rates of immigrants are the same as the actual ones, 
this means differences in individual characteristics such as age, sex 
and education are largely responsible for the unemployment 
differences between immigrants and the native Dutch. If the actual 
unemployment rates are higher than the estimated ones, the higher 
unemployment among immigrants cannot be attributed to the 
differences in individual characteristics alone and other factors play a 
role. 
 The data in Table 6.4 clearly show that the actual unemployment 
among non-Western immigrants is much higher than would be the case 
if they ran the same risk as the native Dutch of unemployment, given 
their individual characteristics. The differences between the estimated 
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and the actual unemployment rates differ however for each ethnic 
category. This difference is the greatest for the Turks and the least for 
the Surinamese. In everyday language, this means that even with the 
same education, non-Western immigrants run more risk of 
unemployment than the native Dutch. In other words, non-Western 
immigrants benefit less from their human capital than the native 
Dutch. This is most true of Turks and least true of the Surinamese. 
Another finding shown in the table is that minority women and younger 
people are much more frequently unemployed than one would expect 
on the basis of their individual characteristics. 
 According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, the 
differences between non-Western immigrants and the native Dutch can 
mainly be attributed to the fact that non-Western immigrants had most 
of their education outside the Netherlands and are less competent in 
Dutch language. The differences between the estimated and actual 
unemployment rates of immigrants are much smaller if the analysis 
only includes minority members whose Dutch and educational 
qualifications are good. However, even then the actual unemployment 
rate of Turks and Moroccans is higher than would be estimated based 
on individual characteristics such as age, sex and education. This is 
also the case with Turks and Moroccans with Dutch diplomas, a good 
command of the Dutch language or a higher education. Even then, the 
unemployment rate among Turks and Moroccans is considerably higher 
than among the native Dutch with the same characteristics. 
 There are however only slight differences between the estimated 
and actual unemployment levels of the Surinamese with favourable 
individual characteristics, particularly with high qualifications. 
According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, this is a clear 
indication of the improved Surinamese labour market position in recent 
years. Surinamese who speak good Dutch, are highly qualified and 
were educated in the Netherlands barely run a greater risk of 
unemployment than the native Dutch with comparable characteristics. 
Generally speaking, this is also true of Antilleans. However, these 
rather favourable outcomes do not apply to all the Surinamese and 
Antilleans. Young Surinamese and Antilleans are in a much less 
favourable situation. Given their individual characteristics, 
unemployment among young Surinamese and Antilleans should be 
about 10%. In reality this figure is much higher. 
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6.4 Non-Western immigrants and social benefits 
Another way to describe the ethnic minority labour market position is 
by the extent to which they are on social assistance or disability 
benefits. The picture presented in this analysis differs slightly from the 
earlier analyses of the labour market participation and unemployment 
of non-Western immigrants. Figures on labour market participation only 
give information on people who either work or are actively looking for a 
job. Figures on social assistance or disability benefit recipients also 
provide information on people who have left the labour market and are 
no longer actively seeking a job. Many labour market dropouts have 
been on social assistance or disability benefits for years. One might say 
that in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, it was not so much 
unemployment (people not having a job but actively seeking one) as 
the large labour market dropout that has been the main socio-
economic problem. A large percentage of the Dutch potential workforce 
(the entire 15-64 age group) has actually left the labour market, 
especially due to the extremely high disability rates in the Netherlands. 
 In this section we describe the distribution of social assistance or 
disability benefit recipients over various ethnic groups. As in the 
previous section, ethnic descent is defined by people’s birth country or 
their parents’ birth country. Non-Western immigrants are comprised of 
e all the first and second-generation immigrants from non-Western 
countries. In this section we also analyse how the first generation of 
immigrants differ in social benefit dependency from the second 
generation. In the analyses we examine three kinds of benefits, i.e. 
social assistance21, unemployment and disability benefits22. In the 
analyses we only include social assistance recipients younger than 65. 
 At the end of 2002, the Netherlands had slightly more than 1.5 
million social benefit recipients. This means almost 14% of the working 
age population (15-64) was on some kind of benefit at the time 
(figures from 2003 are not available yet). This high number of benefit 
recipients (given an employed working population of about 7 million 
people) is sometimes referred to as the dark side of the Dutch miracle. 
Although official unemployment was rather low in the Netherlands in 
                                               
21  National assistance (ABW) and special benefits for the long-term 
unemployed (IOAW/IOAZ). 
22  They include disability benefits for working people (WAO), entrepreneurs 
(WAZ) and people who were never able to work due to physical or mental 
health problems. 
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the late 1990s, there was a large labour market dropout. Given the 
high degree of ethnic minority inactivity, it is hardly surprising that 
they should be strongly over-represented among the social benefit 
recipients as well. No less than 12.5% of the working age Dutch 
population received some kind of benefit and the percentage of ethnic 
minority benefit recipients was almost twice as high (23.1%). Almost 
one in four ethnic minority working age adults was on some social 
benefit in 2002 (see Figure 6.4). 
 
Figure 6.4. Benefit Recipients by Ethnic Descent (1999 and 2002) (in %) 
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations) 
 
Figure 6.4 shows that in all the minority groups, the percentage of 
benefit recipients was slightly higher in 1999 than in 2002. This means 
immigrants were able to improve their social position at the end of the 
period of economic growth in the Netherlands and that in 2002 they 
had not been affected yet by the new recession. This may have 
changed in 2003. There are differences in the percentages of benefit 
recipients in the various immigrant groups. The percentage is highest 
among Turks and Moroccans. At the end of 2002, about 29% of the 
Turkish and Moroccan adults received some kind of benefit. For the 
Surinamese, Antilleans and other non-Western immigrants, the 
percentage of benefit recipients was lower (around 20%), but still 
significantly higher than among the native Dutch (13%). 
 Figure 6.4 also reveals the type of benefit involved. In the 
Netherlands the large number of disability benefits (almost a million 
benefits and a working population of only seven million) is a matter of 
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great political concern. Figure 6.4 shows that the percentage of 
disability benefit recipients is especially high among Turks. At the end 
of 2002, 14% of the Turkish adults received a disability benefit. The 
percentage of disability benefit recipients was significantly lower in all 
the other ethnic groups: 10% among Moroccans, 9% among the 
Surinamese and the native Dutch and much lower still among 
Antilleans and immigrants from other non-Western countries. Earlier 
studies show however that the over-representation of Turks and 
Moroccans among disability benefit recipients is much larger if one 
takes into account that the number of working people entitled to 
disability benefits is relatively small in these groups. The over-
representation of Turks and Moroccans, male and female alike, among 
disability benefit recipients can be explained by a variety of factors:  
• Low educational level of Turks and Moroccans, so that that they 
often do unskilled work with a relatively high risk of health 
problems and disability 
• Industrial restructuring, so that many Turkish and Moroccan men 
lost their jobs when industries closed down and were offered a 
relatively favourable disability benefit instead of an unemployment 
benefit and social assistance after a few years 
• General stress of being an unskilled immigrant in a Western 
country, causing mental heath problems among the Turkish and 
Moroccan population 
• Cultural factors such as a different perception of illness and 
different behaviour during illness (Snel et al. 2002). 
 
In addition to disability benefits, non-Western immigrants are over-
represented among social assistance recipients as well. A total of 2.5% 
of the native Dutch adults were on social assistance in 2002, as 
compared with approximately 16% of the Moroccan, Antillean and 
other non-Western adults, 12% of the Turkish and10% of the 
Surinamese adults. In 1999, the percentage of social assistance 
recipients among these minority groups was even considerably higher. 
Here again, various factors can explain why non-Western immigrants 
receive benefits so much more often than the native Dutch: 
 
• Low educational level and industrial restructuring. Since many of 
the former guest workers specifically came to the Netherlands to do 
unskilled work in factories, they often became redundant when the 
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factories closed down and due to the more general tendency in the 
West of upgrading the employment structure. Although unskilled 
industrial jobs have partly been replaced by unskilled service jobs, 
they are not jobs many Turks and Moroccans have.  
• Single-parent households. One in seven Surinamese and one in four 
Antillean women are benefit recipients. Many of them are single 
mothers on social assistance, a fairly common phenomenon in these 
two population groups, due in part to the cultural tradition of 
matrifocality among Creole-Caribbean immigrants. 
• Illness. As is noted above, many Turks and Moroccans receive 
disability benefits. However, because of the specific regulations of 
the Dutch disability arrangements, low wage-earners are often not 
eligible for disability benefits, in which case they often end up on 
social assistance.  
 
Figure 6.5. Benefit Recipients by Ethnic Descent and Generation (1999 and 2002) 
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations) 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the percentages of benefit recipients among first and 
second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants are 
foreign-born and second-generation immigrants are born in the 
Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. The figure shows significant 
differences in the extent of benefit assistance dependency between 
first and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants 
are far more often benefit recipients than their children of the second 
generation. The differences can be partly explained by differences in 
age. Since the second generation is often much younger than the first, 
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although young immigrants are still coming to the Netherlands, they 
are less often unemployed or ill. The second generation is also more 
integrated into Dutch society. They are better educated, often in the 
Netherlands, and speak better Dutch than their parents and as a result 
are less often dependent on benefits. Both factors probably play a role.  
 Figure 6.5 also shows that the differences between the first and 
second generation in the percentage of benefit recipients are not the 
same in all immigrant groups. Moroccans exhibit the largest difference 
between the first and second generation: the percentage of first-
generation Moroccan benefit recipients is four times higher than of the 
second generation. The fact that the second generation does so much 
better than the first may be less the result of the successful integration 
of Moroccan youth into Dutch society than of their parents’ lack of 
integration. The percentage of Surinamese benefit recipients is only 2.5 
times higher in the first generation than the second. This shows that 
the Surinamese youth are not doing so much better than their parents, 
but it also shows that first-generation Surinamese immigrants are not 
doing that badly in the Netherlands. 
6.5 Labour position of non-Western immigrants  
Our emphasis up to now has been on labour market participation as 
such and whether minority workers are on the labour market or not. 
But as we see in Table 6.2, the number of minority workers has 
increased considerably since the mid-1990s. This makes us wonder to 
what extent minority workers have been able to improve their social 
position in recent years. This is why we now address the development 
of the occupational levels of native Dutch and minority workers, the 
economic branches they work in, the type of labour contracts they 
have (steady or flexible jobs) and how many hours they work. 
 The best indicator of whether minority workers have been able to 
improve their labour position is to look at their occupational levels 
(Figure 6.6, tables in the Appendix). 
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Figure 6.6. Native Dutch and Minority Workers by Occupational Level (1996 and 2002) (in %) 
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Labour Surveys 1996 and 2002 (our own computations) 
 
As the figure demonstrates, Turkish and Moroccan workers are 
especially over-represented in unskilled and lower-level occupations 
and this only changed marginally in the 1990s. In 1996, 70% of the 
male and female Turkish and Moroccan workers were in unskilled and 
lower-level occupations, as compared with 32% of the native Dutch 
workers. Six years later in 2002, the percentage of Turkish and 
Moroccan workers in lower-level occupations had dropped to just above 
60%. But since the percentage of native Dutch workers fell in these 
occupations as well, the over-representation of Turks and Moroccans at 
the lowest occupational levels remained more or less the same. At the 
high end, the percentage of Turks and Moroccans in high-level or 
academic occupations rose from 7% in 1996 to 10% in 2002, but was 
still very low, since the percentage of native Dutch workers in high-
level and academic occupations rose from 27% in 1996 to 31% in 
2002. As regards the figures by gender, Turkish and Moroccan women 
are even more over-represented in lower-level occupations than 
Turkish and Moroccan men (figures in Appendix). 
 Figure 6.6 also shows that other immigrant groups (Surinamese, 
Antilleans and other non-Western groups) are over-represented in the 
lower-level occupations, but to a much lesser extent than Turks and 
Moroccans. The percentage of Surinamese and Antillean workers in 
unskilled and lower-level occupations fell from 43% in 1996 to 39% in 
2002 (1.4 times more than native Dutch workers in both years). 
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Surinamese and Antillean women tend to be less over-represented in 
lower-level occupations than Surinamese and Antillean men. In fact the 
occupational distribution of Surinamese and Antillean women is quite 
similar to that of native Dutch women (figures in Appendix). The 
occupational distribution of other non-Western groups is in between 
those of Turks and Moroccans and Surinamese and Antilleans. Although 
on the average the other non-Western groups came later to the 
Netherlands than Turks and Moroccans, their occupational position is 
better, mainly because of the highly educated immigrants among them, 
especially asylum-seekers.  
 
Table 6.5: Working Population (15-64) by Ethnic Origin and Industrial Branch (1996 and 2002) (in %) 
  
All 
groups 1) 
Native 
Dutch 
Turks & 
Moroccans 
Surinamese 
& Antilleans 
Other non-
Western groups 
2002      
Total (x 1000) (7,125) (5,961) (182) (186) (154) 
Agriculture, fishing 2.9 3.3 3.8 0.5 0.6 
Building and industries 20.6 20.7 25.3 17.7 18.8 
Trade and repair of consumers articles 14.4 14.6 18.1 12.4 13.6 
Hotels, restaurants, etc. 3.1 2.7 5.5 5.4 13.6 
Transport and communication 5.8 5.6 6.6 7.0 7.1 
Commercial and financial services  16.1 15.6 16.5 17.7 17.5 
Local and other government services 7.7 7.8 4.9 11.3 5.2 
Education, health and other public services 23.8 24.3 15.9 23.1 17.5 
Other sectors 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.3 
Unknown 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.8 5.8 
1996      
Total (x1000) (6,185) (5,318) (106) (130) (81) 
Agriculture, fishing 3.9 4.3 3.8 0.8 2.5 
Building and industries 23.2 22.9 37.7 20.0 24.7 
Trade and repair of consumers articles 15.4 15.8 15.1 12.3 13.6 
Hotels, restaurants, etc. 2.8 2.4 3.8 3.1 16.0 
Transport and communication 6.3 6.4 4.7 8.5 4.9 
Commercial and financial services  13.9 13.7 14.2 16.2 12.3 
(Local) government 8.1 8.1 4.7 9.2 4.9 
Education, health and other public services 22.2 22.4 14.2 23.8 14.8 
Other sectors 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.2 
Unknown 2.2 2.1 2.8 2.3 3.7 
1)Includes ethnic origin unknown 
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Labour Surveys (1996 and 2002) 
 
Table 6.5 shows which industrial branches native Dutch and minority 
workers are in. As is expected, Turks and Moroccans still largely work 
in traditional industries and building. In 2002, one in four of the Turks 
and Moroccans worked in these branches. Six years earlier in 1996, the 
percentage of Turks and Moroccans working in traditional industries or 
building was even higher (37%). This illustrates the vulnerable labour 
market position of these minority groups. They still largely work in 
economic branches with fewer and fewer jobs. They barely have any 
access to branches with growing employment, such as the service 
industry. It is true however that in 2002, 18% of the Turks and 
Moroccans and 12% of the Surinamese and Antilleans worked in the 
retail trade. Another positive point is that all the minority groups 
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apparently found access to jobs working for local governments 
including subsidized job schemes. 
 
Table 6.6: Employees with Steady and Flexible Jobs by Ethnic Origin (2003) 
 All employees With steady 
jobs 
With flexible jobs 
 
   All flexible jobs Via employ-
ment agencies 
On call for 
work 
 x 1000 In %    
Native Dutch 5256 93.5 6.5 1.8 1.6 
All minority groups 468 84.4 15.6 6.6 2.8 
Turks 88 84.1 15.9 8.0 2.3 
Moroccans 71 81.7 18.3 5.6 4.2 
Surinamese 133 87.2 12.8 5.3 2.3 
Antilleans 44 88.6 11.4 6.8 2.3 
Other non-Western groups 132 81.8 18.2 7.6 3.0 
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations) 
 
Table 6.6 distinguishes employees with various ethnic backgrounds 
with steady and flexible jobs. Steady jobs are of unlimited duration and 
the employee works a set number of hours a week or a month. Flexible 
jobs are for a limited duration and/or irregular hours. Flexible jobs can 
be via temporary employment agencies or for work on call. Table 6.6 
shows that flexible jobs are much more common among minority than 
native Dutch workers: 94% of native Dutch workers have steady jobs, 
as compared with only 82 to 84% of Moroccan and Turkish workers and 
87 to 88% of Surinamese and Antillean workers. The percentages of 
flexible jobs among minority workers is twice as high for Surinamese 
and Antillean workers and three times as high for Moroccans as for 
native Dutch workers. Turks in particular often work for temporary 
employment agencies, which of course means a great deal of 
uncertainty, especially in recessions. People who work via temporary 
employment agencies are often the first to be dismissed when the 
economy gets worse. 
 
Table 6.7: Employees by Working Hours and Ethnic Origin (2003) 
 total 
< 12 
hours a week 
12-19 hours a 
week 
20-34 hours a 
week 
> 35 
hours a week 
  x 1000 In % 
Native Dutch 6,659 10.6 8.3 24.0 57.1 
All minority groups 565 9.9 7.3 21.1 61.6 
Turks 110 10.0 5.5 17.3 66.4 
Moroccans 81 8.6 9.9 14.8 66.7 
Surinamese 150 7.3 8.0 22.0 62.7 
Antilleans 51 7.8 5.9 25.5 58.8 
Other non-Western groups 173 12.7 6.9 24.3 56.1 
Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations) 
 
Table 6.7 shows the ‘working hour regimes’ of native Dutch and 
minority workers. Unexpectedly, we see that minority workers, in 
particular Turks and Moroccans, have full-time jobs (at least 36 hours a 
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week) more often than native Dutch workers. Native Dutch women in 
particular tend to work part-time at small part-time jobs (less than 20 
hours a week) or larger part-time jobs (20 to 34 hours a week). 
6.6 Explaining the weaker minority labour market 
position  
Although non-Western immigrants did improve their labour market 
position in the 1990s, it is still weak. Non-Western immigrants 
participate less on the labour market, are more often unemployed and 
benefit recipients than the native Dutch. Minority members who do 
work tend to be over-represented in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs that 
are flexible and often uncertain. This persistent weak labour market 
position is particularly true of the former guest workers and their 
families from Turkey and Morocco and less so of post-colonial migrants 
from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. In this section we review 
some explanations for the weak minority labour market position. 
Although most minority research is descriptive, some studies make an 
effort to explain the weak minority position (see Veenman 1997, 
Dagevos 1998, Dagevos et al. 1999, Odé 2002). We would now like to 
present a brief summary of the research findings. 
 The most important finding is that no single factor can explain the 
persistent poor minority position on the labour market, since a 
combination of factors is involved. The most important one is probably 
the lack of individual qualifications (education, work experience, 
command of Dutch). The high risk of minority unemployment can 
largely though not completely be explained by the lower minority 
educational level and other supply characteristics. Generally speaking, 
this is also why non-Western immigrants are over-represented in less 
qualified occupations than the native Dutch. With a better education 
completed in the Netherlands and a better command of Dutch, some of 
the labour market differences between the non-Western immigrants 
and the native Dutch would disappear. Inadequate individual 
qualifications do not however completely explain the differences. If we 
compare the non-Western immigrants with the native Dutch using 
comparable characteristics, the risk of unemployment and the chance 
of a lower level of employment are both higher among immigrant 
groups. In other words, they benefit less from their human capital. This 
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is much more the case with Turks and Moroccans than the Surinamese 
and Antilleans. 
 Another factor to explain the poor minority labour market position 
pertains to economic circumstances. Minority labour market 
participation and unemployment generally fluctuates with the economic 
climate. The same is true of the native Dutch but there is one 
important difference. In the 1990s, the immigrant groups were 
relatively late to benefit from the improving economic situation and the 
first to suffer from the recession. This can be explained using the 
theory of labour queuing. Non-Western immigrants, in particular Turks 
and Moroccans, are at the back of the supply queue because employers 
view them as the least productive. In a period of economic growth, 
job-seekers who are considered more productive are the first to find a 
job. Only if the supply of preferred workers has dried up do those at 
the back of the queue get a chance. And in periods of recession, the 
less attractive jobs disappear first and those at the back of the queue 
are the first to become unemployed. 
 Structural factors also play a role in explaining the weaker minority 
labour market position. Many of the current non-Western immigrants 
originally came to the Netherlands as guest workers and found jobs at 
Dutch factories. This made them exceptionally vulnerable when the 
Netherlands got caught up in the process of industrial restructuring, 
particularly after 1980. When factories closed down and numerous 
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs disappeared in the Netherlands, the 
new immigrants witnessed high levels of unemployment. The growth in 
employment in the 1980s was mostly in the service sector and 
pertained to better-qualified jobs. Non-Western immigrants with their 
low level of education were not qualified for these jobs (labour market 
mismatch). In addition, there were increasing numbers of unskilled or 
semi-skilled service occupations – the Swedish sociologist Esping-
Andersen (1993) refers to the upcoming service proletariat in the 
advanced Western economies – but women have greater access to 
these jobs than men. The result is that native Dutch, Surinamese and 
Antillean women are benefiting from the growth in employment in the 
unskilled or semi-skilled service occupations, but Turkish and Moroccan 
men are not. Turkish and Moroccan women are barely active on the 
labour market anyway. 
 Cultural factors also contribute to the weak position of non-Western 
immigrants. They are highly controversial, but it is only logical that the 
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sustained low labour market participation of Turks and Moroccans is 
partly a consequence of their cultural resistance to the notion of 
women working. More generally, the extent to which the unfavourable 
minority labour market position is due to the fact that these groups are 
generally less oriented to Dutch society has been investigated (Odé 
2002). The study reveals that in addition to their poor educational level 
and poor command of Dutch language, the minority cultural orientation 
also affects their labour market participation and the occupational level 
they achieve. In this study, cultural orientation pertains to the extent 
to which non-Western immigrants support typically modern values such 
as individualization and emancipation. In addition, the level of contact 
with the native Dutch has an important influence on minority 
employment chances and the occupational level they achieve. Having 
typically Western or modern views and maintaining informal contact 
also affect the risk of employment and the occupational level 
achieved.23 
 Another factor contributing to the poor position of non-Western 
immigrants on the labour market might be that they have less effective 
social networks. In the Netherlands many jobs are distributed via 
informal social contact rather than employment agencies or 
advertisements. But to benefit from this, job seekers need to have 
informal contact with people who give access to jobs or provide useful 
information about jobs, and this means people who are actively 
engaged in the employment process and these are likely to be native 
Dutch. The study by Odé (2002) shows that contact with native Dutch 
people increases the chance of a job and the occupational level of non-
Western immigrants. 
 One last significant explanation for the poor minority position is 
discrimination on the labour market (Veenman 2003b). Extensive 
research has been conducted to ascertain whether there is 
discrimination according to ethnic descent on the Dutch labour market 
(see overview: Veenman 2003). Bovenkerk conducted a classic study 
on labour market discrimination. He sent native Dutch and non-Dutch 
                                               
23  Of course the nature of the contact should be considered. Do some ethnic 
minority members have modern views and informal contact with Dutch 
people because they work and are highly educated? Or is the opposite true 
and do they work and are they better educated because they have modern 
views and informal contact with Dutch people? Only in the latter case can 
cultural orientation and social contact be considered a reason for the greater 
chance of a job and higher level of education of some ethnic minority 
members. Using panel data, Odé (2002) confirms this second scenario. 
Modern worldviews precede getting an education and having a job. 
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job applicants with exactly the same qualifications for a job interview. 
In 20% of the cases, a Surinamese or Spanish applicant did not get the 
job, but a native Dutch one with the same qualifications did. According 
to Bovenkerk this is indicative of discrimination. However, this 
conclusion has been contested. The employers might have had 
reasonable arguments to hire the native Dutch rather than the minority 
applicant (e.g. previous experience with Surinamese employees or the 
idea that customers would rather not be helped by minority staff).  
 Another way to investigate possible discrimination is via the 
decomposition method comparing, for example, the risk of 
unemployment among native Dutch and minority workers with similar 
individual characteristics such as educational level. Section 7.3 includes 
an example of this method. This method has been repeatedly used in 
the Netherlands and the outcome has always been a higher minority 
risk of unemployment and lower minority occupational positions, which 
can only be partly explained by an inadequate educational level. An 
unexplained remnant still remains that is not associated with the low 
minority educational level. This unexplained remnant was initially 
associated with discrimination, but this is not necessarily the case. In 
addition to their educational level and discrimination, the greater risk 
of unemployment and lower occupational level of migrants could also 
be due to other factors such as language proficiency, searching 
behaviour of job seekers, communication skills and so forth. 
 Veenman (2003b) notes that research shows that discrimination 
does occur in the Netherlands and has a negative effect on the minority 
labour market position, although we do not precisely know to what 
extent. He believes there are indications that labour market 
discrimination has decreased in recent years in the Netherlands, 
perhaps because of the favourable economic growth and resulting 
shortages on the labour market. If employers have a hard time finding 
employees, they cannot afford to reject people on the basis of ethnic 
descent. It remains to be seen whether discrimination will resurface in 
the present recession. 
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Appendices for Chapter 6 
 
Table A6.6:  Gross Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent* 1994-2003 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total population           
Native Dutch 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 69 70 70 
Of foreign descent 55 57 57 58 59 59 60 61 61 62 
 Western 61 62 62 64 64 65 66 66 66 68 
 non-Western 49 51 51 52 53 53 54 55 56 57 
  Turkish 42 43 45 45 45 46 49 52 51 54 
  Moroccan 40 43 43 45 48 46 39 47 51 56 
  Surinamese 59 61 62 61 66 65 69 66 67 68 
  Antillean 55 57 58 58 57 62 60 59 63 64 
  other non-Western 50 49 51 53 49 50 52 53 53 53 
Total 62 63 64 65 65 66 67 68 68 69 
Male           
Native Dutch 77 78 78 79 80 80 80 81 81 81 
Of foreign descent 68 69 69 69 70 70 71 70 71 72 
 Western 74 74 73 74 75 75 77 76 77 78 
 non-Western 61 63 63 63 64 64 65 65 66 67 
  Turkish 58 59 59 61 60 61 67 67 66 69 
  Moroccan 53 59 59 60 63 63 54 61 65 64 
  Surinamese 67 70 71 65 72 71 77 71 72 75 
  Antillean 67 69 67 62 70 76 66 68 70 72 
  other non-Western 61 59 61 64 59 61 63 63 63 61 
Total 75 76 77 77 78 78 79 79 79 79 
Female           
Native Dutch 48 50 51 53 54 55 56 57 59 60 
Of foreign descent 42 45 46 47 47 48 49 51 50 52 
 Western 47 51 52 53 53 55 56 58 56 58 
 non-Western 36 38 38 40 41 40 41 44 45 46 
  Turkish 23 27 29 27 27 30 30 36 35 36 
  Moroccan 25 21 22 27 29 27 22 31 34 34 
  Surinamese 50 52 54 56 61 61 62 62 61 62 
  Antillean 44 47 50 53 48 49 54 51 57 57 
  other non-Western 35 36 38 40 38 36 39 41 40 43 
Total 48 49 50 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 
* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent 
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Table A6.7:  Net Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent 1994-2003 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total population           
Native Dutch 58 60 61 63 64 66 67 67 68 67
Of foreign descent 46 47 48 50 53 54 55 57 56 56
 Western 54 55 56 58 60 62 63 63 63 63
 non-Western 37 37 40 42 44 46 48 50 50 49
  Turkish 29 30 34 35 37 40 44 48 46 46
  Moroccan 29 29 31 35 38 39 34 42 46 41
  Surinamese 47 49 53 52 59 59 63 62 61 61
  Antillean 43 44 46 45 50 53 55 54 57 54
  other non-Western 35 33 38 39 41 42 45 47 45 44
Total 57 58 59 60 62 64 65 65 66 65
Male  
Native Dutch 73 74 75 76 78 79 79 80 79 78
Of foreign descent 56 57 59 60 63 64 66 66 66 65
 Western 67 67 67 69 72 72 74 73 74 73
 non-Western 45 46 49 49 53 56 58 59 59 57
  Turkish 41 43 46 49 51 53 61 61 59 61
  Moroccan 36 41 44 45 51 53 47 56 59 53
  Surinamese 54 56 62 57 63 63 71 66 67 68
  Antillean 53 56 53 50 60 66 60 61 64 57
  other non-Western 42 41 46 47 49 53 55 56 54 50
Total 70 72 72 74 75 76 77 77 77 75
Female  
Native Dutch 43 45 46 48 50 52 54 55 56 57
Of foreign descent 35 37 39 40 42 43 44 47 46 47
 Western 40 44 45 47 48 51 51 54 52 54
 non-Western 28 28 30 32 34 34 36 40 40 40
  Turkish 16 17 21 21 22 26 26 34 32 29
  Moroccan 20 14 15 23 24 22 19 26 31 28
  Surinamese 40 44 45 48 54 54 55 59 56 56
  Antillean 34 33 39 41 39 42 50 48 50 51
  other non-Western 25 24 28 30 31 28 34 36 35 38
Total 42 44 45 47 49 51 52 54 54 55
* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent  
 
Table A6.8:  Unemployment Rate by Ethnic Descent 1994-2003  
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total population 
Native Dutch 7 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 3 4
Of foreign descent 17 17 15 14 10 9 8 7 8 10
 Western 11 11 10 9 7 5 5 5 5 7
 non-Western 25 26 22 21 16 14 11 9 11 14
  Turkish 30 31 24 22 16 13 9 8 9 14
  Moroccan 29 32 28 22 20 16 13 10 10 17
  Surinamese 19 19 15 14 12 10 9 6 8 10
  Antillean 22 23 21 21 16 14 9 9 10 17
  other non-Western 31 32 25 26 17 16 14 11 14 16
Total 8 8 8 7 5 4 4 3 4 5
Male 
Native Dutch 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 4
Of foreign descent 17 16 14 13 10 8 6 6 7 11
 Western 9 9 8 8 5 4 3 3 4 7
 non-Western 27 26 22 21 16 13 10 9 11 15
  Turkish 30 28 23 21 15 12 8 8 10 12
  Moroccan 33 31 26 24 20 16 12 8 10 17
  Surinamese 19 20 13 13 12 10 7 8 7 9
  Antillean 21 18 20 20 14 13 8 10 8 21
  other non-Western 32 31 25 27 17 14 13 11 14 18
Total 7 6 6 5 4 3 3 3 3 5
Female 
Native Dutch 10 10 10 8 7 5 5 4 4 5
Of foreign descent 18 19 16 15 12 10 10 7 8 10
 Western 15 14 12 11 9 7 8 6 7 7
 non-Western 23 27 23 20 16 15 13 9 10 14
  Turkish 31 39 27 24 18 14 13 7 8 20
  Moroccan 18 37 34 17 19 17 16 15 9 18
  Surinamese 20 17 16 14 12 11 11 5 9 11
  Antillean 23 29 22 23 18 14 9 7 11 11
  other non-Western 27 33 25 25 18 21 14 12 13 13
Total 11 11 11 9 7 6 5 5 5 6
* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent 
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Table B.1.1. NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign population by nationality 
  Thousands 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
United Kingdom  6,496  4,971  3,537  3,650  4,341  4,327  4,741  5,018  5,855  5,886 4,829 4,079 
Germany  7,107  7,446  6,146  4,655  5,695  5,693  4,746  4,491  4,855  5,064 5,091 4,814 
Turkey  9,146  7,757  4,280  4,757  6,399  6,522  5,120  4,215  4,517  4,804 5,434 6,193 
Morocco  7,150  5,877  3,192  3,100  4,272  4,500  5,310  4,427  4,160  4,900 4,919 4,497 
United States  2,910  2,606  2,209  2,202  3,145  3,112  3,274  3,343  3,365  3,118 3,042 2,533 
France  1,795  1,549  1,433 ..  1,719  2,052  2,059  2,022  2,166  2,158 2,037 1,850 
Suriname  6,885  7,840  2,890  1,716  2,755  2,595  3,200  1,802  2,067  2,196 2,171 2,390 
Belgium  2,248  1,987  1,699  1,309  1,949  2,213  1,933  1,995  1,953  1,834 1,800 1,667 
China ..  1,098  1,024 ..  1,305  1,643  1,388  1,273  1,824  2,816 3,428 3,772 
Italy  0,970  1,013  0,870 ..  1,153  1,244  1,381  1,503  1,525  1,524 1,447 1,333 
Poland  1,426  1,310  0,758 ..  1,385  1,397  1,464  0,891  1,316  1,437 1,593 1,530 
Japan ..  1,011  1,103 ..  1,253  1,206  1,220  1,317  1,291  1,302 1,310 1,265 
Spain .. .. .. ..  1,011  1,264  1,157  1,182  1,286  1,362 1,394 1,303 
Iran .. .. .. .. ..  1,576  0,290  0,307  0,392  0,466 0,381 0,427 
Somalia .. .. .. .. ..  1,392  0,285  0,182  0,137  0,780 0,058 0,033 
Former Yugoslavia  4,856  8,912  8,449  7,349  3,383  1,578  1,421  0,735  1,392  1,135 0,845 0,849 
Indonesia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  1,443  1,563 1,585 1,386 
Other countries 32,033 34,196 30,834 38,234 37,412 34,422 42,712 43,662 51,839 52,162 45,255 33,645 
Total  83,022  87,573  68,424  66,972  77,177  76,736  81,701  78,365  91,383  94,507 86,619 73,566 
Of which: EU  22,251  19,725  15,995  14,794  19,225  20,287  19,909  20,439  22,060  22,412 21,044 19,126 
Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.      
1. EU: European Union 15 for all years.           
             
Year 2000/2003 Note Former Yugoslavia : contains immigrants with nationality of Bosnia, Croatia,FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Slovenia 
 
  
 
Table B 1.2. NETHERLANDS, outflows of foreign population by nationality       
  Thousands 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Germany  2,880  2,998  3,185  2,858  3,530  3,060  3,047 2,995 3,219 2,956 3,081 2,811 
United Kingdom  2,424  2,589  2,796  2,932  2,480  2,320  2,617 2,468 2,363 2,101 2,202 2,433 
United States  1,879  1,913  1,832  1,527  1,940  2,201  1,789 1,836 1,747 1,667 1,782 1,687 
Japan ..  0,865  0,920 ..  1,098  1,081  0,997 1,113 1,067 1,054 1,234 1,085 
Belgium  1,325  1,099  1,344  0,853  1,215  1,145  0,970 0,955 0,990 1,000 0,996 1,046 
France  0,834  0,699  0,789 ..  0,773  0,786  0,773 0,787 0,961 0,861 0,974 1,058 
Turkey  1,814  1,744  1,630  1,581  1,472  1,130  0,930 0,686 0,627 0,522 0,445 0,664 
Italy  0,502  0,433  0,498 ..  0,503  0,520  0,550 0,612 0,640 0,644 0,682 0,818 
Morocco  1,027  1,099  1,151  1,100  1,049  0,843  0,602 0,500 0,404 0,436 0,372 0,379 
Poland ..  1,192  0,217 ..  0,311  0,368  0,398 0,341 0,304 0,360 0,307 0,407 
China ..  0,121  0,165 ..  0,179  0,196  0,212 0,212 0,194 0,209 0,355 0,452 
Suriname  0,661  0,625  0,520  0,392  0,327  0,317  0,255 0,172 0,167 0,109 0,126 0,154 
Former Yugoslavia  0,306  0,332  0,322 ..  0,350  0,359  0,387 0,143 0,354 0,306 0,301 0,354 
Indonesia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,240 0,259 0,362 0,401 
Other countries 9,081 6,494 7,377 10,430 7,177 7,614 7,739 7,845 7,450 7,913 7,938 8,121 
Total  22,733  22,203  22,746  21,673  22,404  21,940  21,266 20,665 20,727 20,397 21,157 21,870 
Of which: EU  10,017  10,497  10,444  10,034  10,659  10,023  10,286 10,126 10,810 10,154 10,645 10,830 
Note: Data are from population registers. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.  
1. European Union 15 for all years.           
 
  
 
Table B.1.4. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign-born population by country of birth 
Thousands 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Turkey ..  165,960  165,977  167,498  169,284  172,662  175,476  178,027  181,865  186,204 190,488 194,615 
Suriname ..  182,921  180,894  180,961  181,568  182,234  184,184  184,979  186,469  188,002 189,007 189,732 
Morocco ..  139,402  139,772  140,734  142,683  145,753  149,618  152,693  155,819  159,757 163,422 166,607 
Indonesia ..  183,651  180,426  177,668  174,762  172,134  170,327  168,011  165,781  163,853 161,443 158,804 
Germany ..  129,385  131,223  130,127  128,048  126,797  125,540  124,237  123,110  122,074 120,573 119,002 
Former Yugoslavia ..  29,726  37,172  43,779  46,094  46,717  47,541  50,535  53,865  55,878 56,157 55,497 
United Kingdom ..  44,841  43,251  42,306  41,714  42,312  42,677  43,627  45,670  47,937 48,502 48,267 
Belgium ..  44,038  43,216  43,252  43,329  43,954  44,600  45,343  46,003  46,473 46,847 47,052 
Iraq ..  4,753  7,426  10,206  14,446  20,356  27,297  29,892  33,748  35,981 35,793 35,968 
Afghanistan .. .. .. ..  7,184  10,754  14,619  19,842  24,277  28,470 30,959 32,143 
Former USSR ..  5,651  6,612  8,380  10,138  11,707  13,721  16,131  21,559  27,062 30,791 32,802 
China ..  15,219  15,218  16,106  16,910  18,019  19,386  20,629  22,706  25,786 28,686 31,455 
Iran ..  10,840  12,657  14,879  17,264  18,488  19,267  20,082  21,469  23,246 24,154 24,171 
United States ..  16,955  17,120  17,443  17,923  18,618  19,464  20,349  21,356  22,051 22,543 22,594 
Poland ..  12,422  12,887  13,550  14,348  15,073  15,933  16,319  17,351  18,627 20,095 21,177 
Somalia ..  11,931  14,904  17,171  19,819  20,611  21,047  21,433  21,720  21,084 19,560 17,381 
France ..  15,347  15,354  15,422  15,784  16,494  17,240  17,923  18,657  19,302 19,518 19,570 
Spain ..  17,488  17,478  17,399  17,439  17,622  17,886  18,047  18,273  18,570 18,666 18,624 
Italy ..  15,571  15,383  15,463  15,583  15,936  15,933  16,741  17,207  17,587 17,749 17,666 
South Africa .. .. .. .. .. ..  10,141  10,639  11,286  11,984 12,264 12,292 
Ghana ..  10,206  9,685  9,617  9,783  10,204  10,637  10,880  11,201  11,484 11,798 12,105 
Vietnam ..  9,935  9,578  9,671  9,830  9,984  10,216  10,389  10,646  11,098 11,656 12,006 
India ..  9,477  9,165  9,318  9,483  9,878  10,405  10,735  11,074  11,421 11,616 11,829 
Portugal ..  9,136  8,951  8,975  8,908  8,975  9,222  9,685  10,218  10,969 11,510 11,954 
Cape verde .. .. .. ..  10,632  10,813  10,972  11,012  11,053  11,227 11,340 11,443 
Pakistan ..  9,552  9,620  9,791  9,987  10,154  10,268  10,512  10,827  10,991 11,096 11,054 
Colombia .. .. .. .. .. ..  8,584  8,956  9,588  10,215 10,820 11,312 
Hong Kong (China) .. .. .. .. .. ..  10,457  10,451  10,442  10,450 10,458 10,410 
Sri Lanka ..  7,178  7,432  7,868  8,048  8,401  8,789  9,231  9,720  10,135 10,418 10,402 
Egypt ..  7,779  7,607  7,824  8,003  8,331  8,807  9,156  9,459  9,908 10,381 10,814 
Australia .. .. .. ..  8,645  8,687  8,967  9,209  9,529  9,932 10,141 10,203 
Angola .. .. .. .. .. ..  2,867  3,474  4,646  6,451 9,804 10,124 
Brazil .. .. .. .. .. ..  7,400  7,833  8,301  8,800 9,258 9,783 
Canada .. .. .. .. .. ..  8,045  8,203  8,427  8,718 8,817 8,829 
Thailand .. .. .. .. .. ..  5,637  6,089  6,793  7,522 8,329 9,103 
Ethiopia ..  6,379  6,740  7,034  7,052  7,119  7,198  7,341  7,592  7,874 8,059 8,050 
Philippines ..  4,997  5,115  5,462  5,836  6,182  6,492  6,726  7,117  7,522 7,959 8,366 
Greece ..  6,632  6,565  6,477  6,470  6,720  6,861  7,110  7,375  7,682 7,917 7,995 
Dominican Republic .. .. .. .. .. ..  5,286  5,639  6,107  6,519 6,819 6,949 
Austria .. .. .. .. .. ..  6,798  6,797  6,746  6,755 6,683 6,615 
Sudan .. .. .. .. .. ..  2,712  3,470  4,836  6,065 6,533 6,339 
Syria .. .. .. .. .. ..  3,556  4,094  4,961  5,979 6,490 6,650 
Japan ..  5,309  5,457  5,515  5,520  5,584  5,678  5,734  5,879  6,038 6,035 6,111 
Congo .. .. .. .. .. ..  4,226  4,530  5,020  5,580 5,950 5,942 
  
Table B.1.4. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign-born population by country of birth (continued) 
Thousands 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Switzerland .. .. .. .. .. ..  5,394  5,664  5,792  5,858 5,883 5,918 
Former CSFR .. .. .. .. .. ..  4,568  4,730  5,172  5,661 5,707 5,794 
Korea .. .. .. .. .. ..  4,924  5,098  5,305  5,479 5,675 5,779 
Hungary .. .. .. .. .. ..  5,228  5,193  5,333  5,525 5,628 5,618 
Romania .. .. .. .. .. ..  3,794  4,070  4,554  5,093 5,510 5,992 
Ireland ..  4,803  4,530  4,424  4,359  4,400  4,226  4,288  4,425  4,545 4,558 4,587 
Other countries ..  237,877  239,965  242,766  226,725  237,362  153,806  164,559  179,048  193,157  204,090  208,293 
Total .. 1 375,361 1 387,380 1 407,086 1 433,601 1 469,035 1 513,917 1 556,337 1 615,377 1 674,581 1 714,155 1 731,788 
% of total population   9,0 9,0 9,1 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,8 10,1 10,4 10,6 10,7 
Note: For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.        
             
 
  
Table B.1.5. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign population by nationality     
 Thousands                         Of which: women 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Turkey 212,450 202,618 182,089 154,300 127,000 114,700 102,000 100,700 100,782 100,309 100,286 101,845 50,761 50,790 50,890 51,524 
Morocco 165,138 164,567 158,653 149,800 138,700 135,700 128,600 119,700 111,396 104,262 97,843 94,380 53,089 50,204 47,507 46,254 
Germany 49,333 52,053 53,363 53,900 53,500 53,900 54,100 54,300 54,811 55,572 56,060 56,466 27,650 28,116 28,502 28,949 
United Kingdom 44,117 44,672 43,008 41,100 39,300 39,200 38,800 39,500 41,404 43,604 44,052 43,678 16,532 17,234 17,465 17,384 
Belgium 24,023 24,164 24,135 24,100 24,000 24,400 24,800 25,400 25,860 26,148 26,306 26,223 13,627 13,765 13,975 14,016 
Italy 18,809 17,450 17,461 17,400 17,300 17,400 17,600 17,900 18,248 18,559 18,730 18,503 6,303 6,490 6,597 6,514 
Spain 17,284 16,790 16,831 16,700 16,600 16,600 16,800 16,900 17,155 17,449 17,505 17,418 8,179 8,433 8,539 8,557 
United States 13,002 13,382 12,761 12,800 12,600 13,000 13,389 14,074 14,751 15,217 15,412 15,075 7,236 7,470 7,632 7,501 
France .. .. .. 10,532 10,575 11,152 11,873 12,524 13,326 14,113 14,469 14,529 6,810 7,157 7,284 7,339 
Portugal 9,352 9,622 9,230 9,100 8,800 8,700 8,800 9,200 9,765 10,585 11,257 11,844 4,419 4,738 5,018 5,331 
China .. .. .. 7,912 7,322 7,260 7,480 7,473 7,997 9,395 11,223 13,330 4,331 5,109 6,213 7,484 
Indonesia .. .. .. 8,159 7,945 7,970 8,377 8,717 9,338 10,127 10,786 11,185 6,060 6,559 7,008 7,374 
Suriname .. .. .. 15,174 12,015 11,760 10,497 8,665 8,469 8,491 8,573 9,406 4,573 4,651 4,733 5,178 
Poland .. .. .. 5,910 5,642 5,680 5,906 5,645 5,944 6,312 6,912 7,431 4,475 4,683 5,094 5,422 
Serbia and Montenegro .. .. .. 16,868 14,519 11,523 8,889 7,173 6,822 6,645 6,425 6,277 3,264 3,194 3,135 3,073 
Greece 5,554 5,790 5,627 5,400 5,200 5,300 5,300 5,500 5,692 6,015 6,244 6,314 1,978 2,087 2,206 2,254 
Japan .. .. .. 5,347 5,336 5,369 5,460 5,507 5,626 5,771 5,747 5,813 2,911 3,007 3,021 3,074 
Iraq .. .. .. 9,694 11,355 13,008 12,747 10,025 8,639 6,919 4,771 4,182 3,802 3,137 2,251 2,012 
Russian Federation .. .. .. 1,898 2,318 2,578 2,840 3,070 3,348 3,791 4,052 4,450 2,139 2,474 2,686 3,002 
Former USSR (other) .. .. .. 2,412 2,561 2,767 2,917 2,619 2,632 2,915 3,323 3,794 1,713 1,915 2,200 2,549 
Bosnia-Herzegovina .. .. .. 14,436 15,974 14,616 11,165 6,146 3,745 3,006 2,777 2,683 1,846 1,502 1,429 1,402 
Ukraine .. .. .. 0,701 0,945 1,189 1,378 1,431 1,595 1,837 2,158 2,414 1,103 1,262 1,503 1,715 
Croatia .. .. .. 1,718 1,766 1,685 1,639 1,602 1,582 1,632 1,650 1,679 0,810 0,827 0,852 0,877 
Tunisia 2,560 2,415 2,124 1,900 1,900 1,500 1,400 1,300 1,300 1,276 1,242 1,312 0,504 0,524 0,511 0,550 
Former Yugoslavia (other)   0,491 0,551 0,593 0,655 0,644 0,755 0,839 0,902 0,947 0,391 0,448 0,492 0,528 
Former Yugoslavia 16,788 24,678 29,577 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Stateless .. .. .. 14,662 24,558 38,328 52,157 66,368 87,044 106,999 115,569 110,980 34,896 42,670 46,119 44,651 
Other countries 178,998 201,641 202,279 122,986 111,618 112,222 106,831 99,417 99,776 102,605 105,680 110,027 53,574 55,721 58,359 61,657 
Total 757,408 779,842 757,138 725,400 679,900 678,100 662,400 651,500 667,802 690,393 699,954 702,185 322,976 334,167 341,221 346,171 
Of which: EU 189,035 193,913 193,100 191,100 188,300 190,200 192,200 195,900 201,574 207,858 210,549 211,009 93,834 96,636 98,324 99,158 
Total women 343,744 356,939 348,305 335,396 318,800 320,800 316,200 313,900 322,976 334,167 341,221 346,171       
Note: Data are from population registers and refer to the population on the 31 December of the years indicated. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex. 
1. United Kingdom Including Hong Kong. 2. European Union 15 for all years.    
 
  
 
Table B.1.6. NETHERLANDS, acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality  
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Morocco 7 990 7 750 8 110 13 480 15 600 10 480 11 250 14 220 13 471 12 721 12033 7 126 
Turkey 11 520 18 000 23 870 33 060 30 700 21 190 13 480 5 210 4 708 5 513 5391 3 726 
Iraq .. .. .. ..  854  798 2 721 3 834 2 403 2 315 2367  832 
Suriname 5 120 4 990 5 390 3 990 4 450 3 020 2 990 3 190 2 008 2 025 1957 1 242 
Afghanistan .. .. .. ..  360  217  905 1 847  945  803 1118  982 
China .. .. .. .. 1 394  975  800  977 1 002 1 111 908  722 
Germany  380  330  310  500  780  560  560  580  508  573 608  445 
Poland .. .. .. .. 1 129  827  677  688  587  597 530  318 
Egypt  30  350  540  810 1 080  550  390  500  443  528 437  190 
United Kingdom  670  490  460  820 1 170  690  580  450  374  356 394  294 
Somalia .. .. .. .. 3 002 2 141 4 918 3 487 1 634  873 378  180 
Iran .. .. .. .. 2 299 1 285 1 806 2 560 1 375  754 336  180 
Former USSR (other) .. .. .. ..  289  298  537 1 021  681  544  411  296 
Bosnia-Herzegovina .. .. .. ..  127 2 056 3 873 5 416 2 646  883 400 216 
Russian Federation .. .. .. ..  302  288  289  489  422  335 347 207 
Former Yugoslavia 1 060 2 090 1 880 1 700 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Former Yugoslavia (other) .. .. .. .. 2 156 3 356 2 795 2 577 1 163  764  538  323 
Stateless  210  180  170  610  820  680  120 4 620 7 400 7 800 9647 6 624 
Other countries 9 260 8 890 8 720 16 470 16 188 10 419 10 479 10 424 8 198 8 172 7 521 4 896 
Total 36 240 43 070 49 450 71 440 82 700 59 830 59 170 62 090 49 968 46 667 45 321 28 799 
Note: For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.               
 
  
 
Table B.2.1. NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign workers by nationality (thousands)    
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Poland 0,7 0,9 1,2 1,5 2,5 2,8 6,6 9,5 
Former USSR .. .. .. 2,1 3,6 3,8 3,6 2,9 
United States 1,9 2,3 2,6 2,8 3,1 2,9 2,6 2,6 
China 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,7 1,0 1,2 1,7 2,3 
Former CSFR 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,6 1,1 1,7 1,5 1,6 
Turkey 0,5 0,4 0,7 0,7 1,0 0,9 1,1 1,3 
Sierra Leone .. .. .. 0,0 0,1 0,2 1,0 1,3 
Former Yugoslavia .. .. .. 0,7 1,1 1,1 1,0 0,7 
Japan 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,0 1,2 
Hungary 0,3 0,3 0,5 0,7 0,7 1,1 1,0 1,0 
Afghanistan 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,7 0,6 0,7 1,0 1,0 
Romania 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,9 1,1 
Indonesia 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,8 0,8 0,9 
Iraq 0,0 0,0 1,0 1,5 1,6 1,2 0,8 0,8 
India 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,0 0,8 0,8 
Angola .. .. .. 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,6 0,8 
Sudan 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,5 
Iran .. .. .. 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5 
Canada 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,4 
Suriname 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,0 
Australia 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,3 
South Africa 0,2 0,2 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,4 
Bulgaria 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,4 
Guinea .. .. .. 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,4 
Syria .. .. .. 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,2 
Somalia .. .. .. 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,1 
Cameroon .. .. .. 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,3 
Morocco .. .. .. 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
Other countries 2,5 3,6 4,6 2,9 3,9 4,4 4,4 4,7 
Total 9,2 11,1 15,2 20,8 27,7 30,2 34,6 38,0 
Note: Numbers refer to temporary work permits.         
 
  
 
Table III.22. Current figures on flows and stocks of total population and labour force in the Netherlands (Figures in thousands unless otherwise indicated) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Migration flows1     Refugees and asylum seekers   
Total population    New requests for asylum 45,2 42,7 43,9 32,6 18,7 13,4 
 Inflows 122,4 119,2 132,9 133,4 121,3 104,5 Total requests for asylum heard 38,9 .. .. .. ..  
 Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections) 79,3 78,8 79,0 82,6 96,9 104,8 Total grants of asylum 15,1 13,5 9,7 8,2 8,6 7,8 
 Net migration 62,0 60,1 71,6 70,1 54,5 35,6    
 Adjusted total net migration2 43,1 40,4 53,9 50,8 24,3 -0,3 Expulsions 55,7 69,2 49,1 40,9 50,4 55,6 
Persons born in the Netherlands    Of which: asylum seekers 14,3 18,3 16,6 16,0 21,3 21,9 
 Inflows 26,0 25,0 23,8 23,2 21,4 19,8    
 Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections) 35,8 35,8 37,4 39,4 43,6 45,9 Employment   
 Adjusted total net migration -9,8 -10,8 -13,6 -16,2 -22,2 -26,1 Total foreign employment4 235 .. .. .. ..  
Foreign born    Employment of Dutch nationals    
 Inflows 96,4 94,2 109,0 110,3 99,8 84,7  born abroad and foreigners 579 .. .. .. ..  
 Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections) 43,5 43,0 41,6 43,2 53,3 58,9 Total "allochtonous" employment5   
 Adjusted total net migration 52,9 51,2 67,5 67,1 46,5 25,8  (new definition) 972 1 032 1 083 1 152 1164 1159 
Stock of population3       
Total population 15760.2 15863.9 15987,1 16105,3 16192,6 16258,0 Labour force indicators according to the new definition    
Total foreign population  662,4  651,5  667,8  690,4  699,5  702,2  of "Autochtonous" and "Allochtonous" populations   
 Of which:        
 Morocco  128,6  119,7  111,4  104,3  97,8  94,4  Total   
 Turkey  102,0  100,7  100,8  100,3  100,3  101,8   6 957 7 097 7 187 7 314 7427 7510 
 Germany  54,1  54,3  54,8  55,6  56,1  56,5  Activity rate 66 67 67 68 68 69 
 United Kingdom  38,8  39,5  41,4  43,6  44,1  43,7  Unemployment rate 5 4 4 3 4 5 
 Belgium  24,8  25,4  25,9  26,1  26,3  26,2  Autochtonous6   
Total foreign-born population 1 513,9 1 556,3 1 615,4 1 674,6 1 714,2 1 731,8  Total labour force (thousands)  5 943 6 013 6 079 6167 6216 
 Of which:     Activity rate 67 68 69 69 70 70 
 Surinam 184,2 185,0 186,5 188,0 189,0 189,7  Unemployment rate 4 3 3 3 3 4 
 Turkey 175,5 178,0 181,9 186,2 190,5 194,6  Allochtonous5   
 Indonesia 170,3 168,0 165,8 163,9 161,4 158,8  Total labour force (thousands) 1 086 1 130 1 173 1 232 1260 1293 
 Morocco 149,6 152,7 155,8 159,8 163,4 166,6  Activity rate 59 59  60  61 61 62 
 Germany 125,5 124,2 123,1 122,1 120,6 119,0  Unemployment rate 11 9  8  6 8 10 
      Surinam7   
Naturalisations 59,2 62,1 50,0 46,7 45,3 28,8  Total labour force (thousands) 135 135  148 146 150 154 
 Of which:     Activity rate 66 65  69 67 67 68 
 Morocco 11,3 14,2 13,5 12,7 12,0 7,1  Unemployment rate 12 10  9 6 8 10 
 Turkey 13,5 5,2 4,7 5,5 5,4 3,7  Turkey7   
 Bosnia Herzegovina 3,9 5,4 2,6 0,9 0,4 0,2  Total labour force (thousands) 84 90  101 112 111 115 
 Iraq 2,7 3,8 2,4 2,3 2,4 0,8  Activity rate 44 45 49 52 51 54 
 Suriname 3,0 3,2 2,0 2,0 2,0 1,2  Unemployment rate 17 13 9 8 9 14 
Naturalisation rate (%) 8,7 9,4 7,7   Morocco7   
     Total labour force (thousands) 71 74  67  83 91 89 
     Activity rate 45 45 40 47 50 50 
     Unemployment rate 20 18 13 10 10 17 
     Antilles/Aruba7   
     Total labour force (thousands) 37 43  46  49 54 56 
     Activity rate 57 61  60  59 63 64 
           Unemployment rate .. ..  8  8 10 17 
1. Data are taken from population registers, which include some asylum seekers.  5. "Allochtonous" refers to persons who have at least one parent who is born abroad. 
2. The administrative corrections account for unreported entries and departures on the population register. 6. Autochtonous refers to persons who have both parents who are born in the Netherlands. 
3. Data are from population registers and refer to the population on 31 December of the years indicated. Figures include 
administrative corrections. 
7. Persons who have at least one parent who is born in the mentioned country. 
4. Estimates are for 31 March and include cross-border workers, but exclude the self-employed and family workers. Sources: Statistics Netherlands; Ministry of Justice; Labour Force Survey.  
  
 
